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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Robert Andrew Hedesh, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001430 
Opinion No. 27559 

Submitted July 28, 2015 – Filed August 12, 2015 

DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Ericka M. 
Williams, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Robert Andrew Hedesh, Pro Se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of any sanction set forth in Rule 7(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  
We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from the practice of law in this 
state for ninety days. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
The allegations set forth in the Agreement relate to respondent's actions as a 
closing attorney. As further background information, respondent served as a 
closing attorney for Belle Terre Title Company, which was located in a separate 
suite in the same building as respondent's law office.  Respondent's trust account 
checks were housed in a locked cabinet in Belle Terre's suite.  In October 2008, 
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there was a theft at Belle Terre's office and forty blank checks were stolen from the 
checkbook for respondent's trust account. The theft was not discovered initially 
because there was no forced entry to the office and the stolen checks were removed 
from the back of the checkbook.  Near the end of November 2008, respondent was 
attempting to conduct a manual reconciliation of his trust account when he 
discovered inconsistencies in the check numbers.  An investigation led to the arrest 
of the title agent's brother and two accomplices.  The persons responsible for the 
theft negotiated several of the stolen checks before being apprehended.  
Respondent sought criminal charges against the perpetrators and filed a civil 
lawsuit against them. Respondent also filed lawsuits against the banks that cashed 
the stolen checks. Respondent deposited his own funds to cover some of the losses 
in his trust account.  Respondent cooperated at all times with law enforcement. 
Matter I
In three closings, respondent failed to ensure the closing documents were recorded in  
a timely manner. In a fourth closing, the closing documents were not recorded at 
all. The lender recorded the documents without respondent's assistance, and as a 
result, had to pay $7,000 in deed stamps for the transaction because respondent did 
not have the money. 
The transaction closed in September 2008, but the lender was not able to record the  
documents until March 2009. During this period, respondent delegated the task of 
recording the closing documents to the title agent with Belle Terre.  Respondent 
represents he supervised the process; however, he was not aware the documents 
were not recorded until it was brought to his attention by the lender.  Respondent 
further represents he did not immediately have the funds for the deed stamps due to 
the theft of his trust account checks but he fully intended to cover the losses in this 
matter. However, the lender chose to immediately file the documents to protect its 
interests. Respondent represents he had exhausted most of his personal funds and 
his home equity line, and his only access at the time was to start taking cash from
his credit cards. 
Matter II 
On December 29, 2008, the computer system at the bank where respondent's trust
account was established indicated a check in the amount of $186,656.02 written on 
respondent's trust account could not be paid due to insufficient funds.  The 
14 

  
 
 
 
 
 
following day, respondent deposited a personal check for $10,000 into the account 
so the trust account check could be negotiated.  Respondent informed the bank 
about the theft of trust account checks, and he signed affidavits of forgery for each 
of the checks written by the perpetrators, totaling approximately $88,590. 
Matter III 
ODC received notice of a check written on insufficient funds from respondent's trust 
account in the amount of $150.97.  The check was written on August 11, 2008, but 
not presented for payment until June 23, 2009.  At the time the check was 
presented, respondent's trust account was not in use and had a zero balance.  
Respondent ceased use of the account in 2008 following the theft of checks.  
Respondent represents he made contact with the payee of the check and resolved 
the matter. 
Matter IV 
In January 2011, RBC Bank brought suit against respondent in federal court alleging  
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.  The suit arose from respondent's role as 
closing attorney in seventeen transactions occurring between January 17, 2008 and 
August 19, 2008. In each case, RBC loaned funds that were used to purchase 
residential properties. The transactions were part of an elaborate mortgage fraud 
scheme where participants in the scheme recruited "straw buyers" to apply for a 
loan to purchase property. A fraudulent loan application was prepared, supported 
by fake documentation regarding the straw buyers' income or assets.  Participants 
in the scheme then induced appraisers to produce inflated appraisals.  At closing, 
loan proceeds were paid to participants in the scheme or companies controlled by 
them.  Thereafter, the loans went into default.  A few payments were made on 
some of the loans, but no payments were made on the remaining loans.   
It is not alleged respondent participated in the loan scheme or even knew of the 
scheme; however, at the time of the real estate transactions, all of the books and 
records for respondent's real estate trust account were under the control and 
custody of a title agent for Chicago Title Insurance Company.  Respondent 
permitted the title agent to write checks drawn on respondent's trust account for the 
purpose of disbursing loan proceeds, and allowed the agent to reconcile and audit 
the trust account. Respondent also permitted the title agent to prepare title 
abstracts on each property, prepare HUD-1 statements for each transaction and 
15 

  
 
  
 
 
collect borrower contributions and payoff information.  Respondent failed to 
properly supervise the title agent in these transactions.  The title agent was a key 
participant in the mortgage fraud scheme.
Matter V 
Respondent received $5,000 as an earnest money deposit from a potential 
purchaser of real estate. The Contract of Sale for the property was signed by the 
seller and purchaser on June 7, 2010, but the sale was not consummated.  The 
seller of the property requested that the earnest money be transferred to him 
because the buyer had breached the terms of the sales contract.  Respondent 
informed the seller that respondent would need a release signed by the buyer, or a 
court order, before respondent could release the money to the seller.  The seller 
filed a lawsuit against the buyer for breach of contract and requested the court 
issue an order for the release of the $5,000 deposit to the seller.  The seller was 
unable to locate the buyer to serve the complaint so the lawsuit did not progress.  
Respondent represents the $5,000 deposit is still being held in his trust account. 
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client); Rule 1.15(a)(a 
lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in the lawyer's 
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own 
property, such funds shall be kept in a separate account, and complete records of 
such funds shall be kept by the lawyer); Rule 5.3 (a lawyer who has supervisory 
authority over a nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure the person's 
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer and the 
lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of the person that would be a violation of 
the RPC if engaged in by a lawyer); and Rule 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another).  Respondent also 
admits he has violated Rule 7(a)(1)(it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer 
to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this jurisdiction 
regarding professional conduct of lawyers) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR.  Finally, respondent admits he violated Rule 417, 
SCACR (financial recordkeeping requirements). 
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Respondent states he has ceased doing any buyer related real estate work.  He states 
he has participated in less than five transactions in the last three years and those 
involved preparing deeds related to work with other clients such as homeowners'
associations. 
In addition to consenting to the imposition of any sanction in Rule 7(b), RLDE,  
respondent also agrees to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and 
prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct and to 
complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and Trust Account 
School within nine months of the imposition of any sanction. 
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and suspend respondent from
the practice of law in this state for ninety days.  He shall also pay the costs incurred 
in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission on 
Lawyer Conduct and complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics 
School and Trust Account School within nine months of the date of this opinion, as 
agreed. Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of 
Rule 413, SCACR. 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
The State, Petitioner, 
 
v. 

 
Henry Haygood, Respondent. 

 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001985 

ORDER 
After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to 
discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or 
disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing.  Accordingly, the 
petition for rehearing is denied. However, we hereby withdraw our original 
opinion in this matter and substitute it with Opinion No. 27560. 
 
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty    J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
August 12, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
Henry Haygood, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001985 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Orangeburg County 

The Honorable Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27560 

Submitted February 3, 2015 – Refiled August 12, 2015 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General John Croom Hunter, both of Columbia, 
for Petitioner, 
Assistant Public Defender Breen Richard Stevens, of 
Orangeburg, for Respondent.
19 

  
 
 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM:  The State seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in State v. Haygood, 409 S.C. 420, 762 S.E.2d 69 (Ct. App. 
2014). We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, affirm the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in part, vacate in part, and remand for a new trial. 
The Court of Appeals found the circuit court erred in finding the testimonial 
statements made by the victim to the police did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the statements fell within the excited 
utterance exception to hearsay. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004) ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law 
. . . . Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment 
demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.").   
The Court of Appeals also found the admission of the victim's statements in this 
case violated the Confrontation Clause because the victim's statements were 
testimonial, there was no evidence the victim was unavailable to testify, and there 
was no evidence respondent had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim.  We 
find the Court of Appeals erred in addressing whether the facts of this case 
demonstrated respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated 
because the record before the court lacked the facts necessary to make such a 
determination.  For unexplained reasons, the recording of the proceeding before the 
magistrate's court was unavailable, and the only facts available to the Court of 
Appeals were from the magistrate's summary of the responding officer's testimony 
during the State's case-in-chief.  We find the information contained in the 
magistrate's summary is insufficient to conduct a Confrontation Clause analysis, 
especially where the magistrate did not hold a hearing to determine whether the 
officer's testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause. 
Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion to the extent it addresses 
whether the victim's statements violated the Confrontation Clause.  Moreover, 
because there is no record of the proceedings before the magistrate's court to aid 
the magistrate in fully analyzing this issue were we to remand for a determination 
of whether the statements were testimonial, we find it necessary to remand for a 
new trial in accordance with this opinion.
20 

 AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE, and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Gladys Sims, as the Duly Appointed Guardian and 
Conservator of Kristy L. Orlowski (a/k/a Kristy Wood), 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical 
Center; and, C. Edward Creagh, M.D., Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001179 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from York County 
S. Jackson Kimball, III, Special Circuit Court Judge  
Opinion No. 27561 

Heard June 2, 2015 – Filed August 12, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
Chad A. McGowan, Ashley W. Creech and Jordan C. 
Calloway, all of Rock Hill, and Whitney B. Harrison, of 
Columbia, all of McGowan Hood & Felder, LLC, for 
Petitioner. 
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., 
of Columbia, and H. Spencer King, of The Ward Law 
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Firm, P.A., of Spartanburg, William U. Gunn and Joshua 
T. Thompson, both of Holcombe Bomar, P.A. of 
Spartanburg, all for Respondents. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision in Sims v. Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., 408 S.C. 202, 758 
S.E.2d 187 (Ct. App. 2014), in which the court of appeals affirmed as modified the 
dismissal of this action, which is the second medical malpractice case filed by a 
conservator on behalf of Kristi L. Orlowski relating to medical care she received in 
the fall of 2003. The first medical malpractice action was filed in August 2006 
against a different physician. When the trial of that action resulted in a defense 
verdict, Petitioner Gladys Sims filed the current action on Orlowski's behalf 
seeking the same damages against different defendants—this time against 
Respondents, Dr. Edward Creagh and Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a 
Piedmont Medical Center ("Piedmont").  
Respondents moved for summary judgment, asserting Petitioner's claim was barred 
by the statute of limitations.  Petitioner contended her suit was timely filed because 
the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations in section 15-3-545 of the 
South Carolina Code is subject to the tolling provision for insanity in section 15-3-
40. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents.  As noted, 
the court of appeals affirmed as modified.  We find the court of appeals properly 
construed section 15-3-545 in rejecting Petitioner's reliance on section 15-3-40 in 
arguing for an eight-year statute of limitations.  We affirm.  
I. 
On September 12, 2003, Kristy L. Orlowski, who was twenty-two years old and 
thirty-six weeks pregnant, was found unresponsive in her home by a family 
member.  Less than twenty-four hours earlier, Orlowski had been seen by her 
prenatal care physician, Dr. Norman Taylor, to whom she complained of 
headaches, dizziness, nausea, and swelling of her hands and feet, all of which are 
symptoms of pre-eclampsia, a serious, potentially life-threatening complication of 
pregnancy.1  Despite Orlowski's reported symptoms, Dr. Taylor failed to diagnose 
1 Left untreated, pre-eclampsia can develop into eclampsia, which can result in 
placental abruption, stroke, and seizures.  The only cure for pre-eclampsia is 
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Orlowski's pre-eclampsia and sent her home from her doctor's visit without any 
special instructions or warnings. 
Upon being discovered in an unresponsive state the following morning, Orlowski 
was rushed to Piedmont, where she underwent an emergency cesarean section and 
was later diagnosed as having suffered a seizure caused by eclampsia.2  Orlowski 
remained hospitalized continuously from September 12, 2003, through November 
24, 2003. During that period, she suffered extreme respiratory distress (including a
collapsed lung), was placed on a ventilator, and endured multiple surgeries, 
including the surgical placement of breathing tubes in her neck.  As a result of 
being intubated for a lengthy period of time, Orlowski also developed aspiration 
pneumonia and a MRSA infection in her chest cavity.   
After two-and-a-half months in the hospital, Orlowski was discharged from 
Piedmont on November 24, 2003, but was readmitted the following day by 
Respondent Dr. Edward Creagh.  Dr. Creagh, a board-certified pulmonologist, 
diagnosed and treated Orlowski for a buildup of fluid around her lungs, prescribed 
an oral antibiotic, and discharged her on November 27, 2003.   
Two days later, on November 29, 2003, Orlowski was once again admitted to the 
hospital with persistent vomiting; her pulmonary condition had worsened and the 
fluid around her lungs had become infected.  Thereafter, Orlowski remained 
hospitalized through December 8, 2003, when she experienced cardiopulmonary 
arrest. Orlowski was resuscitated, but she suffered permanent and severe brain 
damage, which prevents her from caring for herself or managing her own affairs.  
She requires around-the-clock care. 
In March 2004, the probate court appointed a conservator for Orlowski.3 
delivery of the baby.

2 As a result of the eclamptic seizure, Orlowski's baby Breanna suffered prolonged 

oxygen deprivation, which caused severe health complications that eventually led 

to her death on March 21, 2006. 

3 See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-424(B)(17) (2009) (providing that a conservator "may 

act without court authorization or confirmation, to . . . prosecute or defend actions, 

claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of estate assets and of 

the conservator in the performance of his duties").    
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Orlowski's conservator is the Petitioner in this appeal.  In August 2006, Orlowski, 
through her conservator, filed her first medical malpractice lawsuit, naming Dr. 
Taylor and his medical practice as defendants. Orlowski alleged her severe and 
permanent neurological deficits were caused by Dr. Taylor's negligent failure to 
diagnose and treat her pre-eclampsia prior to her seizure on September 12, 2003.  
Specifically, Orlowski presented expert testimony that, within a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty, all of her medical problems were caused by the eclamptic 
seizure that occurred on September 12, 2003. Plaintiff's medical expert witness at 
trial testified as follows: 
Q: Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty were all of 
[Orlowski's] problems; medical problems, were they caused by the 
eclamptic episode on September 12th?
A: Yes they were. 	. . . [H]er readmission to Piedmont [Medical
Center], her subsequent cardiac arrest during that admission and 
then her transfer to CMC the Carolina's Medical Center [in 
Charlotte] was all related back to her eclamptic seizure. 
Orlowski's first medical malpractice suit was tried in April 2009 and resulted in a 
defense verdict.4  Thereafter, on November 24, 2009, Orlowski, again through her 
conservator, filed the present medical malpractice action against Respondents Dr. 
Creagh and Piedmont, alleging Respondents committed medical negligence and 
were responsible for her injuries.  Orlowski sought damages against Respondents 
for the same injuries and damages she asserted in her previous medical malpractice 
lawsuit. 
Respondents denied negligence and filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Respondents argued that Orlowski's claims were barred by the statute of limitations 
and that Orlowski should be estopped from seeking to recover damages from
Respondents after contending in her first lawsuit that, to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, all of her injuries were solely attributable to the eclamptic 
seizure episode on September 12, 2003, which resulted from Dr. Taylor's negligent 
failure to diagnose and treat her pre-eclampsia.   
4  As a result of a high-low arrangement, Orlowski received $300,000.   
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During the summary judgment hearing, Orlowski denied that her claims were 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations, contending that section 15-3-40, 
which provides certain exceptions to statutes of limitations, gives an "insane" 
plaintiff a total of eight years from accrual of the claim to commence a lawsuit 
despite the six-year statute of repose in section 15-3-545.  Orlowski further 
contended that her claims in the second lawsuit should not be estopped because she 
alleged Dr. Creagh and Piedmont had committed separate negligent acts from
those of Dr. Taylor and that Respondents' alleged negligence contributed to the 
worsening of her condition. 
The trial court denied Respondents' summary judgment motion on the basis of the 
statute of limitations, but nonetheless granted summary judgment in favor of 
Respondents on the alternative basis that Orlowski was estopped from asserting the 
negligence claims in her second lawsuit against Dr. Creagh and Piedmont because 
"from the record in the prior action, it is clear that [Orlowski] sought to prove Dr. 
Taylor's negligence [] was entirely responsible for all of [Orlowski's] injuries and 
damages."   
The parties filed cross-appeals, and the court of appeals affirmed as modified, 
holding that the trial court erred in finding Orlowski was estopped from bringing 
her second lawsuit but affirming summary judgment on the alternate ground that 
the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations barred Orlowski's second 
lawsuit. In finding the statute of limitations barred Orlowski's second suit, the 
court of appeals relied upon Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 438 S.E.2d 242 
(1993), in which this Court held the six-year statute of repose in section 15-3-545 
was not tolled by the defendant's absence from South Carolina under section 15-3-
30 of the South Carolina Code. This court subsequently issued a writ of certiorari 
to review the court of appeals' decision.5 
II. 
"An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment using the same 
standard employed by the circuit court."  Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia 
Healthcare Sys., LP v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 411 
S.C. 557, 560, 769 S.E.2d 847, 848 (2015) (citing Lanham v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002)).  "Summary 
5  In view of the absence of a challenge to the court of appeals' decision concerning 
the issue of estoppel, we do not reach that issue. 
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judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Id. (citing Rule 56(c), SCRCP; 
Tupper v. Dorchester Cnty., 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997)).  
"'Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we are free to 
decide without any deference to the court below.'" Id. (quoting Grier v. AMISUB 
of S.C., Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 535, 725 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2012)).  
"A cause of action accrues at the moment when the plaintiff has a legal right to sue
on it." Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 111, 124 S.E.2d 781, 785 (1962) (citing 
Livingston v. Sims, 197 S.C. 458, 15 S.E.2d 770 (1941); Bugg v. Summer, 1 
McMul. 333 (1841)). The South Carolina Code provides a three-year statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice causes of action.  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-
545(A) (2005). This three-year limitation period begins to run at the time the 
cause of action accrues or, in other words, "from the date of the treatment, 
omission, or operation giving rise to the cause of action" or, under the discovery 
rule, from the date the injured party either knows or should know, by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action exists for the wrongful conduct.  Id.; 
see also Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005) (citing 
Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 468 S.E.2d 645 (1996)). 
We emphasize that the Court is presented only with a question of statutory 
interpretation. The parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable in a 
medical malpractice action is the three-year period set forth in section 15-3-
545(A). The parties disagree, however, about whether and to what extent certain 
statutory exceptions for persons under disability operate to toll the running of that 
three-year limitation period.6  Specifically, section 15-3-40 provides: 
If a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time the cause of 
action accrued either: 
6 In this regard, we briefly note that Petitioner argues the court of appeals erred in 
considering the statute of limitations as an additional sustaining ground because 
Respondents' position on appeal was inconsistent with their position before the trial 
court. Specifically, Petitioner claims Respondents "conceded" this issue at trial 
and pointed to a specific statement of counsel during the summary judgment 
hearing. We do not read this statement to amount to a concession as Petitioner 
claims.  Rather, the issue of the statute of limitations was contested throughout the 
summary judgment hearing.   
27 

  
(1) within the age of eighteen years; or 
(2) insane; 
 
[then] the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action, except that the period within which the 
action must be brought cannot be extended: 
 
(a) more than five years by any such disability, except infancy; 
nor 
(b) in any case longer than one year after the disability ceases. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (2005).   
Respondents concede Orlowski's mental incompetency satisfies the insanity 
standard. Therefore, the statutory construction question before us concerns only 
the extent to which the Legislature authorized tolling in section 15-3-545, which 
was enacted after section 15-3-40. See Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 
S.C., 311 S.C. 417, 421, 429 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1993) (noting that in reconciling two 
statutory provisions, the "Last Legislative Expression Rule" requires that the "later 
legislation supersedes the earlier") (citations omitted).  We hold the clear language 
of section 15-3-545 forecloses Orlowski's reliance on section 15-3-40 to create an 
effective eight-year statute of limitations due to insanity in a medical malpractice 
action. Subsection (A) of section 15-3-545 provides for a three-year statute of 
limitations (and a six-year statute of repose) for medical malpractice actions "or as 
tolled by this section." (emphasis added).  Subsection (D) of that section provides 
for tolling only in one circumstance, that is, for those "under the age of majority."  
The unambiguous language in section 15-3-545 constrains us to conclude that the 
Legislature did not intend the insanity tolling provision in section 15-3-40 to apply 
in a medical malpractice action. 
We further find the court of appeals properly relied upon this Court's decision in 
Langley in finding that the disability tolling provisions of section 15-3-40 do not 
enlarge the three-year limitation period found in section 15-3-545(A).  See 
Langley, 313 S.C. at 403, 438 S.E.2d at 243 (stating "[i]nclusion of the phrase 'or 
as tolled by this section' in subsection (A) clearly indicates that the only tolling of 
§ 15-3-545(A) intended by the legislature is that contained in subsection (D)" and 
"[s]ubsection (D) of 15-3-545 provides a limited tolling provision, applicable only 
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to minors") (emphasis in original).  We fully understand Petitioner's equitable 
argument that fairness dictates that incapacities other than minority should be read 
into the medical malpractice statute of limitations; however, the "'fairness of such 
decisions remains within the prerogative of the legislature' and not the [C]ourt," 
and the only issue before this Court is to discern the intent of the Legislature.  
Centex Int'l, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 406 S.C. 132, 147, 750 S.E.2d 65, 73 
(2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Nynex Mobile, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 869 
A.2d 611, 626 (Conn. 2005)). Moreover, we note that in the more than twenty 
years since this Court's decision in Langley, the Legislature has taken no action to 
alter section 15-3-545. See Wigfall v. Tideland Utilities, Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 111, 
580 S.E.2d 100, 105 (2003) (noting the "Legislature is presumed to be aware of 
this Court's interpretation of its statutes" and finding the fact that the Legislature 
failed to alter a statute in the four decades following a decision by this Court to be 
"evidence the Legislature agrees with this Court's interpretation") (citing State v. 
192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 525 S.E.2d 872 (2000)).7 
7 Respectfully, the Legislature may wish to reexamine the availability and duration 
of tolling in section 15-3-545(D).  We, nevertheless, note that the apparent 
inequities that could exist where an incompetent person seeks the protections of 
"insanity" tolling are not present here. This is so because of the appointment of 
Orlowski's conservator in March 2004.  The conservator brought Orlowski's first 
medical malpractice lawsuit in August 2006, within the statute of limitations.  
There was no impediment to Orlowski timely pursuing her claim against 
Respondents. There is authority for the proposition that the appointment of a 
conservator who is vested with authority to bring an action on the ward's behalf 
effectively removes the disability.  See Stewart v. Robinson, 115 F.Supp.2d 188 
(D.N.H. 2000) (holding that the medical malpractice statute of limitations is tolled 
on the basis of insanity only until the appointment of a capable guardian who is 
authorized to take possession of the disabled ward's estate and bring all related 
actions necessary). Respondents propose the appointment of a conservator as an 
alternative sustaining ground. Because of our disposition, we need not reach the 
issue of the effect, if any, of the appointment of a conservator on the matter of 
tolling a statute of limitations.     
29 

 III. 
The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, J. and Acting Justices James E. Moore and J. 
Cordell Maddox, Jr., concur. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: The State appeals the court of appeals' decision in 
State v. Larmand, 402 S.C. 184, 739 S.E.2d 898 (Ct. App. 2013), reversing the trial 
court's denial of Frank Larmand's (Respondent) motion for a directed verdict on 
charges for lynching, conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm.  We 
reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
Respondent and his wife (collectively, the Larmands) are residents of 
Kannapolis, North Carolina. Together, they own a branch of Pop-A-Lock, a 
national locksmith franchise company providing customers with roadside
assistance and locksmith services, and operate their branch in and around the 
Charlotte metropolitan area. Ryan Lochbaum worked at the Larmands' branch of 
Pop-A-Lock for several years until his termination in October 2008 for misconduct 
and providing unauthorized services to customers. 
Approximately seven months after Lochbaum's termination, the Larmands 
became suspicious that he and one of their current employees, Mike Taylor, were 
conspiring to defraud Pop-A-Lock.  Specifically, the Larmands believed that 
Taylor would occasionally relay a customer's location to Lochbaum, who would 
then place a removable magnetic sign on his vehicle and masquerade as the Pop-A-
Lock locksmith.  According to the Larmands, after the customer paid Lochbaum
for "Pop-A-Lock's" services, Taylor and Lochbaum would split the money between 
themselves, and Taylor would inform the Larmands that the customer had left the 
designated location before he arrived. 
To confirm their suspicions, the Larmands set up a "mystery shopper call" 
for Taylor. During the call, Respondent's brother-in-law, Leo Lemire, posed as a 
customer needing locksmith services at the Charlotte Knights' former stadium 
(Knights' Stadium) located in Fort Mill, South Carolina.  Respondent and Lemire 
waited at the stadium in the hope of catching Taylor and Lochbaum. 
Ultimately, neither Taylor nor Lochbaum responded to the telephone call.  
Therefore, around midnight, Respondent and Lemire drove to Lochbaum's house in 
1 Because this appeal involves Respondent's motion for a directed verdict, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  State v. Walker, 349 S.C. 49, 
53, 562 S.E.2d 313, 315 (2002). 
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Rock Hill, South Carolina, to investigate further, and potentially confront 
Lochbaum.2  The two men parked at least one-quarter mile away from Lochbaum's
house, despite the ample street parking available closer to the house.  Further, they 
parked their vehicle facing the neighborhood's sole entrance and exit. 
Meanwhile, Lochbaum and three of his neighbors—Mark Whittington, 
Devin Fivecoat, and Ron Lee—were socializing outside Lochbaum's house.  
Respondent, dressed in all-black clothing, approached the group and stood and 
stared silently, looking "edgy" and "agitated."  Eventually, Respondent stated he 
wanted to speak to Lochbaum, and Lochbaum asked his neighbors to give them 
some privacy. 
Respondent and Lochbaum began arguing loudly and pushing one another.  
Approximately one minute into the exchange, Respondent broke eye contact with 
Lochbaum and looked toward the vacant, darkened field abutting Lochbaum's
house. Lochbaum then saw Lemire (also wearing all-black clothing) approaching 
quickly and pointing a handgun at Lochbaum.  Lemire said, "This is what you get 
when you fuck with my family," and pulled the hammer of the gun back. 
Lochbaum seized the gun and began to struggle with Lemire.  Respondent 
placed Lochbaum in a chokehold and attempted to pull him away from Lemire.  
Whittington, Fivecoat, and Lee, who had been watching the exchange from several 
houses away, ran down the street and jumped into the fray in an effort to separate 
Lemire, Respondent, and Lochbaum.  Lochbaum's next-door neighbor, Jesse 
Harris, also heard the commotion and ran out to stop the fight.3  Throughout the 
scuffle, Lemire screamed at everyone, "F-you, he's f'ing with my family, he's f'ing 
with my family." 
2 At trial, a police officer and Lochbaum testified that it takes approximately one-
and-a-half hours to drive from Respondent's home in Kannapolis to Lochbaum's
home in Rock Hill. 
3 During the struggle, Harris placed his finger between the gun's hammer and the 
gun to prevent it from being fired. At some point, the hammer of the gun "clicked" 
on Harris's finger, indicating that the gun would have discharged during the fight 
had Harris's finger not stopped the hammer. 
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Lochbaum, Whittington, Fivecoat, Lee, and Harris were able to wrestle the 
gun away from Lemire and pull Respondent away from Lochbaum.  Respondent 
and Lemire quickly left the scene, driving at approximately sixty miles per hour in 
a thirty-five mile per hour zone without illuminating the vehicle's headlights. 
Ultimately, a grand jury indicted Respondent and Lemire for lynching, 
conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm.  At trial, Respondent moved for 
a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case.  He argued that the State had 
failed to provide any testimony that the attack on Lochbaum was premeditated, or 
that Respondent and Lemire jointly planned the attack.  Rather, Respondent 
asserted he was merely speaking with Lochbaum when Lemire appeared, and he 
only reacted to Lochbaum's "affirmative action" of "jump[ing] on [] Lemire" to 
grab the gun. The trial court denied Respondent's motion, and the jury later 
convicted Respondent and Lemire of second-degree lynching, criminal conspiracy, 
and pointing and presenting a firearm.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to deny Respondent's
motion for a directed verdict.  Larmand, 402 S.C. at 187, 739 S.E.2d at 900.  
Specifically, with respect to the lynching and conspiracy charges, the court of 
appeals found a complete lack of evidence of premeditation or a common plan to 
assault Lochbaum.  Id. at 190–94, 739 S.E.2d at 901–03.  With respect to the 
firearm charge, the court of appeals found that the State did not present any 
evidence of a conspiracy between Respondent and Lemire, and it was undisputed 
that Respondent never had possession of the gun.  Id. at 194, 739 S.E.2d at 903–04.
Therefore, the court of appeals reversed all three of Respondent's convictions.  Id.
at 194, 739 S.E.2d at 904.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision. 
ISSUE
Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in 
considering the trial court's denial of Respondent's directed verdict 
motion? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  
State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  A court is "bound 
by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."  Id.
ANALYSIS
A defendant is only entitled to a directed verdict if the State fails to produce 
any evidence of the offense charged. State v. Walker, 349 S.C. 49, 53, 562 S.E.2d 
313, 315 (2002). In reviewing a defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial 
judge is only concerned with the existence of evidence, not with its weight.  State 
v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) (citation omitted). 
On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, appellate courts must view 
the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State.  Id.
If there is either any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence 
reasonably tending to prove the defendant's guilt, appellate courts must find that 
the trial judge properly submitted the case to the jury.  State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 
588, 593–94, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004); see also Walker, 349 S.C. at 53, 562 
S.E.2d at 315 ("When a motion for a directed verdict is made in a criminal case 
where the State relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge is 
required to submit the case to the jury if there is any substantial evidence which 
reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be 
fairly and logically deduced." (citation omitted)). 
In pursuing a lynching conviction, the State must produce at least some 
evidence that two or more persons had a common, premeditated intent to commit a 
joint act of violence on the person of another. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-220 
(2003) (defining second-degree lynching as "[a]ny act of violence inflicted by a 
mob upon the body of another person and from which death does not result") 
(recodified as amended at S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-210(C) (Supp. 2014)); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 16-3-230 (2003) (defining a mob as "the assemblage of two or more 
persons, without color or authority of law, for the premeditated purpose and with 
the premeditated intent of committing an act of violence upon the person of 
another") (recodified at S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-210(A) (Supp. 2014)); State v. 
Smith, 352 S.C. 133, 137, 572 S.E.2d 473, 475 (Ct. App. 2002).  The premeditated 
35 

  
 
   
 
  
                                        
 
intent to do violence may be formed either before or during the assemblage, but by 
definition cannot be spontaneous. Smith, 352 S.C. at 137, 572 S.E.2d at 475.
Moreover, "[t]o establish the existence of a conspiracy, proof of an express 
agreement is not necessary, and direct evidence is not essential, but the conspiracy 
may be sufficiently shown by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the 
parties." State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 63, 502 S.E.2d 63, 70 (1998).4  Because the 
crime of conspiracy is the agreement itself, the State need not show any overt acts 
in furtherance of the common scheme or plan.  State v. Wilson, 315 S.C. 289, 292, 
294, 433 S.E.2d 864, 867, 868 (1993).  Nonetheless, substantive crimes committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy may constitute circumstantial evidence from
which a jury could infer the existence of the conspiracy, its object, and scope.  Id.
At issue here is whether the State presented any evidence demonstrating a 
premeditated intent on the part of Respondent to assault Lochbaum (for the 
lynching charge), or that Respondent and Lemire entered into an agreement to 
perpetrate the assault (for the conspiracy charge).5  The State contends that the 
court of appeals applied an improper standard of review in conducting its inquiry.  
Specifically, the State argues that the court of appeals expressly credited the 
defense evidence and made credibility determinations, thereby erroneously 
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court and the jury.  We agree. 
While the court of appeals should have considered the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, it instead primarily cited to Respondent's and Lemire's
testimony, including their explanations for their actions.  See, e.g., Larmand, 402 
S.C. at 191–92, 739 S.E.2d at 902; id. at 194, 739 S.E.2d at 903. In doing so, the 
4 See also S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-410 (2003 & Supp. 2014) (defining a criminal 
conspiracy as "a combination between two or more persons for the purpose of 
accomplishing an unlawful object or lawful object by unlawful means"); State v. 
Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 134, 437 S.E.2d 75, 80 (1993) (stating that the "gravamen of 
the offense of conspiracy is the agreement or combination," not merely a common 
objective between similarly situated people (citations omitted)). 
5 We need not address the firearm charge separately, as its validity rises and falls 
on the existence of a conspiracy under the "hand of one is the hand of all" theory. 
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court of appeals incorrectly minimized the circumstantial evidence the State 
presented regarding premeditation and an agreement between Respondent and 
Lemire. 
Specifically, the State demonstrated:  (1) Respondent and Lemire lived 
approximately one-and-a-half hours away from Lochbaum's house; (2) Respondent 
and Lemire arrived at Lochbaum's neighborhood late at night, unannounced; (3) 
Respondent and Lemire wore all-black clothing; (4) Respondent and Lemire 
parked their vehicle over one-quarter mile away from Lochbaum's house, facing 
the sole entrance and exit to the neighborhood, despite ample street parking near 
Lochbaum's house; (5) Respondent and Lemire approached Lochbaum's house on 
foot, rather than conducting a "drive by" to look for incriminating evidence of 
Lochbaum's involvement in the scheme to defraud Pop-A-Lock, such as the 
magnetic sign on Lochbaum's vehicle; (6) Respondent was "edgy" and "agitated" 
when he approached Lochbaum's house, and stood and stared silently at Lochbaum 
and his neighbors; (7) Respondent broke off arguing with and pushing Lochbaum 
to observe Lemire's approach from the adjoining vacant, darkened lot; (8) Lemire
approached Respondent and Lochbaum a mere one minute after Whittington, 
Fivecoat, and Lee departed, despite parking at least one-quarter mile away; (9) 
Lemire approached from a vacant, darkened lot rather than from the lit street or 
sidewalk; (10) upon his approach, Lemire immediately pointed the gun at 
Lochbaum and drew the hammer of the gun back; (11) Lemire told Lochbaum, 
"This is what you get when you fuck with my family," and later during the 
altercation refused to let go of his gun because Lochbaum was "f'ing with [his]
family;" (12) Respondent never confronted Lemire or tried to get him to lower the 
weapon or return to their vehicle; and (13) Respondent and Lemire drove away 
together at a high rate of speed without illuminating their vehicle's headlights.
Although Respondent presented plausible explanations for each of these 
facts, our duty is not to weigh the plausibility of the parties' competing 
explanations. Rather, we must assess whether, in the light most favorable to the 
State, there was any evidence from which the jury could infer Respondent's guilt.  
Given the deferential standard of review, we find the State presented sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of premeditation and a common plan or scheme such that 
the trial judge properly denied Respondent's motion for a directed verdict.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing Respondent's convictions.
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 
REVERSED. 
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J., 
concurring in result only. 
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased 4,461 
acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, 
intending to develop the property.  Columbia Venture knew at the time of the 
purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the 
process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as 
lying within a regulatory floodway.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4101(e)–(f) (requiring FEMA 
to assess the need to revise flood maps every five years).  Pursuant to federal law, 
development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway.  When Columbia 
Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia 
Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking.  By consent, 
the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-
week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County.  We 
affirm.  
I. 
To reduce the losses caused by flood damage, to create a unified national program
for floodplain management, and to increase the availability of affordable flood 
insurance, Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, through 
which it established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4001–4131. Under the NFIP, state and local governments must "make 
appropriate land use adjustments to constrict the development of land which is 
exposed to flood damage and minimize damage caused by flood losses," and 
"guide the development of proposed future construction, where practicable, away 
from locations which are threatened by flood hazards."  Id. § 4001(e). Although 
local communities are not required to participate in the NFIP, no purchaser or 
owner of property located within a non-participating community is eligible for 
federal lending, flood insurance, or federal disaster relief.  See id. §§ 4022(a), 
4106. Richland County has participated in the NFIP since 1981. 
FEMA is the federal agency responsible for implementing the NFIP and for 
making scientific and technical determinations to identify flood hazards for a given 
area. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(e)–(f).  The basis for most of FEMA's mapping and 
regulation is the "base flood" or "100-year flood," which has a one percent chance 
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of occurring in any particular year.1  44 C.F.R. § 59.1. Based on its scientific 
studies regarding the elevation of a base flood, FEMA issues a Flood Insurance 
Rate Map ("FIRM" or "flood map"), which identifies and delineates flood hazards 
within a community.2 Id.  Communities are required to adopt the FIRMs and to 
restrict development in those flood hazard areas.3  42 U.S.C. § 4102(c); 44 C.F.R. 
§ 60.3. A local community's floodplain land-use controls must meet FEMA's
minimum requirements, but FEMA encourages communities to impose more 
restrictive regulations. 44 C.F.R. § 60.1(d).  In one important aspect, Richland 
County's regulations are more restrictive than the FEMA minimum in that 
Richland County, by ordinance, prohibits construction in a floodway.   
1 As a practical matter:
It is important to note that the 100-year storm is not based on any 
actual storm. Instead, a theoretical storm is constructed by using 
mathematical models.  A hydraulic computer model is applied to 
generate the width and location of the floodway at each cross-section 
at which the stream is measured.  The water surface elevation for the 
design flood is plotted onto a corresponding topographical map 
showing relative ground elevations. Areas in which the plotting 
reveals the flood elevation of the theoretical design flood to be higher 
than the ground elevation are then included within the flood hazard 
area. 
Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 555 A.2d 684, 688 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (internal citation omitted). 
2 Floodplain areas are continuously shaped by the forces of water, and surrounding 
development also alters the floodplain and the dynamics of flooding.  Accordingly, 
FEMA must assess the need to revise its flood maps every five years and undertake 
revisions as it sees fit. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(e)–(f).  FEMA may also initiate a re­
study at any time upon the request of a state or local government if the requesting 
community supplies sufficient technical data justifying the request.  Id. 
3 In addition to local land use restrictions, federal law requires flood insurance in 
special hazard areas.  44 C.F.R. § 59.1. 
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Flood hazard areas are divided into two parts, called the "regulatory floodway" and 
the "flood fringe," which are referred to collectively as the "floodplain."  In 
conducting its flood studies, FEMA identifies the area adjacent to a river or stream 
that is subject to dangerously high flood levels and rushing water during a flood 
and within which the presence of development would increase the danger posed by 
flood conditions. This area, which poses the greatest flood risk, is known as the 
regulatory floodway. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. The remainder of the floodplain area is the 
flood fringe, which is expected to be under water during a 100-year flood but 
within which floodwaters are expected to be comparatively more shallow and 
slow-moving.  Richland County is comprised of 487,600 acres of land, of which 
16,516 acres are designated as regulatory floodways. 
Within a regulatory floodway, FEMA requires that a community must, at a 
minimum:
[P]rohibit encroachments, including fill, new construction, substantial 
improvements, and other development within the adopted regulatory 
floodway unless it has been demonstrated through hydrologic and 
hydraulic analyses performed in accordance with standard engineering 
practice that the proposed encroachment would not result in any 
increase in flood levels within the community during the occurrence 
of the base flood discharge. 
44 C.F.R. § 60.3(d)(3) (emphasis added).  This is commonly referred to as the "no-
rise" standard. 
As noted, Richland County's restrictions on encroachments within a regulatory 
floodway are more restrictive than the FEMA minimum.4  Under the floodway 
4 Michael Criss, a former Richland County Planning Director, testified Richland 
County's more restrictive land-use standards enable County residents to receive 
discounted flood insurance rates and that these more-restrictive standards are 
forward-looking and thus further public safety because: 
The federal flood maps do not account for the continued urbanization 
and development of the corresponding watersheds and the resulting 
increase in stormwater runoff and potential flooding.  . . . The federal 
flood maps are retrospective.  They rely on historical flood records 
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provision of the County's stormwater management ordinance in place when 
Columbia Venture purchased the property, "no levees, dikes, fill materials, 
structures or obstructions that will impede the free flow of water during times of 
flood will be permitted in the regulatory floodway."  Richland County, S.C., Code 
§ 8-62(h) (1994). This prohibition against impeding the free flow of floodwater, or 
the "no-impede" standard, essentially prohibits construction in a floodway.5  By 
contrast, areas outside the regulatory floodway but still within the fringes of the 
floodplain may be developed, so long as new structures are sufficiently elevated 
and flood-proofed. Id. § 26-73.5(2) (1999).  Thus, FEMA's determination of 
whether an area of land is within a regulatory floodway (versus within the larger 
floodplain) essentially determines whether development will be permitted.6 
Once FEMA completes its scientific studies and prepares a revised flood map, the 
new maps are issued as preliminary documents for review by the affected 
community and the public.  42 U.S.C. § 4104(a).  The revised flood maps do not 
become final until federal statutory notice and administrative appeal periods have 
passed.7  However, under certain circumstances (that apply in this case), 
communities are directed to use the preliminary revised flood maps for the 
purposes of floodplain regulation.  Specifically, federal guidance provides that if a 
and don't project the potential of increased flooding in the future from
urbanization or from the possibility of more intense storms due to 
climate change. 
5 The following uses are permitted within a regulatory floodway: agricultural and 
horticultural uses, parking areas, accessory and recreational uses (such as lawns, 
gardens, play areas, swimming areas, fishing areas, beaches, boat ramps, parks, 
playgrounds, etc.), airport runways and landing strips, and various infrastructure 
uses (such as streets, bridges, overhead utility lines, storm drainage facilities, sewer 
lines, and waste treatment plants).  Richland County, S.C., Code § 26-73.4(3).   
6 The County's stormwater management ordinance did not contain a variance 
provision.   
7 A community itself or any private citizen adversely affected by the proposed 
flood-map revisions may initiate an administrative appeal challenging the scientific 
or technical basis for FEMA's determinations.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4104–4104-1. 
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preliminary revised flood map widens a floodway or shows higher base flood 
elevations than the current final flood map, then the preliminary revised map 
should be used for regulatory and permitting purposes.   
Aside from successfully appealing the scientific or technical basis for FEMA's
floodplain designations, a floodplain designation may be removed if a landowner 
constructs a certified levee, thereby allowing the area protected by a certified levee 
to no longer be considered part of the floodway or floodplain. 44 C.F.R. § 65.10. 
For a levee to be certified, it must meet FEMA's design, stability, and orientation 
standards, and a local NFIP community must agree to assume responsibility for 
maintaining the levee. 44 C.F.R. § 65.10(c)–(d).  Although FEMA regulations 
require that levees be designed to withstand a 100-year flood, Richland County's 
ordinances are stricter and require that levees must provide protection from a 500­
year flood8 plus three feet of freeboard. Richland County, S.C., Code § 8-62(g) 
(1994). 
Prior to undertaking any levee upgrades necessary to acquire FEMA certification, 
property owners may submit proposed design and construction plans, along with 
supporting scientific data, for FEMA's review and advance comment as to whether 
such plans are sufficient to obtain levee certification.  44 C.F.R. § 65.5. The 
scientific data required for FEMA to consider a proposed project involves 
extensive hydraulic and hydrologic engineering analysis.  Id. § 65.6. After a levee 
construction project is approved and completed, FEMA then revises its flood map 
to reflect the protection provided by the certified levee and removes the floodplain 
designation through a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR).  Id. § 65.10 
We turn now to the facts of this case.  
II. 
This case involves 4,461 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree 
River in Richland County. The property is located just a few miles from the City 
of Columbia, near Interstate 77, Heathwood Hall Episcopal School, and the City of  
8 A 500-year flood is one that has a 0.2% chance of occurring in any given year.  
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Columbia's sewer treatment plant.  For decades, the property was owned by the late 
Burwell Manning and was used for farming and recreational purposes.9 
In order to protect the property from flooding, in the early 1960s, Manning 
constructed a system of levees extending for over twenty miles along the banks of 
the Congaree River and Gills Creek, which runs through the property.  These 
agricultural levees were approximately twenty feet tall by forty-five feet wide and 
were constructed under the supervision of Manning and a registered surveyor using 
an Army Corps of Engineers' levee construction manual and guidance from the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  At the time the levees were constructed, no 
permitting process or levee design and construction regulations existed.  Although 
the immediate purpose of the levees was to protect his crops, Manning ultimately 
envisioned large-scale development on the property, and he knew that sufficient 
levees would be required to protect any future development.  
Following completion of the levees, Manning sold approximately 120 acres to the 
City of Columbia for construction of its sewer treatment plant.10  Thereafter, 
Manning subdivided and donated a parcel of land for the construction of 
Heathwood Hall Episcopal School. In addition to protecting Heathwood Hall, the 
City's sewer plant, and the remainder of Manning's property, the levees also protect 
the nearby land of several other property owners and another wastewater treatment 
plant. 
Over the years, Manning used the property to secure various loans and agricultural 
credit lines, and by June 1997, Manning had defaulted on those loans.  To maintain 
9 The only structures on the property are barns, a grain facility, an unoccupied 
house, and an office building. 
10 The City's parcel included a portion of the levees along the Congaree River, and 
the deed included a covenant by the City to maintain the levees.  In 1976, the City's
portion of the levee failed due to a lack of proper maintenance and allowed water 
to flow onto an adjacent 1806-acre parcel still owned by Manning; Manning sued 
the City and recovered damages resulting from the City's failure to adequately 
maintain the levees. See Manning v. City of Columbia, 297 S.C. 451, 452, 377 
S.E.2d 335, 336 (1989) (affirming a jury award of $4,120,000 in favor of 
Manning). 
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possession of his property (and to keep it from being subdivided, which would 
have thwarted his development vision), Manning entered into a complicated series
of real estate transactions, through which his outstanding agricultural debts were 
paid and he retained an option to repurchase the property no later than February 
1999. After securing the repurchase option in June 1997, Manning and his son 
Deas Manning, began looking for investors to help finance the planned repurchase 
before the option expired. 
At that time, only the thin strip of land between the river channel and the riverside 
toe of the levees was designated as part of the regulatory floodway and subject to 
the County's extensive development restrictions.  Thus, in June 1997, the levees 
themselves could be improved and had the potential to become FEMA-certified, 
thereby allowing the land behind the levees to be developed.  
By the spring of 1998, Tee-To-Green, LLC, expressed interest in developing the 
property into a golf course and entered into a joint venture option agreement with 
Manning. During the contractual due-diligence period, Tee-To-Green ordered site 
plans, conducted environmental assessments and wetlands investigations, and 
commissioned an appraisal, which valued the property at $30 million; however, at 
some point during the due-diligence period, Tee-To-Green discovered FEMA was 
in the process of revising the flood map of Richland County and that the 
preliminary revised map was expected to reconfigure the regulatory floodway to 
include approximately 70% of the property.  Ultimately, Tee-To-Green withdrew 
its option to purchase the property, as it was unable to obtain satisfactory 
assurances from the County that the levees could be upgraded in light of the 
imminent floodway designation. Tee-To-Green understood that the floodway 
designation thwarted its intended development and reduced the value of the 
property.   
On June 5, 1998, FEMA released its preliminary revised flood map, and as 
anticipated, the revisions enlarged the Congaree River's regulatory floodway to 
encompass most of the property owned by Manning, the City of Columbia, and 
Heathwood Hall. Although this revised map was not yet finalized, it was the 
effective map for permitting purposes, as it widened the regulatory floodway and 
showed higher base flood elevations than the prior map.   
Since the levees were included within the regulatory floodway under the 
preliminary revised flood map, as of June 5, 1998, whether it was possible to 
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obtain a land-disturbance permit to upgrade the levees depended on County's 
interpretation of the "no-impede" standard within its ordinance.  Although that 
ordinance has always expressly prohibited any encroachment that would "impede 
the free flow of water," there is some evidence that certain County employees, at 
some point, interpreted that language as being consistent with the less restrictive 
FEMA "no-rise" standard which permits development within a floodway, so long  
as it is shown not to cause an increase in flood levels.  This uncertainty in the 
meaning of the County's 1994 stormwater ordinance no-impede standard is central 
to Columbia Venture's theory of the case.11 
With one potential sale already falling through over the unresolved flood-map 
issues and the expiration of the repurchase option quickly approaching, Manning 
was running out of time to find another investor.  In mid-1998, another 
development company, Burroughs & Chapin, expressed interest in purchasing the 
property to construct a large-scale, mixed-use development.  Burroughs & Chapin 
is based out of Horry County; it had never taken on a project of this large a scale 
outside Horry and Georgetown counties or any project involving levee systems or 
FEMA regulations. Burroughs & Chapin recognized that there was a "small 
window of opportunity to get this large amount of acreage, strategically located, in 
one parcel for development purposes [at] the right price."  As early as May 1998, 
internal documents of Burroughs & Chapin reflect it was well-aware that the bulk 
of the property was designated as a regulatory floodway and that construction is 
not permitted in a floodway.  Nevertheless, Burroughs & Chapin continued to 
pursue the possibility of purchasing the property, and on November 13, 1998, 
Burroughs & Chapin entered into a Purchase Agreement with Manning.  
Before the sale was finalized, Burroughs & Chapin retained the Lockwood Greene 
engineering firm to assist it in exploring the FEMA floodway issues.  Prior to 
closing, Lockwood Greene issued a cursory report purporting to summarize "the 
FEMA and floodway issues" and estimating a cost and completion date range for 
the potential levee construction.  The report acknowledged the 1998 preliminary 
flood map designating most of the property as a floodway but stated "the 
acceptance of these maps as final is currently on hold by FEMA," and that the 
11 Columbia Venture did not seek an opinion from counsel concerning the proper 
interpretation or the impact of the stormwater ordinance on its proposed 
development prior to purchasing the property. 
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property's floodplain classification could be removed altogether through upgrading 
and obtaining FEMA certification of the levees.12  The report also stated that the 
"floodway elevation is currently being re-done by FEMA," and that "[t]he results 
of this are not known as of yet." This preliminary engineering report did not 
include any of the required scientific flood modeling or analysis and did not 
address the relevant levee design and construction requirements. Further, this 
cursory evaluation did not take into account Richland County's more stringent 
development restrictions or the cost implications of those enhanced requirements.  
At trial, Columbia Venture's engineer admitted that at the time of this preliminary 
report, "we didn't quite understand the full [FEMA] certification process."13 
Seeking assurance that its development plans would come to fruition, Lockwood 
Greene, on behalf of Burroughs & Chapin, provided a summary of the intentions to 
upgrade the levees and sought assurance from FEMA that it would agree to certify 
the levees following construction and from Richland County that it would assume 
responsibility for levee maintenance following FEMA certification.   
FEMA responded with a letter stating the following: 
If the aforementioned levee is upgraded to meet in total the applicable 
provisions of 44 C.F.R., Part 65.10, and the construction necessary for 
it to meet said requirement[s] is in compliance with State and local 
floodplain management requirements, then FEMA would revise the 
applicable FIRM to remove the Special Flood Hazard Area 
designation and floodway.  As you are aware, should the structural 
modifications necessary to bring the levee into compliance with 44 
C.F.R., Part 65.10 result in any increase in base flood elevations as a 
result of construction within the existing regulatory floodway of the 
12 This statement that the finalization of the 1998 map had been "put on hold" 
erroneously implied that that preliminary map was not the operative map for 
permitting purposes.     
13 The engineer also acknowledged that "we all didn't completely understand what 
the scope of the work was at that time," in order to challenge the scientific and 
technical basis of FEMA's floodway designations.  At the time of purchase, 
Columbia Venture was not prepared to submit the extensive engineering analysis 
required to obtain a LOMR from FEMA. 
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Congaree River, the requirements of 44 C.F.R., Part 65.12 would also 
have to be met. In addition, any change in the configuration of the 
floodway as a result of the levee modifications will have to be done 
with the approval of the impacted communities.
Meanwhile, Lockwood Greene had also requested that Richland County agree to 
assume responsibility for the levees if FEMA agreed to certify them following 
construction.  However, because this request was presented to County Council 
approximately two weeks before the scheduled closing date, the County was 
concerned that it did not have sufficient time to explore fully the financial and 
safety aspects of the proposed levee construction.  As a result, County Council 
adopted the following contingent resolution regarding the levees: 
[T]o accept responsibility for local inspection and enforcement of the 
levee system, and if required by FEMA, to accept operation and 
maintenance responsibility for the system contingent upon the 
following: 
1) 	 The property owners upgrade the levees to meet FEMA 
standards; 
2) 	 [T]he property owners prepare all required documentation 
including operation and maintenance plans;
3) 	 [C]ertification that the levee system, as upgraded meets FEMA
standards; 
4) 	 The parties, including Richland County, the City of Columbia 
and the developers, resolve the issues of the performance and 
funding of the operation and maintenance responsibility; 
5) 	 The county's acceptance of responsibility terminates if the 
developers of the area do not invest at least $30,000,000 within
ten years of the date of the adoption of this motion. 
(emphasis added).    
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Additionally, Burroughs & Chapin solicited a "Non-Binding Memorandum of 
Understanding" from the County Administrator, which stated, "[t]he County is 
aware of and agrees to work with the development group on issues that are critical 
to the proposed development such as zoning, tax incentive vehicles and a multi-
county business park." The bottom of the memo reiterated, "This agreement is 
intended to be non-binding on the parties."  This memorandum of understanding 
did not provide the outright assurances relating to government assumption of 
ongoing levee maintenance as required by 44 C.F.R. § 65.10. 
Nevertheless, the board of directors of Burroughs & Chapin thereafter resolved to 
move forward with the purchase of the property based on its belief that "an 
agreement can be negotiated with Richland County to assume the maintenance of 
the dike system."  (emphasis added).  Indeed, the board of directors was well aware 
that the County's Resolution expressly involved multiple contingencies, and at 
trial, Columbia Venture conceded that the Resolution did not bind Richland 
County to accept maintenance of the levees.   
Notably, in the days and weeks leading up to the sale, Burroughs & Chapin was 
having difficulty retaining investors in the joint venture to help fund the agreed-
upon purchase price of $18 million.  As the closing date neared, Burroughs & 
Chapin had acquired firm cash commitments of only $11 million.  To cover the 
shortfall, Burroughs & Chapin negotiated with Manning to accept the $11 million 
and take the balance of the purchase price as shares in the joint venture.  On 
February 17, 1999, Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, was formed with its initial 
members including Burroughs & Chapin (contributing $9 million and serving as 
the managing member), Lockwood Greene (contributing $2 million in in-kind 
engineering services), and Manning's Green Diamond, LLC (receiving $6,650,000 
in membership shares in Columbia Venture, which were to be redeemed within 
fourteen months). 
Despite the unresolved status of the various FEMA flood map issues, on February 
19, 1999, Columbia Venture proceeded with the transaction and purchased the 
property for a price of $18 million.  Based on a then-recent appraisal, Columbia 
Venture believed that if its development plan proved unworkable, the property 
could still be sold for around $30 million.   
As of the date of purchase, Columbia Venture knew FEMA's preliminary flood 
map designated almost all of the property as lying within the regulatory floodway, 
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that the County's stormwater ordinance could be interpreted to preclude 
improvement of the levees and subsequent commercial development, and that the 
possibility of FEMA approving and certifying upgraded levees was contingent 
upon a host of factors which Columbia Venture had not fully explored and over 
which Columbia Venture did not exercise ultimate control.  
Shortly after closing, Columbia Venture announced its plans for a $1 billion 
development on the property, which it called Green Diamond.  The initial Green 
Diamond plans included residential uses, golf courses, an outlet mall, restaurants, 
hotels, offices, retail businesses, a research and development park, a retirement 
village, a theme park, and a wildlife expo, all to be constructed within the 
Congaree River floodplain. This development plan was contingent upon Columbia 
Venture receiving $864 million in multi-county business park public financing 
incentives and $80 million in infrastructure costs to be financed through special 
revenue bonds issued by the County.  Columbia Venture had not obtained any 
assurances as to these plans and was aware of the concerns raised by its requests of 
Richland County and the City of Columbia.14 
On February 20, 2002, FEMA's revised floodway determinations, placing 3,130 
acres of Columbia Venture's property within a regulatory floodway, became final 
by operation of law.15  Columbia Venture appealed FEMA's findings in federal 
court but, ultimately, was unsuccessful.16  Columbia Venture claims that the date 
14 Moreover, in addition to government concerns, public opposition to the project 
began to mount, and a citizen group called the Congaree Task Force opposed the 
project. 
15 The remaining 1,135 acres of Columbia Venture's property were outside of the 
floodway. 
16 In its federal appeal, Columbia Venture disputed the scientific and technical 
basis for FEMA's September 2000 base flood elevation determinations, which 
caused most of Columbia Venture's land to be designated as lying within the 
regulatory floodway. Columbia Venture LLC v. S.C. Wildlife Fed'n, 562 F.3d 290, 
294 (4th Cir. 2009). The federal district court vacated FEMA's determinations 
based on FEMA's failure to strictly comply with the timing of required notice 
publications. Id. FEMA appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court and reinstated FEMA's base flood determinations, finding FEMA's
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of the alleged taking was February 20, 2002.  Thus, it was FEMA's floodway 
determination that Columbia Venture claims constitutes the alleged taking—not 
any action by Richland County. 
In August 2004, Columbia Venture filed suit, claiming the County's actions 
constituted an unconstitutional taking and a substantive due process violation.  
Following a lengthy stay pending the resolution of Columbia Venture's appeal of 
the federal court action, this action resumed in December 2010, and was referred to 
retired circuit court judge John Hamilton Smith as Special Referee.  In various pre­
trial rulings, the Special Referee granted summary judgment in favor of the County 
as to Columbia Venture's per se taking claim and substantive due process claim, 
but denied summary judgment on Columbia Venture's regulatory taking claim.   
Thereafter, Columbia Venture's regulatory taking claim was tried before the 
Special Referee, sitting without a jury. Following the multi-week trial, the Special 
Referee found that Richland County's actions did not constitute a taking.17 
Specifically, in terms of the Penn Central18 factors, the Special Referee found the 
designation of Columbia Venture's property as a regulatory floodway (by FEMA, 
not Richland County) caused a significant decrease in the property's value; 
however, the Special Referee concluded that factor was outweighed by the fact that 
Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light 
of the inherent risk in floodplain development.  Moreover, the Special Referee 
found the County's pre-existing floodplain regulations and floodplain management 
regulations served an important purpose of flood protection.  The Special Referee 
concluded that, on balance, the Penn Central factors preponderated against a 
taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in 
the property's value.  This appeal followed. 
noncompliance was harmless and Columbia Venture was not prejudiced by 
FEMA's failure to publish notifications, as Columbia Venture was deeply involved 
in the administrative process from the beginning.  Id. at 294–95. 
17  We commend the learned Special Referee for his expert handling of this case, 
including his thorough and excellent order. 
18 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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III. 

Having set forth in detail the factual background and procedural history associated 
with Columbia Venture's purchase of the property and many efforts to remove the 
floodway designation, we address the merits of this appeal.  Like the able Special 
Referee, we find Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions 
and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data do not constitute a taking 
of any sort.    
"The question of a taking is one of law." Ex Parte Brown, 393 S.C. 214, 224, 711 
S.E.2d 899, 904 (2011). However, "[w]hether a taking that is compensable under 
the Fifth Amendment has occurred is a question of law that is based on factual 
determinations."  Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).  "In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried 
without a jury, the findings of fact of the judge will not be disturbed upon appeal 
unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the judge's
findings."  Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 
773, 775 (1976). "The judge's findings are equivalent to a jury's findings in a law 
action." Id. (citing Chapman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 263 S.C. 565, 567, 11 S.E.2d 
876, 877 (1974)). The evidence compellingly supports the findings of the Special 
Referee. 
A. Flowage Easement 
Columbia Venture argues the County's adoption of the revised FEMA flood maps 
(which designate most of Columbia Venture's property as lying within the 
regulatory floodway and trigger development restrictions that prevent Columbia 
Venture from expanding the levees) is tantamount to the County taking a flowage 
easement upon Columbia Venture's property for which it is entitled to just 
compensation under the Takings Clause.  We disagree, for the Special Referee 
properly found Richland County's floodway development restrictions are simply 
limitations on land use and do not constitute a flowage easement upon Columbia 
Venture's property.   
We acknowledge the well-established principle that government-induced flooding 
may, in some circumstances, constitute a taking that would justify compensation 
under the Takings Clause. See Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 
53 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 S.Ct. 511, 518 (2012) ("'[W]here real estate is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material . . . so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the 
Constitution.'") (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871)). 
However, for flooding to amount to a taking, there must be a causal connection 
between the challenged government act and the increased flooding—a connection 
which is lacking in this case. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149– 
50 (1924) (finding no taking occurred where there was no causal connection 
between the construction of a nearby government canal and the increased amount 
or severity of periodic flooding).   
In addition to the requirement of a causal connection, a compensable taking occurs 
only where a claimant shows an actual increase in the frequency or severity of 
flooding. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939) (rejecting the 
argument that the passage of legislation in and of itself constitutes a taking and 
noting that although "[a] reduction or increase in the value of property may occur 
by reason of legislation . . . [s]uch changes in value are incidents of ownership" 
and "cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense"); see also Stueve 
Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States, 737 F.3d 750, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[U]nder 
well-settled law, the apprehension of flooding does not constitute a taking of a 
flowage easement.").  Indeed, to successfully show the government has taken a 
flowage easement, a claimant must demonstrate that the occurrence of flooding is 
the "natural consequence of government action" and that such flooding, though it 
may be intermittent, is nevertheless "of a type which will be inevitably recurring."  
Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870–73 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (finding claimant had 
shown a government taking of a flowage easement by demonstrating significant 
damages resulting from frequent and inevitably recurring flooding which was the 
natural consequence of the government's control of the flow of a river through a 
nearby dam). 
In evaluating this claim, we find the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939), instructive.  Following "the 
most disastrous of all recorded floods" which occurred along the Mississippi River 
in the spring of 1927, Congress enacted the Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928 
(the "1928 Act") which provided for extensive improvements to a 950-mile system
of levees along both banks of the Mississippi River stretching from Missouri to the 
Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 261. The improved levee system was designed to include 
several designated spillway points, at which the height of the existing levees would 
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not be raised and behind which diversion channels would be constructed.  These 
lower spillway points were created to divert floodwaters from the main river 
channel in an effort to prevent floods from cresting over the higher riverside levees 
during major flood events. Thereafter, Julia Sponenbarger, an owner of land lying 
in a contemplated diversion channel along the waterway, filed suit against the 
United States alleging the 1928 Act would result in her property being inundated 
with water during major floods, for which she was entitled compensation under the 
Takings Clause. Although the existing levees protecting her land would not be 
altered or reduced under the 1928 Act, Sponenbarger nevertheless claimed a taking 
had occurred because the government planned to improve other nearby levees but 
not those protecting her land. 
The Supreme Court held the 1928 Act did not constitute a taking of Sponenbarger's 
property or a "servitude from excessive floodwaters" because the United States had 
neither caused her property to flood nor "in any wise nor to any extent increased  
the flood hazard thereto." Id. at 263 (internal marks omitted).  Since the existing 
levees were to remain in place, the Supreme Court found: 
[T]he 1928 Act had not increased the immemorial danger of 
unpredictable major floods to which [Sponenbarger]'s land had always 
been subject. Therefore, to hold the Government responsible for such 
floods would be to say that the Fifth Amendment requires the 
Government to pay a landowner for damages which may result from
conjectural major floods, even though the same floods and the same
damages would occur had the Government undertaken no [action] of 
any kind. So to hold would far exceed even the "extremest" 
conception of a "taking" by flooding within the meaning of that 
Amendment. For the Government would thereby be required to 
compensate a private party owner for flood damages which it in no 
way caused. 
Id. at 265. 
The Supreme Court readily acknowledged that a taking may occur where the 
government directly subjects private land to intermittent floods; however, as to 
Sponenbarger's property, the Court held "[t]he Government has not subjected [her] 
land to any additional flooding, above what would occur if the Government had 
not acted; and the [Takings Clause of the] Fifth Amendment does not make the 
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 Government an insurer that the evil of floods be stamped out universally."  Id. at 
266. 
 
Here, as in Sponenbarger, the existing levees have remained in place, and unlike 
other cases in which the natural consequence of government action caused an 
increase in flooding, here, the County's actions in adopting FEMA's revised flood 
maps do not, in any way, increase the flood hazard to which Columbia Venture's 
property has historically been exposed.  Compare Jacobs v. United States, 290 
U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (finding a compensable flowage easement was created by 
reason of the government's construction of a dam along a tributary of the 
Tennessee River, which caused an increase in the frequency of intermittent 
overflows upon claimant's farmland, destroyed claimant's crops, and impaired his 
use of the land for agricultural purposes), and Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 
F. Supp. 232, 233–35 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (finding compensable taking occurred where 
the construction of a dam and the impounding of water in its reservoir caused over 
7,000 acres of claimant's land to be flooded), and Barnes, 538 F.2d at 870–73 
(finding claimant demonstrated the government had taken a flowage easement 
where claimant proved significant damages resulting from frequent and inevitably 
recurring flooding that was the natural consequence of the government's control of 
the flow of a river through a nearby dam), with Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 
271, 286 (1939) (finding no taking occurred where riverbank levee was not 
lowered from its previous height and the land at issue was "as well protected from 
destructive floods as [it was] formerly" and stating "[t]he Government could 
become liable for a taking, in whole or in part, even without direct appropriation, 
[only] by such [action] as would put upon this land a burden, actually experienced, 
of caring for floods greater than it bore prior"), and Sanguinetti 264 U.S. at 149–50 
(finding no taking occurred despite periodic flooding of claimant's property 
because the land was subject to the same periodic overflows prior to the 
government's construction of a nearby canal and levee system and claimant 
produced no evidence that the amount or severity of flooding was increased by 
construction of the canal).  Indeed, the County's ordinances, which allow for 
maintenance and repair but prohibit expansion of the existing levees, merely 
maintain the status quo in terms of the flood risk.  Thus, in the absence of any 
increase in flooding attributable to an act of the County, we affirm the Special 
Referee's finding that the County did not take a flowage easement.19  
                                        
19 To the extent Appellant argues an exaction has occurred, we would likewise find 
this theory unavailing. This case in no manner falls within the exactions line of 
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B. Regulatory Taking 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the 
United States Supreme Court "identified three factors to be weighed in order to 
determine whether a regulatory imposition could constitute a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment, thus requiring compensation on the part of the government for the 
taking of private property." Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 261 (2004).
"In this analysis, the court must balance (1) the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with the property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations; 
(2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and (3) the character of 
the governmental action at issue." Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
Here, Columbia Venture argues that the Special Referee erred in finding no 
cases, as Richland County has not required Columbia Venture to grant an easement 
or dedicate a portion of its property for public use. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (finding conditions on development of property
constitute a taking if there is not a nexus between the legitimate state interest and 
the condition created or if the burden created by the condition is not "roughly 
proportionate" to the government's justification for regulating) (citing Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)). 
Further, to the extent Columbia Venture argues the County's development 
restrictions amount to a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding a taking occurs where a regulation 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land), we likewise find this 
theory provides no relief because approximately thirty percent of Columbia 
Venture's property is not designated as lying within the regulatory floodway and 
therefore is not subject to the same stringent development restrictions.  Moreover, 
the entire tract retained substantial value for agricultural and other purposes, even 
under the existing designations.  Indeed, since February 2002, Columbia Venture 
has sold approximately 3,000 acres of the property for almost $10 million.  Thus, 
no regulation has deprived the property of all economically beneficial use, and no 
Lucas-type categorical taking occurred. See Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town 
of Mount Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280, 313–14, 737 S.E.2d 601, 619 (2013) (finding that 
except in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically 
beneficial use of land is permitted, no taking has occurred) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. 
at 1015–16). 
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regulatory taking occurred because the Penn Central factors did not preponderate 
in Columbia Venture's favor.  We disagree. 
Aside from cases involving a Lucas-type categorical taking, "regulatory takings 
challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central." Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); see also Byrd v. City of Hartsville,
365 S.C. 650, 658, 620 S.E.2d 76, 80 (2005) (finding that an inverse condemnation 
claim involving denial of less than all economically viable use is governed by Penn 
Central ). "The 'common touchstone' of each regulatory taking theory is 'to 
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in 
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from
his domain.'" Dunes West, 401 S.C. at 314, 737 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Lingle, 544 
U.S. at 539, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (emphasis added)).  "However, the United States 
Supreme Court repeatedly has declined to identify a specific threshold of 
interference with property rights below which no taking occurs and above which 
there is a taking."  Id. at 314–15 (citing Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332–35 (2002) (holding that 
determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred is not best served by 
categorical rules but rather "requires careful examination and weighing of all the 
relevant circumstances")).  
The Supreme Court has recognized "that no magic formula enables a court to 
judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a 
taking." Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 518. "In view of the nearly 
infinite variety of ways in which government actions or regulations can affect 
property interests, the [Supreme] Court has recognized few invariable rules in this 
area." Id. "Noting that these constitutional challenges present 'essentially ad hoc' 
inquiries which are largely dependent on the particular circumstances of each case, 
Penn Central identifies the appropriate factors to consider in determining whether 
a taking has occurred: the character of the government action, the economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant, and the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."  Dunes West, 401 S.C. at 
315, 737 S.E.2d at 619–20 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
In evaluating the Penn Central factors vis-à-vis Columbia Venture's property, the 
Special Referee noted that the property was historically, and still may be, used for 
agricultural and recreational purposes, even with the regulatory floodway 
designation. However, the Special Referee nevertheless found the regulatory 
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floodway designation significantly impaired the fair market value of the property 
since mixed-use development, the highest and best use of the property, would not 
be possible.  The Special Referee found this was the only Penn Central factor that 
preponderated in Columbia Venture's favor, and that on balance, this factor was far 
outweighed by the other two—namely, the unreasonableness of Columbia 
Venture's development expectations and the important, safety-enhancing character 
of the government action. Columbia Venture contends this was error.  We disagree 
and address each in turn. 
1. Investment-Backed Expectations 
Columbia Venture urges this Court to reverse the Special Referee's findings, 
claiming its Green Diamond development plans were reasonable and achievable 
and that the County "induced" its development expectations by adopting the 
contingent resolution regarding levee maintenance and executing the non-binding 
memorandum of understanding regarding the same prior to purchase.  We find the 
Special Referee did not err in concluding Columbia Venture's expectations were 
unreasonable. 
In evaluating a regulatory taking claim, "[t]he purpose of consideration of 
plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations is to limit recoveries to property owners 
who can demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs 
that did not include the challenged regulatory regime."  Cienega Gardens v. United 
States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted).  
"A property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations are defined at the 
time the property is purchased." Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 267 
(2004) (citation omitted).   
In examining a party's investment-backed expectations, "'the regulatory regime in 
place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the 
reasonableness of those expectations.'"  Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 
F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).  In examining the reasonable 
expectations prong, the level of industry regulation is a "pertinent but not
determinative factor."  Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891, 906 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003).  "The subjective expectations of the [claimant] are irrelevant."  Id. at 
904 (citation omitted).  "The critical question is what a reasonable owner in the 
[claimant's] position should have anticipated."  Id.
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As for the regulatory scheme at issue here, the NFIP was enacted in 1968, and the 
County has been a participant since 1981—well before Columbia Venture 
purchased the property.  Based on the evidence presented at trial, there is no doubt 
that Burroughs & Chapin, Columbia Venture's managing member, was a 
sophisticated real estate development company with actual and constructive notice 
of the County's floodplain development restrictions that essentially prohibited 
construction within a regulatory floodway.  Moreover, at the time of the purchase, 
Columbia Venture was well aware of the revised FEMA flood map's floodway 
designation and the fact that such designation carried with it extensive regulatory 
implications affecting over seventy percent of the property.  
Although Columbia Venture may have subjectively believed that, in spite of all 
this, it would nevertheless be allowed to develop the extensive Green Diamond 
project, we find any such expectation was not objectively reasonable. As the 
Special Referee found:
[P]rior to purchase, Columbia Venture had made very little investment 
in actual engineering analysis of its levee.  Columbia Venture did not 
know if it could convince FEMA to issue a Flood Map with no 
floodway. Columbia Venture did not know whether it could upgrade 
its levee to meet FEMA's levee certification requirements.  It did not 
know whether Richland County would ultimately accept 
responsibility for maintenance.  It did not even have the financial 
resources in hand to undertake levee construction; in fact, Columbia 
Venture expected this cost to be paid through public financing.   
. . . . 
Columbia Venture faced an uncertain path forward with very little 
technical data and a complex regulatory scheme.  Even Burroughs & 
Chapin's Board of Directors admitted that Green Diamond was 
"purely speculative in nature."  This complex array of moving parts, 
all of which needed to fall into place in order for Columbia Venture to 
be able to develop its Property to the extent that it hoped for, made 
Columbia Venture's investment backed expectations unreasonable.   
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There is ample evidence in the record to support the Special Referee's factual 
findings, and we find the Special Referee did not err in determining this factor of 
the Penn Central analysis weighs against a taking. See Mehaffy v. United States, 
499 F. App'x 18, 22 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that recovery under a takings 
analysis is limited to property owners who can demonstrate reliance on a 
regulatory scheme that would allow their development plans to proceed 
unhindered); Paradissiotis v. United States, 304 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(finding that when a party moves forward with a transaction in light of actual or 
constructive knowledge of changing regulatory circumstances, "[t]he fact that his 
risk-taking turned out badly for him does not render it a taking in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment").20 
2. Character of the Governmental Action 
Columbia Venture argues the Special Referee erred in failing to find this prong 
preponderates in its favor and contends it alone bears a disproportionate burden of 
the County's flood map designations and that it receives no reciprocity of 
advantage by virtue of the regulation.  We disagree, and find this factor likewise 
lends Columbia Venture no support.  
The "character of the Government action" prong of the Penn Central analysis 
examines "the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation 
imposes upon private property rights" and "how any regulatory burden is 
20 To be clear, we do not find the fact that Columbia Venture was on notice of the 
impending floodway designation prior to its purchase of the property to be 
dispositive of the takings claim; indeed, such a finding would be inconsistent with 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, in which 
the Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court's finding that "the acquisition 
of title after the effective date of the regulations barred the takings claims."  533 
U.S. 606, 631 (2001). However, by the same token, Palazzolo does not require 
this Court to ignore the timing or sequence of the claimant's notice of the 
regulatory imposition relative to the purchase of the property in evaluating the 
reasonableness of investment-backed expectations.  To the contrary, timing and 
sequence are quite probative and material to our analysis; we note they are simply 
not dispositive.  See id. at 633 (noting "the regulatory regime in place at the time
the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of 
those expectations") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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distributed among property owners."  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.  In evaluating the 
benefits and burdens of a government regulation, "a taking does not take place if 
the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby 'secure[s] an 
average reciprocity of advantage.'" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (quoting 
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415) (noting that the concept of "reciprocity of advantage" is 
the reason zoning does not constitute a taking and stating "[w]hile zoning at times 
reduces individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is 
reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one 
aspect of the zoning will be benefitted by another").  Indeed, the Fifth Amendment 
"'prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of 
the burdens of government'" and provides that only when an individual "'surrenders 
to the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other 
members of the public, [shall] a full and just equivalent [] be returned to him.'" Id. 
at 417–18 (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 
325 (1893)). 
Considering the character of the County's floodplain development restrictions, we 
find the important public purposes of mitigating the social and economic costs of 
flooding that are served by the County's ordinances are substantial and legitimate.  
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 (acknowledging that floodplain development 
restrictions further legitimate public purposes of mitigating the serious risks posed 
by flooding). Moreover, the County's regulations further the important federal 
purposes served by the NFIP, namely to reduce the losses caused by flood damage, 
to create a unified national program for floodplain management, and to increase the 
availability of affordable flood insurance for all County residents.  See 42 U.S.C. §
4001 (setting forth Congressional findings and declaration of purpose for the 
NFIP). 
Columbia Venture's contention that it alone bears the burden of the County's 
ordinance is without merit. Indeed, the ordinance is applicable to all property 
located within a floodplain, which encompasses over 16,500 acres throughout the 
County. Richland County, S.C., Code § 8-18 (2001).  This provision does not 
unjustly burden Columbia Venture.  See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 ("[A] 
taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of 
land and thereby 'secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage.'" (quoting Mahon, 
260 U.S. at 415))). 
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Moreover, in terms of reciprocity of advantage, the County's restriction of 
floodway development benefits all owners of floodplain property within the 
County by reducing general flood hazards and allowing access to flood insurance 
under the NFIP. See 42 U.S.C. § 4022(a) (providing flood insurance coverage is 
available only in areas where governing bodies have adopted adequate land use 
and control measures); Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 267 (noting that where 
enforcement of a broad flood control program "measured in its entirety greatly 
reduces the general flood hazards," such a program is "highly beneficial" to 
individual tracts of land and does not involve a taking).  Further, the County's 
limitations on development in flood-prone areas reduce the inherent risk of flood-
related property damage and benefit all County taxpayers and residents by 
reducing the County's potential liability incurred in emergency response, rescue, 
evacuation, and other actions taken during a flood. See, e.g., Roger A. Pielke, Jr., 
et al., Flood Damage in the United States, 1926–2003: A Reanalysis of National 
Weather Service Estimates 55 (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 
June 2002) (estimating that between 1929 and 2003, urban floods in the United 
States caused approximately $171 billion in property damage and noting the need 
for effective development management to mitigate future flood hazards as 
"[e]conomic damage results from an interaction between flood waters and human 
activities in the flooded area"). 
We find there is considerable evidence in support of the Special Referee's finding 
that this prong of the Penn Central analysis preponderates in favor of the County.  
Indeed, in light of the potential public costs of extensive development in the 
regulatory floodway, we reject the argument that the County's floodway 
development restrictions constitute anything but responsible land-use policy.  See
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) 
("Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is 
a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such 
regulations against constitutional attack." (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926))). 
We conclude the Special Referee correctly determined that Columbia Venture's 
lack of reasonable investment-backed expectations coupled with the legitimate and 
substantial health and safety-related bases for the County's floodplain development 
restrictions outweigh Columbia Venture's economic injury, and under Penn
Central, no regulatory taking occurred. See Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 
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 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting a regulatory taking claim where the 
challenged government action aimed at preventing possible contamination into a 
water supply caused a substantial diminution in the value of certain mining leases 
and stating "[t]he exercise of the police power to address that kind of general 
public welfare concern is the type of governmental action that has typically been 
regarded as not requiring compensation for the burdens it imposes on private 
parties who are affected by the regulations").   
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we find no taking occurred.  Richland County is not the "'involuntary 
guarantor of the property owner's gamble that he could develop the land as he 
wished despite the existing regulatory structure.'" Mehaffy v. United States, 102 
Fed. Cl. 755, 765 (2012) (quoting Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed.Cl. 
56, 76–77 (1997)). "Purchasing and developing real estate carries with it certain 
financial risks, and it is not the government's duty to underwrite this risk as an 
extension of obligations under the takings clause."  Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 
S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 1994). Because no taking occurred, the decision of the 
Special Referee is affirmed. 
 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Amendment to Rule 31(h) of Rule 413, SCACR  
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001286 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, Footnote 1 to Rule 
31(h) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 
413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR) is hereby amended as 
follows: 
For purposes of this rule, the following rates are currently established for 
reimbursement of fees, expenses, and the cost of copies but are subject to
change at the discretion of the Court. 
Receiver and Attorneys to Assist the 

Receiver Fees $75.00 per hour 

Receiver Staff and Other Support Staff  $15.00 per hour 
Copies $ 0.15 per page 
This amendment shall be effective immediately.  
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s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina  
August 10, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
Amendment to Rule 402, SCACR 

 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000017 

ORDER 

Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, Footnote 1 to Rule 
402, SCACR, is hereby amended as follows:  
This fee is currently fifty dollars ($50.00) and shall be made by check 
payable to the National Conference of Bar Examiners.     
This amendment shall take effect immediately.   
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
August 10, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Amendments to the Rules of the Resolution of Fee 
Disputes Board 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001258 
ORDER 
The South Carolina Bar has petitioned this Court to amend Rules 5, 10 and 19 of 
the rules governing the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board contained in Rule 416 of 
the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  While it is appropriate to 
amend the rules, we do so using slightly different language from that proposed by 
the South Carolina Bar. 
 
Accordingly, pursuant to Article V, § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, and 
Rule 22 of Rule 416, Rules 5, 10 and 19 contained in Rule 416, SCACR, are 
amended to read as shown in the attachment to this order.  These amendments are 
effective immediately.   
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
August 7, 2015 
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RULE 5. APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
From among the appointed Board members, the President shall appoint an 
Executive Council comprised of the following: One Executive Council member 
from each of the four Judicial Regions of the state and one at large member. The 
President shall designate the chair of the Executive Council. 
The Executive Council shall have the authority to interpret these Rules. The duties 
of the Executive Council will be to oversee and assist the functioning of the Board 
in the respective circuits of the state and to make recommendations to the Board of 
Governors as to procedures to be followed and rules to be amended. 
Executive Council members should be experienced in the practice of law with no 
fewer than seven (7) years active practice. 
The terms of the Executive Council shall be for three (3) years. The expiration of a 
term will coincide with the date of expiration of the term of the incumbent 
President in the same year. Should the term of an Executive Council member on 
the Board expire and the member not be reappointed to the Board, the member's
term on the Executive Council shall expire at the same time the member's term on 
the Board expires. In that event, the President shall appoint a replacement member 
to the Executive Council for the unexpired term. A member of the Executive 
Council may be reappointed.
The Executive Council shall meet at such times and places as may be called by the 
chair or by any four members thereof. 
RULE 10. COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
All proceedings hereunder shall be commenced by filing an application in the 
Office of the Bar, on forms provided by the Bar. The application shall include a 
written statement of the facts and circumstances surrounding the dispute, 
furnishing complete names and addresses. If the materials submitted exceed 
twenty-five (25) pages, the client-applicant shall submit three additional sets of the 
materials. 
If the applicant is a client, but is not the person who paid for the lawyer's services, 
the third party payer, with the written consent of the client-applicant, may jointly 
file with the client-applicant, with both signatures affixed to the application.   
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If the responding party is an attorney, the Bar shall forward the completed 
application, as filed, to the attorney by electronic mail, with confirmation of 
delivery. If the responding party is not an attorney, the Bar shall forward the 
completed application, as filed, to the responding party by certified mail, return 
receipt requested. A copy shall be sent by regular mail or email to the circuit chair 
in the circuit where the principal place of practice of the attorney is located. If the 
application involves attorneys in more than one circuit, a copy of the completed 
application shall be sent to the chair of the Executive Council, who shall designate 
which of these circuit chairs shall have jurisdiction and shall proceed with the 
matter. 
If the amount in dispute exceeds $7,500, the circuit chair may appoint a hearing 
panel without assignment of the matter to an assigned member. 
After the initial correspondence, all other correspondence will be sent by regular 
mail or, with the written consent of the client and lawyer, by email. Such written 
consent may be withdrawn by written notice served on all other parties or 
attorneys. If served by regular mail, correspondence will be deemed served upon 
deposit in the U.S. Mail with proper postage affixed. If served by email, service is 
complete upon transmission, unless the party making service learns that the 
attempted service did not reach the person to be served. All parties have the duty to 
inform the circuit chair of any change of address. 
RULE 19. COMPLIANCE
The decision of the Board shall be final and binding upon the parties and shall be 
enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction.  The parties shall comply with 
the terms of the final decision within thirty (30) days after mailing.  In case of non-
compliance by either party, the circuit chair shall issue a Certificate of Non-
Compliance which may be entered as a judgment pursuant to Rule 58(a), SCRCP. 
If the certificate is issued against a lawyer, it shall be forwarded by the circuit chair 
to the Bar and then forwarded to the Commission on Lawyer Conduct under Rule 
8.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR. 
70 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
In the Matter of Robert W. Herlong, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case Nos. 2015-001664 and 2015-001666 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver to protect the 
interests of respondent's clients pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is 
hereby appointed to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust 
account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
accounts respondent may maintain.  Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by 
Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  
Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment. 
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre Thomas 
Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly appointed by this Court.
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly 
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 appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
 
                s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
                              FOR THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 6, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Sierra Club, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control and Chem-Nuclear Systems, LLC, Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-212791 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
 
Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 5253 

Heard February 5, 2014 – Filed July 30, 2014 

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled August 12, 2015 

 AFFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART 

Amy Elizabeth Armstrong and Michael Gary Corley, 
S.C. Environmental Law Project, both of Pawleys Island, 
and Robert Guild, of Columbia, for Appellant. 
Mary Duncan Shahid and Stephen Peterson Groves, Sr., 
both of Charleston, and Sara S. Rogers, of Columbia, all 
of Nexsen Pruet, LLC, for Respondent Chem-Nuclear 
Systems; Claire Harley Prince and Jacquelyn Sue 
Dickman, both of Columbia, for Respondent South 
Carolina Department of Health & Environmental 
Control.
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FEW, C.J.:  This is an appeal from the administrative law court (ALC), which 
upheld the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's 
(DHEC) decision to renew the license under which Chem-Nuclear Systems, LLC 
operates a disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste.  We affirm the ALC as 
to all issues, except four subsections of the regulation governing DHEC's issuance 
and renewal of such licenses. See 24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63, pt. VII (1992 
& Supp. 2010). 
I. Procedural History 
Chem-Nuclear operates a disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste in 
Barnwell County (the "facility") pursuant to a license DHEC first issued in 1971.  
Part VII of regulation 61-63—entitled "Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal 
of Radioactive Wastes"—establishes "specific technical requirements" and 
"performance objectives" "upon which [DHEC] issues licenses for the land 
disposal of wastes." 24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.1.1, 7.1.3 (1992).  
Before DHEC may renew Chem-Nuclear's license to operate the facility, it must 
determine Chem-Nuclear designed, constructed, and operates the facility in 
compliance with the requirements and objectives of part VII of regulation 61-63.  
See generally § 7.1. 
In 2000, Chem-Nuclear submitted an application to renew its license.  After 
holding a public hearing and accepting comments, DHEC issued a renewal license 
to Chem-Nuclear in 2004.  DHEC's decision to renew the license was challenged 
on the basis that the disposal methods at the facility do not meet certain 
requirements and objectives of part VII of the regulation.  The ALC issued an 
order affirming DHEC's decision to renew the license (the "2005 order"), and 
found Chem-Nuclear complied with subsections 7.10.1 through 7.10.4 of South 
Carolina Code Regulation 61-63 (1992 & Supp. 2010) and section 7.18 of South 
Carolina Code Regulation 61-63 (1992).  However, the ALC ordered Chem-
Nuclear to conduct further studies to address concerns "related to the potential for 
groundwater contamination on and near the [facility]."  In particular, the 2005 
order stated these studies must "concern[] methods to reduce contact between 
radioactive waste and rainfall and other water at its facility" and ordered Chem-
Nuclear to submit the results of the studies to DHEC within 180 days.   
This court's opinion reviewing the findings of the 2005 order is reported at 387 
S.C. 424, 693 S.E.2d 13 (Ct. App. 2010) (Chem-Nuclear I). We affirmed the 
findings related to section 7.18 and subsections 7.10.1 through 7.10.4.  387 S.C. at 
438, 693 S.E.2d at 20. However, we remanded the case to the ALC to apply its 
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factual findings from the 2005 order to determine whether Chem-Nuclear complied 
with the following subsections of regulation 61-63: 7.11.1 through 7.11.12 (1992 
& Supp. 2010), 7.23.6 (1992), and 7.10.5 through 7.10.10 (1992 & Supp. 2010).  
387 S.C. at 435, 436, 438, 693 S.E.2d at 18-19, 20.  
On remand, the ALC issued an order affirming DHEC's conclusion that Chem-
Nuclear complied with these subsections (the "remand order").  In this appeal, we 
review the findings in the remand order.  After we filed our first opinion, Op. No. 
5253 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 30, 2014) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 30 at 53), DHEC 
and Chem-Nuclear petitioned for rehearing.  We granted a stay of the relief 
ordered in the first opinion on August 28, 2014, and we now grant both petitions 
for rehearing. We withdraw our original opinion and substitute this opinion.   
II. Factual Findings in the 2005 Order 
Following this court's instructions, the ALC considered on remand only the 
findings from the 2005 order.  In reviewing the remand order, therefore, we 
likewise consider only the findings from the 2005 order.  In this section of the 
opinion, we recite those findings relevant to our review.  Unless otherwise 
indicated, all quotations in this section are from the 2005 order.    
A. Overview of Chem-Nuclear's Disposal Practices 
Chem-Nuclear disposes of waste at the facility using "enhanced shallow land burial 
with engineered barriers."  An engineered barrier is "a man-made structure or 
device that is intended to improve the land disposal facility's ability to meet the 
performance objectives" set out in part VII of regulation 61-63.  24A S.C. Code 
Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.2.9 (Supp. 2010). The primary engineered barriers used by 
Chem-Nuclear are disposal trenches, disposal vaults, and enhanced caps.   
Initially, waste is shipped to the facility in a disposal container.  See 24A S.C. 
Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 3.2.30 (Supp. 2010) ("'Disposal container' means a 
container principally used to confine low-level radioactive waste during disposal 
operations at a land disposal facility . . . [and] for some shipments, the disposal 
container may be the transport package.").  Depending on the type of waste, 
disposal containers are also shipped to the facility inside a container called a cask.  
When a shipment of waste arrives at the facility, it is directed to either the 
appropriate trench for disposal or the Cask Maintenance Building, where Chem-
Nuclear performs quality control inspections to ensure the casks are not damaged.  
Following this inspection, Chem-Nuclear transports the casks to the appropriate 
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disposal trench where the disposal containers are loaded into reinforced concrete 
disposal vaults inside the trench.  As disposal containers are loaded into vaults, 
Chem-Nuclear continues to inspect them.  
Some "large components," such as steam generators and pressurizers, are 
considered disposal vaults themselves and can be placed directly into the trench 
after DHEC approves them for burial.  Otherwise, all waste is contained inside a 
disposal container that is loaded into a vault, which is located within a trench.    
Chem-Nuclear uses the term "active" to describe disposal vaults and trenches that 
are in the process of being filled.  Thus, vaults are active until filled to capacity 
with disposal containers, and trenches are active until filled to capacity with vaults 
and large components.  Once vaults and trenches become full, Chem-Nuclear 
refers to them as "inactive."  When an individual vault becomes full, Chem-
Nuclear covers the inactive vault with "general cover soils and an initial clay cap," 
which reduces "the infiltration of surface water into the trench."  When a trench 
becomes full, Chem-Nuclear installs an "impermeable" multi-layer enhanced cap 
over the inactive trench, which consists of an initial clay cap, polyethylene and 
bentonite, a sand drain layer, and general soil materials.  
Waste is divided into three classes—A through C—based on the concentration of 
"long-lived" and "shorter-lived radionuclides" in the waste.  Class A is the least 
radioactive waste, while C is the most radioactive.  See 24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 
61-63 § 3.56.1.1 to .8 (Supp. 2010). Chem-Nuclear currently uses three types of 
disposal trenches that are designed to hold different types of waste: (1) Class A 
trenches, which are the largest of the three types, hold vaults containing Class A 
waste; (2) Class B/C trenches hold vaults containing Class B and C waste; and (3) 
slit trenches, which are narrow, hold irradiated hardware and large components.  
Chem-Nuclear uses soil to fill voids between the vaults in each type of trench, 
which "enhance[s] long-term stability of the entire trench system."  
Each trench has a drainage system "to facilitate monitoring of water accumulation 
entering the trench."  Chem-Nuclear also implements a "surface water management 
plan" to manage rainfall after it collects in trenches, which consists of pumping 
water into either adjacent trenches or a lined pond.  
B. Tritium Contamination of Groundwater 
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that is found in "trace amounts in 
groundwater throughout the world." NRC Senior Management Review of Overall 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Approach to Groundwater Protection (N.R.C., Rockville, M.D.), Feb. 
9, 2011, at SECY-11-0019. Although tritium is naturally occurring, it is also a 
byproduct of the manufacture of nuclear power, and found in radioactive waste 
generated by nuclear power plants. Id.
The waste disposed of at the facility contains tritium.  Rainfall "in and on the 
disposal trenches drives tritium into the groundwater beneath the facility."  Chem-
Nuclear initially discovered the presence of tritium in its disposal trenches in 1974.  
Chem-Nuclear determined that early disposal practices utilizing "unreliable 
containment and waste forms" led to this initial tritium contamination.  However, 
these early containment methods "were acceptable at the time" under the 
regulations. In fact, they "were identical to practices at . . . other low-level 
radioactive waste disposal facilities." 
Although "it is inadvisable to attempt to uncover or excavate" the old containers 
that caused the initial tritium release, improvements in disposal technology and 
changes in the operations at the facility have "enhanced site performance."  In 
1995, DHEC substantially revised part VII of regulation 61-63 to require 
engineered barriers for all waste classes disposed of at the facility.  Specifically, 
DHEC required all waste, except large components, to be placed in vaults, and 
required enhanced caps to be installed on all inactive trenches.  Chem-Nuclear 
began using vaults and enhanced caps to meet these new requirements.  In 
addition, Chem-Nuclear began using high-integrity polyethylene disposal 
containers to hold certain waste forms and discontinued the disposal of unstable, 
liquid waste forms.  All of these measures served to "reduce[] the amount of 
tritium migrating to groundwater."   
DHEC imposes a regulatory limit on the amount of radioactive material Chem-
Nuclear may release to the "general environment."  See § 7.18. Although certain 
groundwater samples collected from beneath the facility show high concentrations 
of tritium, these samples are inappropriate for evaluating Chem-Nuclear's
compliance with section 7.18.  This is because DHEC regulates the release of 
radiation into the "general environment," § 7.18, not into the groundwater within 
the boundaries of the facility where there is no risk of public exposure.  To 
determine whether Chem-Nuclear is in compliance with section 7.18, DHEC 
established a "compliance point"—defined as the "first point where a hypothetical 
member of the public might receive a dose of radiation"—at which it measures 
Chem-Nuclear's release of tritium into the general environment.  This compliance 
point is located at Mary's Branch Creek, where the groundwater from beneath the 
facility flows into an above-ground stream.  Chem-Nuclear regularly samples the 
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water from Mary's Branch Creek to determine whether there has been a release of 
tritium above the regulatory limit set by DHEC.  Since 2001, tritium
concentrations at the compliance point have been declining, and all measurements 
taken at Mary's Branch Creek have been well below the regulatory limit for 
exposure under section 7.18. In fact, "[t]here is no evidence of any actual release 
resulting in an exposure above regulatory limits to any member of the general 
public." 
C. Actions to Prevent Tritium Exposure 
Chem-Nuclear has taken steps to protect the public from exposure to radiation at 
the compliance point.  The general public is restricted from accessing the waters of 
Mary's Branch Creek at the compliance point, and there are no known consumers 
of the water who are "located in and around the compliance point."  Chem-Nuclear 
also erected a fence around the compliance point to prevent entry of unauthorized 
persons. Additionally, Chem-Nuclear has a restrictive covenant and easement on 
three parcels of property surrounding the compliance point.  This property serves 
as a buffer zone by prohibiting the use of groundwater under the property, as well 
as surface water on the property, without written consent from DHEC.  Moreover, 
changes in design and operations at the facility further reduce the potential for 
radioactive exposure to the general environment.    
D. Long-Term Predictions for Compliance 
As required by DHEC, Chem-Nuclear created a predictive model—the 
Environmental Radiological Performance Verification (ERPV)—to predict the 
future performance of the site for up to two thousand years.  This model relies on 
data collected through a system of groundwater monitoring wells and thirty years 
of data derived from over two hundred sampling points.  DHEC commissioned and 
funded a panel of experts—the "Blue Ribbon Panel"—to review the ERPV and 
determine whether Chem-Nuclear's predictions were accurate.  After finding the 
ERPV predictions to be reliable, the Blue Ribbon Panel concluded the facility 
"pose[d] minimal risk to either the environment or members of the public, both 
today and into the long-term future."  DHEC relied on the conclusions of both the 
ERPV and the Blue Ribbon Panel in deciding to renew the facility's license.  
III. Standard of Review 
In the 2005 order, the ALC conducted a de novo review of DHEC's decision to 
renew Chem-Nuclear's license.  See Marlboro Park Hosp. v. S.C. Dep't of Health 
 & Envtl. Control, 358 S.C. 573, 579, 595 S.E.2d 851, 854 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating 
the ALC acts "as the fact-finder" in a contested case and "must make sufficiently 
detailed findings supporting the denial [or grant] of a permit application" 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).  In Chem-Nuclear I, this court reviewed 
the ALC's findings and conclusions in the 2005 order to determine whether they 
were "[]supported by substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law."  See 
387 S.C. at 430-31, 693 S.E.2d at 16 (relying on the standard of review set forth in 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2013)).  Although we affirmed the ALC's 
determination that Chem-Nuclear complied with all sections of regulation 61-63 
addressed in the 2005 order, we remanded for the ALC to apply the factual 
findings from the 2005 order to other, applicable sections it did not address.  387 
S.C. at 439, 693 S.E.2d at 20-21. See 387 S.C. at 439, 693 S.E.2d at 20 
(instructing the ALC "to apply its factual findings [from the 2005 order] to these 
sections of regulation 61-63" on remand). In the remand order, the ALC applied 
the factual findings from the 2005 order to determine whether Chem-Nuclear 
complied with these additional sections.         
 
In this appeal from the remand order, we must accept the factual findings in the 
2005 order. We review the remand order under the standard of review set forth in 
subsection 1-23-610(B)(d), and may reverse only if the ALC's decision was 
affected by an error of law.  See § 1-23-610(B)(d) (stating an appellate court may 
reverse the ALC's decision when it is affected by an error of law); S.C. Dep't of 
Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc., 397 S.C. 256, 260, 725 S.E.2d 480, 483 
(2012) ("The construction of a regulation is a question of law to be determined by 
the court. We will correct the decision of the ALC if it is affected by an error of 
law, and questions of law are reviewed de novo." (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).    
 
IV. Chem-Nuclear's Compliance with Regulation 61-63 
 
DHEC drafted part VII of regulation 61-63 to include three general categories of 
regulations. See § 7.1.3 ("This Part establishes procedural requirements[,] . . . 
performance objectives[,] . . . [and] specific technical requirements for near-surface 
disposal of radioactive waste . . . ."). All three categories are applicable to the 
enhanced shallow land burial of low-level nuclear waste at the facility.1  In this 
appeal, we address the ALC's determination that Chem-Nuclear complied with 
                                           
1 Subsection 7.1.3 provides that the "procedural requirements" and "performance 
objectives" apply "to any method of land disposal," and the "specific technical 
requirements" apply to "near-surface disposal of radioactive waste."   
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regulations in two of these categories—regulations imposing technical 
requirements and performance objectives. Generally, regulations containing 
technical requirements require Chem-Nuclear to take action to comply with the 
regulation, while regulations containing performance objectives require Chem-
Nuclear to achieve certain results sought under the regulation.  There is some 
overlap, however, between the action-based and result-based requirements of these 
two categories of regulations. 
Some regulations imposing "technical requirements" require Chem-Nuclear to take 
a specific action to meet the requirement.  For example, subsection 7.24.2 of South 
Carolina Code Regulation 61-63 (1992) requires that Chem-Nuclear place five 
meters of material above Class C waste when the disposal unit is full and made 
inactive. See id. (requiring Class C waste be disposed of "so that the top of the 
waste is a minimum of 5 meters below the top surface of the cover").2  Other 
regulations imposing technical requirements do not list any specific action, but 
leave to Chem-Nuclear the choice of action to take to comply with the regulation.  
For example, subsection 7.11.11.7 of South Carolina Code Regulation 61-63 
(Supp. 2010) requires "[t]he disposal units and the incorporated engineered 
barriers . . . be designed and constructed to . . . prevent[] contact between the waste 
and the surrounding earth."3  Chem-Nuclear's compliance with "technical
requirements" regulations may be determined only by examining the specific 
actions taken by Chem-Nuclear.  As to subsection 7.24.2 and others, the required 
action is specifically listed in the regulation.  As to subsection 7.11.11.7 and 
others, Chem-Nuclear may choose what action to take to comply with the 
regulation.  In both instances, Chem-Nuclear must take action to meet the technical 
requirements of the regulation. 
On the other hand, compliance with a regulation imposing "performance 
objectives" must be determined by examining whether Chem-Nuclear obtained the 
results required by the regulation. An example of such a regulation is section 7.18, 
which requires reasonable efforts be made to maintain radioactive releases to the 
general public "as low as is reasonably achievable"—a concept known by the 
acronym "ALARA."4  This and other result-based "performance objective" 
2 Chem-Nuclear's compliance with subsection 7.24.2 is not an issue in this appeal.   
3 We discuss Chem-Nuclear's compliance with subsection 7.11.11.7 in section 
IV.B.5 of this opinion. 
4 Regulation 61-63 defines the "ALARA" standard as:  
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regulations require consideration of existing environmental conditions, such as the 
fact that tritium levels are declining in the groundwater below the facility and in 
the surface water of Mary's Branch Creek. 
In Chem-Nuclear I, we affirmed the ALC's finding that Chem-Nuclear met the 
performance objectives of sections 7.18 and 7.10.  387 S.C. at 438, 693 S.E.2d at 
20. Section 7.18 and the subsections of 7.10 that we addressed in Chem-Nuclear I
relate to whether Chem-Nuclear is protecting the public from radioactive releases, 
and generally do not impose specific requirements as to how Chem-Nuclear must 
accomplish any particular result.5  In affirming Chem-Nuclear's compliance with 
section 7.18, we gave deference to the ALC's finding that "Chem-Nuclear . . . 
demonstrated adherence to ALARA . . . by taking appropriate measures to address 
tritium migration from the Barnwell facility and the potential for releases from
other radionuclides." 387 S.C. at 429, 438, 693 S.E.2d at 15, 20.  Showing similar 
deference, we affirmed the ALC's findings that Chem-Nuclear complied with four 
of the performance objectives in section 7.10.  387 S.C. at 438, 693 S.E.2d at 20. 
[M]aking every reasonable effort to maintain exposures 
to radiation as far below the dose limits in this part as is 
practical consistent with the purpose for which the 
licensed activity is undertaken, taking into account the 
state of technology, the economics of improvements in 
relation to state of technology, the economics of 
improvements in relation to benefits to the public health 
and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic 
considerations, and in relation to utilization of nuclear 
energy and licensed materials in the public interest.   
24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 3.2.6 (Supp. 2010).   
5 See § 7.10.1 ("The issuance of the license will not constitute an unreasonable risk 
to the health and safety of the public."); § 7.10.2 ("The applicant is qualified . . . to 
carry out the disposal operations . . . in a manner that protects health and 
minimizes danger to life or property."); § 7.10.3 ("The . . . operations . . . are 
adequate to protect the public health and safety in that they provide reasonable 
assurance that the general population will be protected from releases of 
radioactivity . . . ."); § 7.10.4 ("The . . . operations . . . are adequate to protect the 
public health and safety in that they will provide reasonable assurance that 
individual inadvertent intruders are protected . . . ."). 
 82
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
                                           
 
 
We found, however, the ALC did not address the six remaining subsections of 7.10 
(7.10.5 through 7.10.10). 387 S.C. at 438-39, 693 S.E.2d at 20-21.  We remanded 
for the ALC to determine whether Chem-Nuclear complied with those subsections.  
Id.
We also required the ALC to consider on remand Chem-Nuclear's compliance with 
section 7.11 and subsection 7.23.6. 387 S.C. at 435-36, 693 S.E.2d at 18-19.  
DHEC argued that in determining whether DHEC properly renewed the license, 
the ALC must consider compliance with the result-based requirements "set forth in 
section 7.10 . . . rather than apply criteria set forth in sections 7.11 and 7.23.6."  
387 S.C. at 431, 693 S.E.2d at 16. We rejected that argument, finding "the 
technical requirements" of "section 7.11 impose[] additional compliance 
requirements for Chem-Nuclear such that the balancing test of ALARA would not 
be sufficient to address[] whether Chem-Nuclear is in compliance."  387 S.C. at 
435, 693 S.E.2d at 18-19. Similarly, we found "the technical requirements of 
[sub]section 7.23.6 . . . impose[] additional compliance requirements for Chem-
Nuclear." 387 S.C. at 436, 693 S.E.2d at 19.  Under our holding in Chem-Nuclear
I, therefore, the technical requirements of subsections 7.11.11 and 7.23.6 require 
Chem-Nuclear to take action to design and construct the disposal site, disposal 
units, and engineered barriers to meet the specifications in those subsections.  See
387 S.C. at 432, 435, 436, 693 S.E.2d at 17, 19, 20.  DHEC and Chem-Nuclear 
may not demonstrate compliance with those subsections simply by showing Chem-
Nuclear met the performance objectives of other subsections.  See id.
With these considerations in mind, we discuss the ALC's determination that DHEC 
properly found Chem-Nuclear complied with the applicable subsections of 
regulation 61-63. 
A. Section 7.106 
The subsections of 7.10 that we review in this appeal7 set forth performance 
objectives for the issuance and renewal of Chem-Nuclear's license.  The 
6 In this section, we discuss compliance with subsections 7.10.6 and 7.10.8, and not 
7.10.7, because our analysis of that subsection depends on whether Chem-Nuclear
complied with the relevant subsections of 7.11.11.  We later discuss subsection 
7.10.7 in section IV.D. of this opinion.    
7 Chem-Nuclear's compliance with subsections 7.10.5, 7.10.9, and 7.10.10 is not an 
issue in this appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
correctness of DHEC's and the ALC's determination of compliance with 
subsections 7.10.6 and 7.10.8 depends, in part, on Chem-Nuclear's progress in 
reducing the amount of tritium released from the facility.  In reviewing the ALC's 
findings as to these subsections, therefore, we rely upon evidence that shows its 
operations are "adequate to protect the public health and safety," which includes 
the following result-based evidence: (1) Chem-Nuclear's disposal operations 
currently meet the ALARA standard; (2) "improvements in waste disposal 
procedures" have enhanced site performance; and (3) there is a decline in
the "tritium concentration at the compliance point."  
1. Subsection 7.10.6 
Subsection 7.10.6 provides that before DHEC may issue a license to Chem-
Nuclear, it must find:  
[Chem-Nuclear]'s proposed disposal site, disposal site 
design, land disposal facility operations, disposal site 
closure, and postclosure institutional control are adequate 
to protect the public health and safety in that they will 
provide reasonable assurance that long-term stability of 
the disposed waste and the disposal site will be achieved 
and will eliminate to the extent practicable the need for 
ongoing active maintenance of the disposal site following 
closure. 
This subsection focuses our analysis on Chem-Nuclear's efforts to protect the 
public, the environment, and inadvertent intruders from radioactive exposure by 
ensuring "long-term stability of the disposed waste and the disposal site."  We 
begin our discussion with the definitions of the relevant terms used in subsection 
7.10.6. 
"Site closure" is defined as "those actions that are taken upon completion of 
operations that prepare the disposal site for custodial care [by the State of South 
Carolina] and that assure that the disposal site will remain stable and will not need 
ongoing active maintenance." 24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.2.19 (1992).   
Once site closure is accomplished, the "institutional control" period begins, in 
which the State of South Carolina "assume[s] responsibility" for maintaining the 
facility, 24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 §§ 7.8.1, 7.15 (1992), and "control[s] 
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access to the disposal site."  24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.27.2 (1992).  By 
regulation, the institutional control period is one hundred years.  Id.   
 
"Stability" is defined as "structural stability."  24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 
§ 7.2.20 (1992). According to Part III of regulation 61-63, structural stability 
results from: (1) "the waste form itself" being stable, or "processing the waste to 
stable form"; (2) converting waste containing liquid "into a form that contains as 
little free-standing and non-corrosive liquid as is reasonably achievable"; and (3) 
filling "[v]oid spaces within the waste and between the waste and its package."  
24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 3.56.2.2.1 to .3 (Supp. 2010).   
 
"Active maintenance" means "any significant activity needed during the period of 
institutional control to maintain a reasonable assurance that the performance 
objectives in 7.18 and 7.19 are met." 24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.2.1 
(1992). As we previously discussed, section 7.18 regulates the concentration of 
radioactive material that may be released to the general environment and the 
public. Section 7.19 of South Carolina Code Regulation 61-63 (1992) requires that 
the "[d]esign, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility . . . ensure 
protection of any individual inadvertently intruding into the disposal site and 
occupying the site or contacting the waste at any time after active institutional 
controls over the disposal site are removed."  An "inadvertent intruder" is a "person 
who might occupy the disposal site after closure and engage in . . . activities . . . in 
which an individual might be unknowingly exposed to radiation from the waste."  
24A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.2.13 (1992).   
 
The following findings from the 2005 order support the ALC's determination that 
the waste and disposal site are structurally stable:  
 
(1) 	 All waste is placed into reinforced concrete disposal vaults;  
(2) 	 Void space between the vaults is filled with soil, which enhances "long-
term stability of the entire trench system"; 
(3) 	 Enhanced caps are installed on all inactive trenches; 
(4) 	 "[T]he elimination of liquid waste forms . . . have increased site 

performance"; and 

(5) 	 "Improvements in waste forms . . . have succeeded in reducing the 

amount of tritium that is migrating to groundwater."    

 
Additionally, the following findings support the determination that long-term 
stability of the disposed waste and disposal site will be achieved and will be 
adequate to protect the general public and inadvertent intruders from radioactive 
exposure: 
 
(1) 	 Predictions of a declining trend in radioactive releases to the general 
environment;  
(2) 	 The Blue Ribbon Panel's conclusion that the facility "poses a minimal 
risk to either the environment or members of the public, both today and 
into the long-term future";  
(3) 	 The presence of a buffer zone, which provides "long-term protection to 
the public from exposure to radioactive material in the surface water at 
the compliance point"; and  
(4) 	 The use of concrete disposal vault lids8 for Class C waste, which serves 
as an intrusion barrier for inadvertent intruders.9     
 
Based on these findings, we find the ALC did not err in concluding Chem-Nuclear 
is in compliance with subsection 7.10.6.  
 
2. 	 Subsection 7.10.8 
 
Subsection 7.10.8 requires Chem-Nuclear to provide a "proposal for institutional 
control" that gives "reasonable assurance that such control will be provided for the 
length of time found necessary to ensure the findings in 7.10.3 through 7.10.6 and 
that the institutional control meets the requirements of 7.27."  On appeal, Chem-
Nuclear's compliance with this subsection is challenged on the ground that it 
violated subsection 7.10.6.10  As previously discussed, subsection 7.10.6 requires 
the design and operations of the facility to provide "long-term stability of the 
                                           
8 We are uncertain of the nature and purpose of disposal vault lids.  Neither the 
regulations nor the 2005 order defines "disposal vault lid," and the 2005 order 
references disposal lids only twice and in two limited contexts: (1) "the lids of the 
vaults are not grouted or otherwise sealed to prevent water from entering the 
vault"; and (2) "[t]he disposal vault lids serve as an intrusion barrier for Class C 
waste." 
 
9 Subsection 3.56.1.2.3 requires Class C waste to be disposed of in a manner that 
"protect[s] against inadvertent intrusion." 
 
10 We previously affirmed Chem-Nuclear's compliance with subsections 7.10.3 and 
7.10.4. Chem-Nuclear I, 387 S.C. at 438, 693 S.E.2d at 20.  Chem-Nuclear's 
compliance with subsection 7.10.5 is not an issue on appeal.     
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disposed waste." When considered in the context of subsection 7.10.6, subsection 
7.10.8 requires Chem-Nuclear to provide reasonable assurances the waste will be 
stable after the facility is closed. Based on our ruling regarding subsection 7.10.6,
we find the ALC correctly determined Chem-Nuclear is in compliance with 
subsection 7.10.8. 
B. Subsection 7.11.11 
Subsection 7.11.11 provides, in relevant part,  
The disposal units and the incorporated engineered 
barriers shall be designed and constructed to meet the 
following objectives: 
7.11.11.1 to minimize the migration of water onto the 
disposal units.
7.11.11.2 to minimize the migration of waste or waste 
contaminated water out of the disposal units.
7.11.11.4 temporary collection and retention of water and 
other liquids for a time sufficient to allow for the 
detection and removal or other remedial measures 
without the contamination of groundwater or the 
surrounding soil. 
7.11.11.6 reasonable assurance that the waste will be 
isolated for at least the institutional control period.
7.11.11.7 prevention of contact between the waste and 
the surrounding earth, except for earthen materials which 
may be used for backfilling within the disposal units. 
DHEC and Chem-Nuclear continue to assert that in reviewing the ALC's findings 
as to subsection 7.11.11, we may rely on result-based evidence—(1) its operations 
meet the ALARA standard, (2) "improvements in waste disposal procedures" have 
enhanced site performance, and (3) there is a decline in the "tritium concentration 
at the compliance point."  As we previously acknowledged, evidence of 
improvements in disposal practices and a decline in tritium concentrations is 
certainly relevant to our analysis of compliance with the regulations containing 
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performance objectives.  However, that evidence does not directly relate to, and 
cannot alone show compliance with, the technical requirements imposed by 
subsection 7.11.11. See 387 S.C. at 435, 693 S.E.2d at 18-19 (holding "the 
[specific] technical requirements" of "section 7.11 impose[] additional compliance 
requirements for Chem-Nuclear such that the balancing test of ALARA would not 
be sufficient to address[] whether Chem-Nuclear is in compliance").  For these 
subsections of the regulation, compliance may not be measured solely by results.  
Instead, we must consider whether Chem-Nuclear took any actions to meet the 
technical requirements imposed by these subsections, and if so, the sufficiency of 
Chem-Nuclear's actions.        
1. Subsection 7.11.11.1 
Subsection 7.11.11.1 requires that Chem-Nuclear design and construct its disposal 
units and engineered barriers "to minimize the migration of water onto the disposal 
units." 
The regulations define "disposal unit" to include "a vault or a trench," 24A S.C. 
Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.2.8 (Supp. 2010), and "engineered barrier" to include 
"vaults or equivalent structures," § 7.2.9.  The regulations, however, do not define 
the phrase "migration of water."  DHEC concedes the phrase encompasses not only 
the flow of surface water, but also rainfall.  We need not rely on DHEC's 
concession, however, because we find the subsection clearly applies to rainfall.  
Thus, for DHEC to have correctly determined Chem-Nuclear complied with this 
subsection, DHEC must have found Chem-Nuclear took action that reduced 
rainfall and the flow of surface water onto the vaults and trenches.  Chem-
Nuclear's compliance concerning the migration of rainfall onto disposal units is 
particularly important, given the following findings from the 2005 order: (1) 
"[t]ritium is driven into the groundwater through rainfall in and on the disposal 
trenches," and (2) tritium concentrations in the groundwater seem to "vary[] with 
the amount of rainfall."  Referring to these and other findings, the ALC called this 
"the undeniable 'rainfall problem.'" 
We first examine whether the ALC correctly determined Chem-Nuclear complied 
with subsection 7.11.11.1 in regard to rainfall migrating onto active disposal 
units—vaults and trenches that are in the process of being filled.  The 2005 order 
provides that while Chem-Nuclear is filling individual vaults with disposal 
containers, it employs "no cover or roof, so rain can fall directly into the vault 
during the loading period."  The 2005 order also indicates Chem-Nuclear provides 
no cover for active trenches, which leaves these trenches and the vaults contained 
 
 
                                           
within them exposed to rainfall until the trenches become full. Vaults contained 
within an active trench remain exposed to rainfall for up to two years while Chem-
Nuclear fills the trench. The 2005 order further states rainfall enters vaults because 
they "are not sealed against water intrusion," and the "lids of the vaults are not . . . 
sealed to prevent water from entering" them.   
 
DHEC interprets subsection 7.11.11.1 as requiring Chem-Nuclear to "minimize the 
migration of water onto the disposal units" during the period in which the trenches 
are active. This interpretation required DHEC to consider what action Chem-
Nuclear took to reduce the amount of rain falling onto open vaults while they are 
being filled, and onto closed vaults in active trenches.  However, neither the 2005 
order, the remand order, nor any other portion of the record or the briefs contain 
any evidence that Chem-Nuclear has taken a single action to stop a single raindrop 
from falling onto active vaults or trenches.   
 
Although the ALC determined Chem-Nuclear complied with this subsection, none 
of the evidence it relied upon addresses the rainfall issue.  Specifically, the ALC 
listed the following factual findings from the 2005 order to support DHEC's 
determination of compliance as to active and inactive disposal units:  
 
(1) 	 The Class A trench has a sloped floor and a drainage system that 

facilitates monitoring of water that enters the trench;  

(2) 	 The Class B/C trench contains a French drain and sump system that 
allows monitoring of water accumulation in the trench;  
(3) 	 The slit trench has a sloped floor that is filled with "coarse drain sand" 
and contains "standpipes" that monitor water accumulation;  
(4) 	 Chem-Nuclear implements a surface water management plan to pump 
water out of trenches. 
 
We find none of these findings support the ALC's determination that Chem-
Nuclear complied with this subsection as to rain falling on disposal units—active 
or inactive. These findings relate to remedial measures to monitor, drain, and 
manage water that has already migrated onto disposal units.  The plain language of 
this subsection, however, requires Chem-Nuclear to do more than monitor, drain, 
or otherwise manage water once it enters the vaults and trenches.11  These 
11 Other subsections of regulation 61-63 deal with accumulation of water within 
disposal units once it migrates there.  See, e.g., § 7.23.6 (requiring the disposal site 
to be designed in a way that "minimize[s] . . . the contact of standing water with 
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measures listed by the ALC have no effect on the initial migration of rainfall and 
thus, do not relate to compliance with subsection 7.11.11.1.  Furthermore, the 
record is devoid of any evidence to support the ALC's conclusion that Chem-
Nuclear has done anything to reduce rainfall onto active disposal units.  When 
pressed at oral argument to list what Chem-Nuclear has done to reduce rainfall 
onto active disposal units, neither Chem-Nuclear nor DHEC could name one action 
Chem-Nuclear took, except to construct berms along the edges of trenches.12    
 
The ALC also listed the following two factual findings, in addition to the four 
discussed above, to affirm DHEC's determination of compliance with this 
subsection as to rainfall on inactive disposal units only: 
 
(5) 	 Backfilling methods that fill voids between vaults are implemented for all 
trenches; and 
(6) 	 Initial clay caps placed on inactive vaults and enhanced caps installed 
over inactive trenches minimize the infiltration of surface water into the 
trench. 
 
We find neither of these findings support—and only one actually addresses—the 
ALC's determination that Chem-Nuclear complied with this subsection as to 
inactive disposal units. Regarding finding (5), "backfilling methods" involve 
placing soil in open spaces between the vaults, which has nothing to do with 
reducing the migration of water onto disposal units.  Finding (6), however, is 
relevant to Chem-Nuclear's compliance with subsection 7.11.11.1 as to inactive 
disposal units. The installation of the initial clay cap on inactive vaults and the 
enhanced cap on inactive trenches reduces the migration of water onto these 
disposal units. Although these measures reduce the migration of water, subsection 
7.11.11.1 requires Chem-Nuclear to "minimize" this occurrence.  Thus, whether 
finding (6) supports Chem-Nuclear's compliance with this subsection requires us to 
consider the meaning of "minimize."   
 
waste during disposal, and the contact of percolating or standing water with wastes 
after disposal" (emphasis added)).  
12 While berms may keep surface water from migrating onto the disposal units, 
they do nothing to minimize direct rainfall onto active trenches and vaults.  
Additionally, the ALC made no findings as to whether Chem-Nuclear ever 
constructed a berm, or if so, whether the berms reduce the migration of surface 
water onto the disposal units. 
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Regulation 61-63 does not define minimize.  Chem-Nuclear and DHEC filed a 
joint brief with this court in which they set forth the following definition of 
minimize: "to reduce to the smallest possible amount, extent, size, or degree."13 
Applying this definition to the requirements of subsection 7.11.11.1, we must 
consider two sub-issues in analyzing compliance: (1) whether there is evidence to 
support a finding that Chem-Nuclear has reduced the migration of water onto 
disposal units, and (2) whether the extent of this reduction is adequate to meet 
DHEC's definition of minimize.  Thus, we cannot find the ALC correctly 
determined Chem-Nuclear complied with this subsection simply because Chem-
Nuclear "reduced" the migration of water onto disposal units.   
As to the first sub-issue, we agree with the ALC that installation of initial clay caps 
and enhanced caps reduce the migration of surface water and rainfall onto inactive 
vaults and trenches. However, the ALC did not address the second sub-issue— 
whether initial clay caps and enhanced caps "reduce to the smallest possible 
amount" the migration of water onto inactive disposal units.  Both DHEC and 
Chem-Nuclear represented to this court in their brief that Chem-Nuclear must have 
taken action to "reduce [the migration of water onto inactive trenches] to the 
smallest possible amount." Yet, neither DHEC nor the ALC made any finding as 
to whether Chem-Nuclear did so.  The determination of this issue is crucial to the 
question of whether Chem-Nuclear complied with subsection 7.11.11.1.   
In considering whether Chem-Nuclear's disposal units and engineered barriers 
adequately reduce—"minimize"—the migration of water, we acknowledge it is the 
duty of DHEC, not this court, to enforce regulation 61-63.  Similarly, it is the duty 
of Chem-Nuclear, not DHEC, to take the necessary action to comply with the 
13 While this definition sets a strict standard for compliance, we find this is 
supported by the way in which this regulation, and others, are written.  For 
example, subsection 7.23.6 requires Chem-Nuclear to "minimize to the extent 
practicable" the contact of water with waste at different stages of the disposal 
process. We interpret subsection 7.23.6 as imposing a less stringent standard for 
compliance than subsection 7.11.11.1 because the term "minimize" is followed by 
language prompting DHEC to consider the reasonableness of Chem-Nuclear's
efforts to comply.  The lack of similar language in subsection 7.11.11.1 suggests 
there is no inherent reasonableness or practicability consideration involved in 
analyzing Chem-Nuclear's compliance.  The definition of "minimize" provided by 
Chem-Nuclear and DHEC accords with this interpretation.  Thus, we rely on their 
definition of minimize—"to reduce to the smallest possible amount, extent, size, or 
degree"—in analyzing DHEC's and the ALC's determinations of compliance. 
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regulations. Nevertheless, we find support in the 2005 order that implementing 
"relatively simple measures" could further reduce the migration of water onto both
active and inactive disposal units. These measures include "shelter[ing] the 
disposal trenches from rainfall" while they are being filled and "sealing and 
grouting the concrete disposal vaults to prevent the intrusion of water."   
In 2001, DHEC directed Chem-Nuclear to consider implementing such measures.  
According to the 2005 order, "during the review of the re-issuance of the Chem-
Nuclear license, DHEC . . . advis[ed] Chem-Nuclear to review and revise all trench 
construction details, plans, specifications, and procedures."  "In particular, [DHEC] 
informed Chem-Nuclear that consideration should be given to protection of the 
open trenches from direct rainfall and runoff such as temporary covers."  In 
response to this directive, Chem-Nuclear considered "several conceptual trench 
designs," including designs for "temporary roofs to keep water out of the trenches 
and vaults." Although Chem-Nuclear informed DHEC in 2001 it would take "up 
to two years to evaluate [these] designs," the ALC found in the 2005 order "Chem-
Nuclear ha[d] not completed its evaluation and ha[d] not submitted final designs to 
DHEC for review and approval."  
The ALC found it significant that Chem-Nuclear had not yet completed and 
submitted these final designs to DHEC, given the "undeniable 'rainfall problem.'"  
Specifically, the 2005 order stated, "Chem-Nuclear has already considered 
conceptual designs to keep rainfall out of the trenches, . . . [but] it failed to 
complete a report on its research and has not submitted such a report to DHEC, 
despite its request." Additionally, the ALC found further studies "were needed to 
evaluate the . . . feasibility of employing or implementing designs" that would: (1) 
"shelter disposal trenches from rainfall and prevent rainfall from entering the 
trenches," and (2) "provide for sealing and grouting the concrete disposal vaults to 
prevent the intrusion of water to the maximum extent feasible."  The order 
explained these additional studies were necessary because "no evidence was 
presented . . . that the Blue Ribbon Panel considered any of these particular issues."  
The ALC ordered that "Chem-Nuclear shall conduct the[se] studies . . . and submit 
the results to DHEC within 180 days." 
These findings and directives from the 2005 order support the importance of 
implementing measures to address concerns related to rainfall on the disposal 
units. Both DHEC and the ALC ordered Chem-Nuclear to consider such 
measures. However, none are currently in place, a fact directly relevant to Chem-
Nuclear's ability to reduce water migration onto the disposal units "to the smallest 
possible amount."   
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In conclusion, we find the record in this case conclusively demonstrates Chem-
Nuclear has taken no action whatsoever to prevent even one raindrop from 
migrating onto one active vault or trench.14  Additionally, while initial clay caps 
and enhanced caps reduce the migration of water onto inactive disposal units, there 
is no evidence and no finding by the ALC that DHEC has required, or that Chem-
Nuclear has taken, any action that would reduce this migration to the smallest 
possible amount.  In light of these facts, we hold the ALC erred in affirming 
DHEC's conclusion that Chem-Nuclear complied with subsection 7.11.11.1.  
2. Subsection 7.11.11.2 
Subsection 7.11.11.2 requires that Chem-Nuclear design and construct its disposal 
units and engineered barriers "to minimize the migration of waste or waste[-] 
contaminated water out of the disposal units."  DHEC and Chem-Nuclear contend 
the same definition of minimize used in the previous section applies to the analysis 
of this subsection. 
Based on the plain language of subsection 7.11.11.2, Chem-Nuclear must 
minimize the migration of two types of wastes: (1) the radioactive waste-form
contained within the disposal containers, and (2) water that has been contaminated 
by radioactive waste. As to the first, we agree with the ALC's determination that 
Chem-Nuclear's disposal units and engineered barriers minimize the migration of 
radioactive waste-forms out of disposal units.  The record establishes that Chem-
Nuclear uses disposal containers and reinforced concrete vaults, which prevent the 
migration of these waste-forms out of disposal units.  Thus, we affirm the ALC's 
14 DHEC argues in its petition for rehearing that we "misapprehended the 
requirement of subsection 7.11.11.1" because "[t]he regulation does not require a 
design that prevents rainfall onto the disposal units."  We do not believe our 
opinion can be fairly read to require Chem-Nuclear to prevent all rainfall onto the 
disposal units. Rather, the opinion is written to the requirement in subsection 
7.11.11.1 that Chem-Nuclear "minimize" rainfall.  See § 7.11.11.1 (requiring that 
Chem-Nuclear design and construct its disposal units and engineered barriers "to 
minimize the migration of water onto the disposal units" (emphasis added)).  We 
chose the phrase "prevent even one raindrop from migrating onto one active vault 
or trench" in contemplation of the reality that to minimize rainfall onto disposal 
units, Chem-Nuclear must start by taking some action in an attempt to stop one 
drop of rain. We are struck by the lack of any evidence that Chem-Nuclear has 
taken any action to stop any rainfall onto the disposal units.   
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ruling that DHEC correctly determined Chem-Nuclear is in compliance with this 
subsection as to the migration of the waste itself out of the disposal units.   
We next address whether Chem-Nuclear is in compliance as to the migration of 
waste-contaminated water out of the disposal units.  According to the 2005 order, 
the vaults contain holes that allow water to drain from them and into the trenches.  
As for the trenches, they are lined with partially impermeable materials so that 
liquids may drain to the soil below the trench.  Thus, "rainfall that accumulates in 
the trenches eventually percolates into the soil" and groundwater beneath the 
trenches. Also, the water table may rise during "wet periods," causing 
groundwater to "rise up into the [vaults]."   
The ALC relied on its previous findings related to subsection 7.11.11.1 to hold 
Chem-Nuclear complied with this subsection because the methods "designed to 
minimize the infiltration of water into the vaults" serve to "minimize[] the 
migration of . . . waste-contaminated water out of them."  We agree evidence of 
compliance with subsection 7.11.11.1 is relevant to our determination of 
compliance with this subsection.  This is because reducing the initial migration of 
water onto disposal units has a reciprocal effect upon reducing the migration of 
waste-contaminated water out of disposal units.  Therefore, our holding that Chem-
Nuclear failed to comply with subsection 7.11.11.1 relates to whether it complied 
with subsection 7.11.11.2 as to waste-contaminated water.15 
Relying on the two-part definition of minimize discussed in the previous section, 
we must first analyze whether there is evidence that Chem-Nuclear reduced the 
migration of waste-contaminated water out of disposal units.  The ALC found 
Chem-Nuclear's use of disposal containers prevents waste from coming into direct 
contact with water that enters vaults, which reduces the potential for water to 
become contaminated.  This, in turn, reduces the migration of waste-contaminated 
water out of vaults. Second, the ALC found that although the drainage holes in the 
vaults allow "water to rise up into the containers" and drain into the trenches 
below, they also allow water to drain away from the waste.  This decreases the 
15 Noncompliance with subsection 7.11.11.1 would not conclusively establish non-
compliance with this subsection.  Subsection 7.11.11.1 regulates the migration of 
"water," while subsection 7.11.11.2 regulates the migration of "waste[-] 
contaminated water."  Thus, the fact that water migrates onto and, subsequently, 
out of disposal units does not itself violate this subsection.  A violation occurs only 
when water is allowed to come in contact with waste and waste-contaminated 
water then migrates out of disposal units.   
 likelihood that water entering the vaults will become contaminated.  We agree the 
ALC's findings support the conclusion that Chem-Nuclear has taken some action to 
reduce the migration of waste-contaminated water from the disposal units.   
 
However, the ALC did not address the second part of the analysis—whether these 
measures are sufficient to meet DHEC's definition of minimize.  As we previously 
stated regarding subsection 7.11.11.1, compliance with subsection 7.11.11.2 
depends on whether there is evidence to support a finding that Chem-Nuclear's 
actions "reduce to the smallest amount possible" the migration of waste-
contaminated water out of disposal units.   
 
On this point, the 2005 order stated "trench water . . . becomes contaminated by the 
fact that there is some residual tritium on . . . vaults and waste packages that 
have . . . water on them as a result of rain."  Based on this fact, the following 
findings in the 2005 order demonstrate the vaults and trenches allow water that has 
come into contact with residual tritium on the disposal containers to migrate out of 
them:  
 
(1) 	 The "floors of the vaults have holes to allow water to drain from the 
vaults"; 
(2) 	 These drainage holes "can also allow water to rise up into the 

containers"; 

(3) 	 "[N]one of the trenches . . . have an impermeable liner";  
(4) 	 "The bottoms of the trenches" are not designed to "prevent the migration 
of liquids out of the bottom of trenches" and, in fact, are "designed to be 
partially impermeable and . . . allow liquids to infiltrate the soil below the 
trenches"; and 
(5) 	 "Precipitation in and on the disposal trenches drives tritium into the 
groundwater beneath the [facility]." 
 
As we acknowledged above, the holes in the vaults allow water to drain away from 
the waste, which decreases the likelihood that water entering the vaults will 
become contaminated.  Nevertheless, these holes permit water that has come in 
contact with residual tritium to drain into the trenches, which, in turn, allow the 
water to percolate into the soil and groundwater beneath the facility.  This supports 
that Chem-Nuclear has not taken action to reduce to the smallest possible amount 
the migration of waste-contaminated water out of its vaults and trenches.  
Moreover, the fact that Chem-Nuclear has failed to minimize the migration of 
water onto vaults under subsection 7.11.11.1 weighs in favor of non-compliance 
with subsection 7.11.11.2. 
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In affirming DHEC's conclusion that Chem-Nuclear complied with this subsection, 
the ALC recognized that trench bottoms "are designed to be partially impermeable 
and allow liquids to infiltrate the soil below" them.  However, the ALC noted the 
2005 order contained "no finding that Chem-Nuclear's waste disposal design is 
faulty or fails to minimize the migration of . . . waste-contaminated water out of 
disposal units." We find the ALC erred in relying on the absence of such a finding 
in the 2005 order. 
In Chem-Nuclear I, we held "section 7.11 imposes additional compliance 
requirements" not addressed by the 2005 order.  387 S.C. at 435, 693 S.E.2d at 19. 
We remanded for the ALC "to apply its factual findings [in the 2005 order] to the 
technical requirements" of section 7.11—including subsection 7.11.11.2.  387 S.C. 
at 435, 693 S.E.2d at 18-19. Thus, the ALC could not rely on the fact that the 2005 
order did not contain the conclusion we ordered the ALC to make on remand— 
whether, based on the factual findings in the 2005 order, the disposal units
minimized the migration of waste-contaminated water out of them.  The lack of 
such a conclusion in the 2005 order was the very reason we remanded for the ALC 
to make this determination.   
We also find the ALC erred in relying on evidence that "improvements in waste 
disposal procedures" have reduced the "tritium concentration at the compliance 
point." As acknowledged by the ALC in the remand order, this evidence "does not 
get to the heart of the technical requirements" established by the subsection.  This 
is because subsection 7.11.11.2 imposes technical requirements, and we find the 
evidence does not relate to the requirement that the disposal units be designed to 
minimize the migration of waste-contaminated water out of them.  Instead, this 
evidence relates to Chem-Nuclear's compliance with the result-based performance 
objectives contained in section 7.18—that Chem-Nuclear keep radioactive releases
to the general environment "as low as is reasonably achievable."  Subsection 
7.11.11.2 required DHEC and the ALC to analyze the sufficiency of Chem-
Nuclear's actions to comply with the plain language of this subsection.  Thus, we 
cannot base our decision on the fact that Chem-Nuclear has reduced the overall 
tritium concentration at the compliance point. 
We conclude the record demonstrates Chem-Nuclear has taken measures to reduce 
the migration of waste-contaminated water out of disposal units.  However, the 
record does not support a finding that Chem-Nuclear complied with subsection 
7.11.11.2. We base our holding on (1) Chem-Nuclear's failure to comply with 
subsection 7.11.11.1, and (2) there being no evidence, and no finding, that Chem-
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Nuclear has taken action to "minimize"—reduce to the smallest amount possible— 
the migration of waste-contaminated water out of disposal units.  We hold the ALC 
erred in affirming DHEC's conclusion that Chem-Nuclear complied with 
subsection 7.11.11.2. 
 
3. 	 Subsection 7.11.11.4 
 
Subsection 7.11.11.4 requires Chem-Nuclear to design and construct its disposal 
units and engineered barriers in a way that allows for "temporary collection and 
retention of water and other liquids for a time sufficient to allow for the detection 
and removal or other remedial measures without the contamination of groundwater 
or the surrounding soil." The plain language of this subsection imposes multiple 
requirements on Chem-Nuclear: (1) collect and retain water that migrates onto the 
disposal units, (2) test this water for radioactive waste material, (3) if such waste 
material is discovered, engage in removal or remedial measures, and (4) 
accomplish this without contaminating the groundwater or surrounding soil.  
 
The ALC relied on the following findings in the 2005 order to support its 
conclusion that Chem-Nuclear complied with this subsection:  
 
(1) 	 Chem-Nuclear implements a surface water management plan to manage 
precipitation that collects in trenches, which involves pumping water into 
adjacent trenches or a lined pond; and 
(2) 	 The trenches are designed to prevent the flow of surface water from 
coming into contact with waste.  
 
We find neither finding supports—and only one addresses—the ALC's 
determination that DHEC correctly concluded Chem-Nuclear complied with this 
subsection. Finding (1)—regarding Chem-Nuclear's surface water management 
plan—is relevant to the first requirement of subsection 7.11.11.4, "temporary 
collection and retention of water." However, there is no evidence that Chem-
Nuclear tests the water pumped from the trenches for radioactive waste material.  
The subsection requires Chem-Nuclear to do more than collect and retain the 
water. Finding (2)—that trenches are designed to prevent surface water from 
coming into contact with waste—is irrelevant to Chem-Nuclear's compliance with 
this subsection. It has nothing to do with collecting, testing, or removing 
contaminated water from the disposal units.  Because the ALC cited no additional 
evidence of Chem-Nuclear's compliance with this subsection, we hold the ALC 
erred in affirming DHEC's determination that Chem-Nuclear complied with 
subsection 7.11.11.4. 
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Upon our review of the 2005 order, we find no evidence of compliance with this 
subsection.16  In fact, the evidence in the record demonstrates Chem-Nuclear is not 
in compliance.  First, the vaults and trenches are designed to allow water that 
enters them to drain into the soil and groundwater below.  That water is not tested 
before it enters the ground. Second, the only other evidence relevant to this 
subsection is the finding in the 2005 order that states, "None of the trenches at the 
[facility] have . . . a leachate collection system."  Leachate is defined as "any 
liquid, including any suspended or dissolved components in the liquid, that has 
percolated through or drained from the [radioactive] material." 10 C.F.R. § 40 app. 
A (2011). Although the regulation does not define "leachate collection system," in 
common industry usage, it is "a system or device . . . that is designed, constructed, 
maintained, and operated to collect and remove leachate" for proper disposal.  40 
C.F.R. § 503.21(i) (2011); see also 40 C.F.R. § 264.301(a)(2) (2011).17  Such a 
system would allow Chem-Nuclear to satisfy the four requirements of subsection 
7.11.11.4—(1) collect water migrating onto the disposal units, (2) test this water, 
(3) remove waste-contaminated water, and (4) do this without contaminating the 
groundwater because the system would collect the leachate for alternate disposal.  
Thus, the ALC's finding regarding the non-existence of a leachate collection 
system undermines its conclusion that Chem-Nuclear complied with this 
subsection and supports our determination that the ALC erred in reaching that 
conclusion. 
 
16 This regulation imposes requirements for the design and construction of 
"disposal units" and "engineered barriers."  While Chem-Nuclear has monitoring 
wells to test the groundwater for contamination and a system to monitor water 
accumulation in trenches, neither of these qualifies as a disposal unit.  See § 7.2.8 
(defining "disposal unit" as "a discrete portion of the disposal site into which waste 
is placed for disposal").  To the extent they are considered engineered barriers—"a 
man-made structure or device that is intended to improve the land disposal 
facility's ability to meet the performance objectives in this part," § 7.2.9 (emphasis 
added)—there is no evidence these monitoring "devices" allow Chem-Nuclear to 
collect and test this water "without the contamination of the groundwater."  
§ 7.11.11.4.  
17 These regulations provide the Environmental Protection Agency's definition of 
"leachate collection system" as stated in the regulations for "surface disposal" of 
"sewage sludge," 40 C.F.R. § 503.20(a) (2011), and "dispos[al] of hazardous waste 
in landfills," 40 C.F.R. § 264.300 (2011).
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DHEC and Chem-Nuclear argue Chem-Nuclear is justified in not having a leachate 
collection system due to "concerns regarding the radioactive exposure to workers 
handling and processing the leachate."  We find the argument contrary to the 
purpose and intent of the regulation. We fail to see how the danger of radioactive 
contamination to workers actually justifies releasing it into the groundwater 
without testing and remediation. Rather, it seems the danger to health and safety 
requires testing and remediation. We believe the drafters of these regulations 
imposed such a requirement for just that purpose.  Subsection 7.11.11.4 contains 
no language excusing Chem-Nuclear's duty to comply with its regulatory 
requirements, which is especially important when the excuse for not taking a 
particular action is the very reason for the regulation—health and safety.  Instead, 
the focus of compliance is on what action Chem-Nuclear did take—whether it 
designed and constructed its engineered barriers in a manner that allows it to 
collect, test, and remove contamination before it percolates into the soil and 
groundwater.18 
We find no evidence to support a finding that Chem-Nuclear meets the 
requirements imposed by this subsection.  We hold the ALC erred in affirming 
DHEC's conclusion that Chem-Nuclear complied with subsection 7.11.11.4. 
4. Subsection 7.11.11.6 
Subsection 7.11.11.6 requires Chem-Nuclear to design and construct its disposal 
units and engineered barriers in a way that provides "reasonable assurance that the 
waste will be isolated for at least the institutional control period."   
We hold the ALC did not err in affirming DHEC's determination that Chem-
Nuclear's current disposal units and engineered barriers—including the disposal 
containers, concrete disposal vaults, disposal vault lids, disposal trenches, and 
18 In deciding whether Chem-Nuclear's operations met the ALARA standard, the 
2005 order appropriately weighed Chem-Nuclear's concerns regarding exposure to 
workers because an ALARA analysis involves balancing the benefit to the general 
public with the risk associated with worker exposure.  See 24A S.C. Code Ann. 
Regs. 61-63 § 7.20 (1992) ("Operations at the land disposal facility shall be 
conducted in compliance with the standards for radiation protection . . . [and]
governed by 7.18."). In determining compliance with the technical requirements of 
subsection 7.11.11.4, however, we consider the actions taken by Chem-Nuclear to 
comply, not the reasons why it decided not to implement a certain measure based 
on its own ALARA analysis. 
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enhanced caps on inactive trenches—comply with subsection 7.11.11.6.  Waste is 
put into a disposal container, which is then placed into a reinforced concrete vault 
that is covered with an initial clay cap and buried in a disposal trench.  Once the 
trench is full, Chem-Nuclear installs an enhanced cap over the trench.  The 
following findings from the 2005 order demonstrate that the use of these disposal 
units and engineered barriers provide reasonable assurance the waste will be 
isolated from the general environment and inadvertent intruders "for at least the 
institutional control period": (1) the predictions of a "continually declining trend in 
radioactive releases to the general environment"; and (2) the Blue Ribbon Panel's 
conclusion that the facility's disposal practices "pose a minimal risk to either the 
environment or members of the public, both today and in the long-term future." 
(emphasis added).   
5. Subsection 7.11.11.7 
Subsection 7.11.11.7 requires Chem-Nuclear to design and construct its disposal 
units and engineered barriers in a way that "prevent[s] contact between the waste 
and the surrounding earth, except for earthen materials which may be used for 
backfilling within the disposal units." We interpret the plain language of this 
subsection as seeking to prevent waste, and not waste-contaminated water, from
coming in contact with soil.  Otherwise, the regulatory effect of subsections 
7.11.11.1 and 7.11.11.2 becomes obsolete.19  Under this interpretation, we hold the 
ALC did not err in affirming DHEC's determination that Chem-Nuclear complied 
with this subsection because the "placement of waste in a waste container and a 
reinforced concrete vault" prevents the waste from coming into direct contact with 
the soil. 
19 Subsections 7.11.11.1 and 7.11.11.2 explicitly regulate the migration of water
onto disposal units and the migration of waste and waste-contaminated water out 
of disposal units.  This distinction between "water," "waste," and "waste-
contaminated water" in these subsections supports a conclusion that these 
regulations seek to prevent waste and waste-contaminated water from infiltrating 
the soil and groundwater beneath disposal units.  Thus, we narrowly construe 
subsection 7.11.11.7 as applying to only the prevention of waste, and not waste-
contaminated water, from coming in contact with the soil.  To the extent the ALC 
relied on evidence related to subsections 7.11.11.1 and 7.11.11.2, we hold the ALC 
erred in that regard. 
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C. Subsection 7.23.6 
Subsection 7.23.6 requires Chem-Nuclear to design the disposal site in a way that 
"minimize[s] to the extent practicable the contact of water with waste during 
storage, the contact of standing water with waste during disposal, and the contact 
of percolating or standing water with wastes after disposal."20 
As we previously discussed, subsection 7.23.6 imposes technical requirements that 
require Chem-Nuclear to take action to design and construct the disposal site to 
meet the specifications of this subsection.  Thus, DHEC and Chem-Nuclear cannot 
demonstrate compliance with subsection 7.23.6 simply by showing Chem-Nuclear 
met the performance objectives of other subsections.  Chem-Nuclear I, 387 S.C. at 
436, 693 S.E.2d at 19. Instead, we must consider whether Chem-Nuclear took any 
actions to meet the technical requirements of this subsection, and if so, the 
sufficiency of Chem-Nuclear's actions.        
This subsection distinguishes between "water," "standing water," and "percolating 
water" and between the three different phases of operations at the facility—storage, 
disposal, and after disposal. This subsection requires Chem-Nuclear to implement 
practices that drain or remove water from active vaults and trenches, as well as 
minimize to the extent practicable the entry of water into inactive vaults and 
trenches. Although the failure to minimize the migration of water onto active 
vaults and trenches under subsection 7.11.11.1 contributes to the accumulation of 
standing water, the regulatory effect of this subsection, when narrowly construed, 
requires Chem-Nuclear to implement methods to minimize to the extent 
practicable standing water that has already migrated into the disposal units. 
As to the requirement that Chem-Nuclear design the disposal site in a way that 
minimizes to the extent practicable the contact of water with waste during storage, 
the ALC found that "[a]ny 'storage' of waste is temporary" because "there is 
available disposal capacity at the [facility]."  The ALC stated that when a shipment 
of waste is received, it is taken either to the appropriate trench for disposal or to the 
Cask Maintenance Building, where Chem-Nuclear inspects the casks and prepares 
them for off-loading.  The ALC found that "[b]ased on the practice of inspecting 
and preparing waste for disposal within the [Cask Maintenance Building], Chem-
20 "Disposal site" is defined as "that portion of a land disposal facility which is 
used for disposal of waste" and "consists of disposal units and a buffer zone."  24A 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-63 § 7.2.7 (1992).  
Nuclear minimizes the contact of water with waste prior to off-loading the waste 
into the trench." We affirm because this evidence relied on by the ALC supports 
compliance with this particular requirement of subsection 7.23.6.   
 
As to whether Chem-Nuclear designed the disposal site to minimize to the extent 
practicable the contact of standing water with waste during disposal, we interpret 
this requirement as applying to Chem-Nuclear's active vaults and trenches.  We 
hold the ALC did not err in affirming DHEC's conclusion that Chem-Nuclear 
complied with this requirement of subsection 7.23.6 because the following findings 
from the 2005 order support this conclusion:  
 
(1) 	 The vaults and trenches are designed to allow water to flow out of them;  
(2) 	 Trenches are sloped and contain other design features that prevent "water 
from coming in contact with waste";  
(3) 	 Each trench has a drainage system that allows Chem-Nuclear to monitor 
any water that accumulates in the trench; and  
(4) 	 Chem-Nuclear implements a surface water management plan to manage 
rainwater that collects in the open trenches.  
 
Turning to the requirement regarding minimizing to the extent practicable the 
contact of percolating or standing water with wastes after disposal, we interpret 
this as applying to Chem-Nuclear's inactive vaults and trenches.  We hold the 
following findings relied on by the ALC support DHEC's determination of 
compliance:  
 
(1) 	 When vaults become full, Chem-Nuclear places an initial clay cap over 
inactive vaults; 
(2) 	 When trenches become full, Chem-Nuclear installs an impermeable 
enhanced cap on inactive trenches; and 
(3) 	 Employees fill void spaces between the vaults with backfill, which 

"minimizes the potential for subsidence of the enhanced caps."   

 
Based on the above discussion, we hold the ALC did not err in finding DHEC 
correctly determined Chem-Nuclear is in compliance with subsection 7.23.6.   
 
D.	  Subsection 7.10.7 
 
Subsection 7.10.7 requires DHEC to find Chem-Nuclear "provides reasonable 
assurance that the applicable technical requirements of [part VII] will be met."  
The technical requirements relevant to this appeal include those set forth in 
101 
 
 
 102
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
subsections 7.11.11 and 7.23.6. Based on Chem-Nuclear's noncompliance with 
subsections 7.11.11.1, 7.11.11.2, and 7.11.11.4—particularly the absence of 
evidence that Chem-Nuclear took any action to comply with the technical 
requirements of subsections 7.11.11.1 and 7.11.11.4—we do not understand how 
DHEC could make, nor how the ALC could affirm, a finding that Chem-Nuclear 
provided assurance it would meet the applicable technical requirements. 
DHEC argues, however, Chem-Nuclear is in compliance with these subsections 
because "tritium concentrations began to decline at the compliance point" after "the
incorporation of new disposal techniques." While this may have been a reasonable 
position for DHEC to take prior to our opinion in Chem-Nuclear I, the argument 
ignores our holding in that case—that the "specific technical requirements" of 
7.11.11 cannot be met by satisfying the "performance objectives" of 7.10.  As we 
found in Chem-Nuclear I, "section 7.11 imposes additional compliance 
requirements for Chem-Nuclear such that the balancing test of ALARA would not 
be sufficient to address[] whether Chem-Nuclear is in compliance with section 
7.11." 387 S.C. at 435, 693 S.E.2d at 19.   
DHEC nevertheless continues to argue the "technical requirements are written to 
meet the performance objectives," and Chem-Nuclear may comply with them
without taking any action—as long as it meets the performance objectives.  In its 
petition for rehearing, DHEC states "the Court overlooks and misapprehends the 
crucial interplay of the performance objectives and [technical] requirements," and 
argues "evidence that the performance objectives have been met is appropriate to 
demonstrate compliance with other requirements of the regulation."  We disagree 
with DHEC's interpretation of the regulations.  The "interplay" between the 
performance objectives and the technical requirements of the regulations was 
squarely raised in Chem-Nuclear I. In that case, DHEC specifically "argue[d] the 
[court] . . . must apply the [performance objectives] criteria set forth in section 7.10 
. . . rather than apply [technical requirements] criteria set forth in sections 7.11 and 
7.23.6." 387 S.C. at 431, 693 S.E.2d at 16.  We specifically rejected the argument 
and held the technical requirements of the regulation must also be met—they 
cannot be satisfied simply by meeting performance objectives.  387 S.C. at 435-36, 
693 S.E.2d at 18-19.
There can be no doubt that the technical requirements are designed to bring about 
compliance with the performance criteria.  As DHEC points out, "The overarching 
purpose of the Part VII requirements is to ensure that the performance objectives of 
subsection 7.18 (ALARA) through 7.21 are met."  However, DHEC's argument 
renders the technical requirements optional, and thus essentially writes them out of 
 the regulations. To illustrate this point, we consider how DHEC's argument would 
affect Chem-Nuclear's duty to comply with subsection 7.24.2.  DHEC 
acknowledges in its petition for rehearing that subsection 7.24.2 "contain[s] 
requirements for specific action[]" by Chem-Nuclear.  Under the subsection, 
Chem-Nuclear must place five meters of material above the top of the waste after 
the storage unit becomes inactive. We also consider subsection 7.11.11.7, which 
requires Chem-Nuclear to "prevent[] . . . contact between the waste and the 
surrounding earth." Under DHEC's theory that it may demonstrate compliance 
with the technical requirements of these subsections simply by meeting the 
performance objectives in other subsections, Chem-Nuclear is not actually required 
to place five meters of fill on top of the waste, or prevent contact between the 
waste and the earth. Rather, DHEC's argument allows Chem-Nuclear to ignore the 
specific, clear, and unambiguous requirements of these subsections by 
demonstrating compliance with performance objectives—despite the fact that the 
technical requirements subsections do not provide such an exception.  We fully 
understand the technical requirements are interconnected with the performance 
objectives and are designed primarily to ensure the performance objectives are 
achieved. We do not agree, however, that the technical requirements may be 
ignored as long as the performance objectives are met.   
 
In light of our holding in Chem-Nuclear I, however, it is no longer reasonable for 
DHEC to argue Chem-Nuclear complied with subsection 7.10.7 without 
considering what action Chem-Nuclear took to comply with the technical 
requirements of 7.11.11. This is particularly true given that Chem-Nuclear failed 
to take any action to comply with the requirements of subsections 7.11.11.1 and 
7.11.11.4. And yet, DHEC continues to assert Chem-Nuclear "provide[d] 
reasonable assurance that the applicable technical requirements of [its own 
regulations] will be met." Considering, for example, the technical requirement in 
subsection 7.11.11.1—that Chem-Nuclear "minimize the migration of [rainfall] 
onto the disposal units"—DHEC could not identify one action Chem-Nuclear took 
to meet this requirement. Nevertheless, DHEC determined Chem-Nuclear 
complied with subsection 7.10.7 by providing reasonable assurance that this 
technical requirement of 7.11.11.1 would be met.   
 
To determine whether DHEC complied with subsection 7.10.7 in light of these 
facts, we consider DHEC's role in the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.  In 
1967, our General Assembly enacted the Atomic Energy and Radiation Control 
Act. See Act No. 223, 1967 S.C. Acts 305 (codified at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-10 
to -100 (1977 & Supp. 2013)). Noting "that remarkable scientific developments 
have occurred in the field[] of atomic energy," and "plans for further developments 
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. . . are creating broad opportunities and also responsibilities for the states," id. at 
305, the General Assembly found "[i]t is prudent and wise that the State [give] . . . 
full consideration of the health and safety requirements of its people."  Id. at 305-
06. Based on these findings, the General Assembly required DHEC to "formulate, 
adopt, [and] promulgate . . . regulations relating to the control of ionizing and 
nonionizing radiation."  S.C. Code Ann. § 13-7-40(F)(3) (Supp. 2013).  Pursuant to 
this mandate, DHEC promulgated Part VII of regulation 61-63.  Under the 
authority of the Act, the regulations are the law of South Carolina,21 and DHEC is 
required by law to enforce them. See S.C. Code Ann. § 13-7-40(A) (Supp. 2013) 
(providing DHEC "is designated as the agency of the State which is responsible for 
the control and regulation of radiation sources"); § 13-7-40(F)(9) (stating DHEC 
"shall . . . provide by regulation for the licensing . . . of radiation sources"). 
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), through its federal 
enforcement policy, has emphasized the importance of regulatory enforcement 
when nuclear disposal facilities do not conduct their operations with "the necessary 
meticulous attention to detail" and in accordance with "the high standard of 
compliance" imposed by the applicable regulations.  General Statement of Policy 
and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, 10 C.F.R. Pt. 2, app. C (1995).  
Thus, while it is important for private companies such as Chem-Nuclear to comply 
with applicable regulations, it is equally important, if not more so, that the 
administrative agency mandated by law to enforce the regulations require 
adherence to its own standard for compliance.  To allow otherwise would impede 
the purpose for which DHEC was created—to act in the public interest—and risk 
the health and safety of our citizens.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 48-1-20 (2008) ("It is 
declared to be the public policy of the State to maintain reasonable standards of 
purity of the air and water resources of the State, consistent with the public health, 
safety and welfare of its citizens, . . . [and] that to secure these purposes and the 
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter, [DHEC] shall have authority to 
abate, control and prevent pollution."). 
DHEC promulgated regulation 61-63 under statutory mandate for the obvious 
reason that nuclear waste can adversely affect the health and welfare of our citizens 
if not disposed of properly. In doing so, DHEC required Chem-Nuclear to comply 
with the "technical requirements" and "performance objectives" that DHEC chose 
to put in the regulations. It is important that DHEC enforce its own regulations 
21 See S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 
390 S.C. 418, 429, 702 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2010) (noting "a regulation has the force 
of law"). 
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and require Chem-Nuclear to take action to comply with the technical 
requirements. This importance derives not simply from the need to avoid the 
serious consequences of non-compliance; it is important because it is the law.  We 
are concerned that DHEC did not follow the law in failing to require Chem-
Nuclear to comply with all of the technical requirements of subsection 7.11.11.
We are also concerned by DHEC's decision not to amend the requirements for 
issuance of the license after the ALC instructed Chem-Nuclear in its 2005 order to 
submit a report to DHEC regarding the feasibility of covering trenches and sealing 
vaults. The propriety of DHEC's decision to "concur[] with the report's evaluation 
of the issues" is not before this court, and we do not base our holding on the merits 
of that decision.22  However, the fact that DHEC did not require Chem-Nuclear to 
take any action or make any changes to its disposal practices casts doubt upon 
DHEC's decision to renew the license.   
Regardless of our affirmance of Chem-Nuclear's compliance with the remaining 
subsections of 7.11.11, we hold the ALC erred in affirming DHEC's determination 
that Chem-Nuclear complied with subsection 7.10.7.
V. Remedy 
As to four separate subsections of regulation 61-63, DHEC failed to enforce the 
law of South Carolina. As to each, the ALC erred in finding Chem-Nuclear in 
compliance.  Under the law, Chem-Nuclear's license to operate the facility is 
invalid. However, the appellant informed the court at oral argument it does not 
seek revocation of the license; it asks simply that DHEC enforce its regulations, 
and that Chem-Nuclear comply.  In light of this request, we decline to rule the 
permit is invalid.  Rather, we remand to DHEC for further proceedings.   
22 A footnote in the ALC's order states Chem-Nuclear conducted these studies and 
DHEC "concurred with the report's evaluation of the issues."  The record does not 
contain the results of these studies or the reasons DHEC chose not to amend the 
license requirements as a result of the report. The basis of DHEC's decision not to
amend the license or impose additional requirements for operating the facility is 
not before this court. While DHEC must enforce—and Chem-Nuclear must 
comply with—the regulations, it is not our place to disagree with DHEC as to how 
it should enforce its own regulations, or mandate how Chem-Nuclear should 
comply with these regulations.  We merely review the ALC's and DHEC's 
determinations of compliance without passing judgment upon the technical aspects 
of how this compliance is accomplished. 
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DHEC and Chem-Nuclear argue on rehearing that this court's requirement in 
Chem-Nuclear I that all remand proceedings be based only on the factual findings 
of the 2005 order has hampered both DHEC and Chem-Nuclear's efforts to 
demonstrate to this court compliance with subsections 7.11.11.1 and 7.11.11.2 and 
others. We understand the problem. On remand, DHEC shall consider all 
available information as to whether Chem-Nuclear has complied with the 
regulations. On appeal to the ALC, it may conduct its proceedings with no 
limitations from this court on the evidence it may consider. 
VI. Conclusion 
We affirm the ALC as to all issues presented to this court, except Chem-Nuclear's
compliance with subsections 7.11.11.1, 7.11.11.2, 7.11.11.4, and 7.10.7.  As to 
those four subsections, we hold the ALC erred in affirming DHEC's conclusion 
that Chem-Nuclear was in compliance.  
HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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LOCKEMY: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, George Wigington 
(Petitioner) argues the PCR court erred in finding trial counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to properly argue to the trial court and preserve for appellate review 
whether he was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter jury charge.  We reverse 
and remand for a new trial. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In August 2005, Petitioner was indicted by a Spartanburg County grand jury for 
murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. 
At trial, Petitioner testified his son, his son's girlfriend, and his two granddaughters 
lived with him at the time of the incident.  Petitioner testified he got home around 
seven in the evening on the day of the incident and heard what sounded like a very 
loud argument. He explained he heard his son's voice.  He testified when he got 
inside the house, he walked into his son's bedroom and saw his granddaughter, 
Jessica Wigington, standing near the bed crying and his son was berating her.  
Petitioner stated he told his son to calm down and not be so loud, then left the 
bedroom and went into the den to watch television.  He explained his son and 
granddaughter came into the den shortly thereafter, and they were still arguing.  He 
testified he again told his son to quiet down and give his granddaughter a chance to 
talk. He stated they sat down, but the loud arguing continued.  Petitioner explained 
he stood up, walked over to the chair where his son was seated, put his left hand on 
his son's right shoulder, and told his son to calm down.  He further explained his 
son immediately stood up and said, "if you put your hands on me again, I'll kill 
you." He testified he had previously been the victim of criminal domestic violence 
with his son, and he felt he "didn't know what was going to happen next."  
Petitioner stated he "felt for [his] safety and [he] felt for [his] grandchildren's 
safety." He explained he believed he was in danger because his son had just 
threatened to kill him.   
Petitioner testified the situation had escalated out of control and he needed to do 
something to protect himself and his grandchildren, so he went to his car and got 
his pistol out of the locked glove box.  He stated he made sure the safety was on, 
and then put the gun in his pocket.  He explained he walked back into the den, with 
his hand in the pocket where the gun was located.  Petitioner testified his son asked 
him if he went to retrieve his gun, and he told his son he had because the situation 
was getting out of control. He stated he took the gun out of his pocket and was 
holding it, but was not pointing it at his son.  Petitioner explained he walked closer 
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to the chair his son was sitting in, and then his son grabbed his hand holding the 
gun. He testified the struggle felt like it lasted a long time, but he was sure it was 
only a few seconds. He stated he did not mean to pull the trigger and was 
surprised when the gun discharged because he thought the safety was on.  He 
explained his son had not done anything to him to make him want to shoot him.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court stated it intended to charge the jury on 
murder, accident, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime.  Trial counsel asked the trial court to charge the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter, self-defense, and involuntary manslaughter. As to involuntary 
manslaughter, trial counsel argued "if you were going to charge self-defense, I 
believe we, we would be entitled to a, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter."  
The trial court granted trial counsel's request to charge the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter, but denied trial counsel's request to charge the jury on self-defense 
and involuntary manslaughter. 
The jury convicted Petitioner of murder and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent 
sentences of life imprisonment for murder and five years' imprisonment for 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.   
On appeal, this court held Petitioner was not entitled to a jury instruction on self-
defense because he was at fault in bringing on the difficulty and he did not 
reasonably believe he was in actual danger. As to Petitioner's argument that he 
was lawfully armed in self-defense at the time of the shooting and did not 
intentionally discharge the weapon, this court held Petitioner's argument was 
unpreserved because Petitioner did not raise this argument to the trial court.  
Instead, Petitioner only argued he would be entitled to a charge on involuntary 
manslaughter if the trial court determined it was appropriate to charge self-defense.  
Accordingly, this court affirmed Petitioner's convictions.  See State v. Wigington, 
375 S.C. 25, 649 S.E.2d 185 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Petitioner subsequently filed a PCR application.  At the PCR hearing, Jessica 
testified she was present when Petitioner killed her father.  She stated she was 
looking at her father's head when he was shot in the head.  She explained she did 
not see Petitioner point the gun at her father or pull the trigger.  She testified 
Petitioner and her father did not wrestle over the gun, and her father was not 
touching Petitioner at the time Petitioner shot him.
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Roger Poole, an employee of the Spartanburg County Public Defender's Office, 
testified he had trial counsel's file from Petitioner's case and had reviewed it.1 
Poole testified trial counsel requested jury charges on self-defense and involuntary 
manslaughter, and the trial court denied trial counsel's requests.  He stated this 
court affirmed the trial court's denial.   
Petitioner also testified at the PCR hearing regarding his version of the facts 
leading up to the incident. He stated he felt the trial court "took away [his] entire 
defense." Petitioner explained his defense was the fact that his son was "raging on 
crack cocaine," his son was screaming at his granddaughter, and his son threatened 
to kill him, so he went and got his gun for protection.  Petitioner testified he did not 
intentionally point the gun at his son, and during their struggle over the gun, it just 
went off. Petitioner asserted he did not want trial counsel to "fight on the self-
defense claim" because Petitioner "didn't think [he] had a self-defense claim."  
Petitioner stated he felt his strongest defense was the fact that his son had drugs in 
his system. Petitioner further testified his defense was accident, asserting his son's 
death was an "[a]ccidental death." He explained the threatening manner his son 
was acting was important because it was why he went to get his gun.  Petitioner 
further explained his son was considerably stronger than he was, and he was 
seventy-four years old at the time of the incident.   
The PCR court denied Petitioner's application, finding Petitioner's "testimony to be 
completely lacking in credibility." The PCR court also found trial counsel "was 
not ineffective for failing to persuade the [trial] court to adopt self-defense and 
involuntary manslaughter jury [charges]."  Moreover, the PCR court found trial 
counsel "properly made this request and the trial court denied the request."  
Further, the PCR court found Petitioner failed to show the trial court and this 
court's rulings were incorrect and Petitioner failed to establish any error by trial 
counsel in his presentation of these arguments to the trial court.  Petitioner did not 
file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion asking the PCR court to rule on whether trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the argument that he was lawfully 
armed at the time of the shooting and the evidence reduced the crime from murder 
to manslaughter. This court granted Petitioner's petition for certiorari on March 
12, 2014. 
1 Petitioner's trial counsel, Michael Bartosh, died before Petitioner's PCR hearing.   
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A PCR applicant has the burden of proving his entitlement to relief by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See Thompson v. State, 340 S.C. 112, 115, 531 
S.E.2d 294, 296 (2000); Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP.  This court gives great deference to 
the PCR court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  McCray v. State, 317 S.C. 
557, 560 n.2, 455 S.E.2d 686, 688 n.2 (1995).  If matters of credibility are 
involved, this court gives deference to the PCR court's findings because this court 
lacks the opportunity to observe the witnesses directly.  Solomon v. State, 313 S.C. 
526, 530, 443 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322, 737 S.E.2d 480 (2013). If there is any probative evidence to 
support the findings of the PCR court, those findings must be upheld.  Cherry v.
State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989).  Likewise, a PCR court's 
findings should not be upheld if there is no probative evidence to support them.  
Holland v. State, 322 S.C. 111, 113, 470 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1996). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Petitioner argues the PCR court erred in finding trial counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to preserve the involuntary manslaughter jury charge issue for appellate 
review. Petitioner contends he was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter jury 
charge under the second definition of involuntary manslaughter based on the 
evidence presented during his trial. Petitioner asserts trial counsel's performance 
was deficient because he failed to preserve the issue and trial counsel argued the 
wrong law to the trial court. Further, Petitioner contends trial counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced his case because if trial counsel preserved his involuntary 
manslaughter argument, Petitioner would have been entitled to a new trial and a 
jury charge on involuntary manslaughter.   
A. Law 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCR applicant must 
prove counsel's performance was deficient, and the deficient performance 
prejudiced the applicant's case.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 
(1984); Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.  To show counsel was 
deficient, the applicant must establish counsel failed to render reasonably effective 
assistance under prevailing professional norms.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; 
Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625.  To show prejudice, the applicant must 
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show that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the 
trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Johnson v. State, 325 
S.C. 182, 186, 480 S.E.2d 733, 735 (1997).  "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial."  Johnson, 
325 S.C. at 186, 480 S.E.2d at 735. 
"If there is any evidence to warrant a jury instruction, a trial court must, upon 
request, give the instruction." State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 412, 706 S.E.2d 12, 14 
(2011). "[A] trial court commits reversible error if it fails to give a requested 
charge on an issue raised by the evidence" presented at trial.  State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 
260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993).  "The law to be charged to the jury is 
determined by the evidence presented at trial."  Id.
Involuntary manslaughter is: (1) the unintentional killing 
of another without malice, but while engaged in an 
unlawful activity not amounting to a felony and not 
naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or 
(2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, 
while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard 
for the safety of others. 
Smith, 391 S.C. at 414, 706 S.E.2d at 15.  For the purposes of an involuntary 
manslaughter jury charge, "'[a] person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in 
unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense 
at the time of the shooting.'" State v. Brayboy, 387 S.C. 174, 180, 691 S.E.2d 482, 
485 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 
112 (2003)). "[A] self-defense charge and an involuntary manslaughter charge are 
not mutually exclusive . . . ."  State v. Light, 378 S.C. 641, 650, 664 S.E.2d 465, 
470 (2008). 
There is a difference between being armed in self-
defense and acting in self-defense . . . . [In] determining 
whether one is armed in self-defense, the court is 
"concerned only with whether the defendant had a right 
to be armed for purposes of determining whether he was 
engaged in a lawful act, i.e. was lawfully armed, and not 
whether he actually acted in self-defense when the 
shooting occurred." 
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Brayboy, 387 S.C at 181, 691 S.E.2d at 486 (quoting Light, 378 S.C 641, 664 
S.E.2d 465). Our appellate courts have held that "evidence of a struggle over a 
weapon between a defendant and victim supports submission of an involuntary 
manslaughter charge" when the evidence shows the defendant was lawfully armed 
in self-defense at the time of the shooting and the defendant recklessly handled the 
loaded gun. Id. at 180, 691 S.E.2d at 485; see also State v. Rivera, 389 S.C. 399, 
404-05, 699 S.E.2d 157, 159-60 (2010); Light, 378 S.C. at 648-49, 664 S.E.2d at 
468-69; Tisdale v. State, 378 S.C. 122, 125-26, 662 S.E.2d 410, 412 (2008); State 
v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 265, 513 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1999).  "Recklessness is a state 
of mind in which the actor is aware of his or her conduct, yet consciously 
disregards a risk which his or her conduct is creating." State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 
527, 571, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167 (2008). 
 
B. Analysis 
 
We find Petitioner was entitled to a jury instruction under the second definition of 
involuntary manslaughter.  See Smith, 391 S.C. at 414, 706 S.E.2d at 15 (defining 
involuntary manslaughter under the second definition as "the unintentional killing 
of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless 
disregard for the safety of others"); id. at 412, 706 S.E.2d at 14 ("If there is any 
evidence to warrant a jury instruction, a trial court must, upon request, give the 
instruction."). Petitioner's testimony from trial provides some evidence that 
Petitioner did not intend to kill his son.  Petitioner's testimony indicates the gun 
went off during his struggle with his son, he did not mean to pull the trigger, and 
his son had not done anything to make Petitioner want to shoot him.   
 
The closer question is whether Petitioner was "engaged in a lawful activity with 
reckless disregard for the safety of others."  Smith, 391 S.C. at 414, 706 S.E.2d at 
15. Petitioner's testimony establishes his actions amounted to presenting a loaded 
firearm, a felony.2   See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-410 (2003) ("It is [a felony] for a 
person to present or point at another person a loaded or unloaded firearm."); In re 
Spencer R., 387 S.C. 517, 522-23, 692 S.E.2d 569, 572 (Ct. App. 2010) (defining 
"the phrase 'to present' a firearm in section 16-23-410 as: to offer to view in a 
threatening manner, or to show in a threatening manner"); State v. Cabrera-Pena, 
361 S.C. 372, 381, 605 S.E.2d 522, 526-27 (2004) (concluding the defendant was 
not entitled to a jury charge under the first definition of involuntary manslaughter 
because the defendant's use of a firearm to intimidate the victim constituted 
presenting a firearm, a felony).  Petitioner, who was in his home at the time of the 
                                           
2 Petitioner was not charged with pointing or presenting a firearm. 
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killing, was permitted to carry his gun on his property; it was still a felony for him
to present a firearm to another person, unless he had the right to arm himself in 
self-defense. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-20(8) (Supp. 2014) (allowing a person 
to carry a handgun on their person when in their home); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-
410 (permitting a person to point or present at firearm at another person in self-
defense). 
Nevertheless, we note the trial court charged the jury on the defense of accident.  
See State v. Chatman, 336 S.C. 149, 153, 519 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1999) ("A 
homicide will be excusable on the ground of accident when (1) the killing was 
unintentional, (2) the defendant was acting lawfully, and (3) due care was 
exercised in the handling of the weapon.").  The distinction between involuntary 
manslaughter's second definition and accident is essentially the manner in which 
the defendant handles the weapon. Compare id. (setting forth the elements of the 
defense of accident) with Smith, 391 S.C. at 414, 706 S.E.2d at 15 (defining 
involuntary manslaughter under the second definition as "the unintentional killing 
of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless 
disregard for the safety of others"). The trial court's decision to charge the jury on 
the defense of accident indicates the trial court found some evidence indicating 
Petitioner was acting lawfully. 
Our appellate courts have held that evidence of a struggle over a gun supports an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter when the evidence shows the defendant 
was lawfully armed in self-defense at the time of the shooting and the defendant 
recklessly handled the loaded gun.  See Rivera, 389 S.C. at 404-05, 699 S.E.2d at 
159-60; Light, 378 S.C. at 648-49, 664 S.E.2d at 468-69; Tisdale, 378 S.C. at 125-
26, 662 S.E.2d at 412; Burriss, 334 S.C. at 265, 513 S.E.2d at 109; Brayboy, 387 
S.C. at 180-82, 691 S.E.2d at 485-86.  Petitioner's testimony indicates Petitioner's 
gun went off during the struggle over the gun.  According to Petitioner, at the time
of the shooting, Petitioner's son grabbed his hand that was holding the gun, which 
Petitioner asserted was not pointed at his son.  Petitioner testified he made sure the 
safety was on when he put the gun in his pocket and he was surprised when it fired 
because he believed the safety was still on.  Petitioner also testified his son's threat 
and prior act of domestic violence against him made him afraid for his and his 
grandchildren's safety.  Accordingly, evidence from trial indicates Petitioner may 
have been armed in self-defense at the time of the shooting and Petitioner may 
have been recklessly handling the loaded gun at the time of his son's death. 
Trial counsel failed to preserve Petitioner's involuntary manslaughter issue for 
appeal because he never argued the evidence from trial entitled Petitioner to such a 
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charge. See State v. Wigington, 375 S.C. 25, 35-36, 649 S.E.2d 185, 190 (2007) 
(holding Petitioner's involuntary manslaughter argument was not preserved).  This 
was deficient, particularly in light of trial counsel's erroneous argument to the trial 
court that Petitioner would have been entitled to a jury charge on involuntary 
manslaughter only if the trial court determined a self-defense charge was 
appropriate. See Light, 378 S.C. at 650, 664 S.E.2d at 470 ("[A] self-defense 
charge and an involuntary manslaughter charge are not mutually exclusive . . . ."); 
Hill, 315 S.C. at 262, 433 S.E.2d at 849 ("[A] trial court commits reversible error if 
it fails to give a requested charge on an issue raised by the evidence."). 
We further find Petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's improper argument to 
the trial court regarding Petitioner's entitlement to an involuntary manslaughter 
jury charge. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688-89 (holding that to 
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCR applicant must prove 
counsel's performance was deficient, and the deficient performance prejudiced the 
applicant's case).  Had trial counsel properly raised this issue to the trial court, 
Petitioner would have been entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge.   
Accordingly, we reverse the PCR court's finding that defense counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to properly argue to the trial court and preserve for appellate 
review whether Petitioner was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter jury charge. 
CONCLUSION
We reverse the PCR court's dismissal of Petitioner's PCR application and remand 
to the trial court for a new trial. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.   
115 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Alphonso Chaves Thompson, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-213141 
Appeal From Spartanburg County 
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5341 

Heard June 11, 2015 – Filed August 12, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
Michael Patrick Scott, of Nexsen Pruet, LLC, of 
Charleston, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert 
Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant 
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, and Assistant 
Attorney General Mary Williams Leddon, all of 
Columbia, and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of 
Spartanburg, for Respondent.
HUFF, J.: Alphonso Chaves Thompson appeals from his trafficking in cocaine, 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and possession 
with intent to distribute marijuana convictions.  Thompson contends the trial court 
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erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress all evidence found as the result of an 
illegal search, (2) denying his motion to suppress his confession, and (3) denying 
his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of possession of a weapon during 
the commission of a violent crime.  We affirm. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following issuance of a search warrant for 120 River Street1 in Spartanburg, South 
Carolina, officers discovered cocaine, marijuana, various guns, and certain drug 
and gun related items at the residence.2  Thompson had been arrested at his 
business pursuant to an arrest warrant and was transported to the River Street 
address as the search warrant was being executed.  During the search, Thompson 
confessed that the marijuana and cocaine found in the home were his.  He was 
thereafter charged in a two count indictment with trafficking in more than four 
hundred grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of or 
attempt to commit a violent crime.  He was also charged in a separate indictment 
with possession with intent to distribute marijuana.   
Thompson moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search 
warrant, which included the marijuana, cocaine, and weapons recovered from the 
warrant, as well as his confession.  Thompson argued the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant included stale information and conclusory statements, it failed to set 
forth the reliability or basis of knowledge of the confidential reliable informants 
referred to in the affidavit, and it lacked specific facts giving the issuing judge3 a 
basis to believe the evidence would be found at 120 River Street, and therefore 
there was no probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant.  The 
trial court denied this motion.  Thompson also made a separate motion to suppress 
his statement to police, which the trial court also denied.  Following the close of 
evidence by the State, Thompson moved for a directed verdict with respect to the 
1 The address is alternately referred to as River Street and River Drive in the 
transcript.
2 Although not included in the search warrant affidavit, evidence was submitted at 
trial that Thompson's mother had entered into a lease-purchase agreement to buy 
120 River Street and this is where Thompson's parents resided. 
3 The search warrant affidavit was not taken to a magistrate, but was presented to a 
circuit court judge.
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weapons charge. The trial court likewise denied this directed verdict motion, as 
well as Thompson's renewal of this motion after presentation of his defense.  
Upon submission of the case to the jury, Thompson was found guilty on all 
charges. The trial court then sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-five 
years on the trafficking charge, five years on the weapons charge, and five years on 
the possession with intent to distribute charge.
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Search Warrant 
On May 13, 2010, Investigator Chris Raymond, with the Spartanburg County 
Sheriff's Office, executed an affidavit setting forth the following information in 
support of issuance of a search warrant for 120 River Street: 
In June of 2007 Investigators from the Spartanburg 
County Sheriff's Office Narcotics Division had two 
different Confidential Reliable Informants (CRI) give 
information that they had been buying large amounts of 
cocaine from a black male that they only knew as "POO 
BEAR." These two CRI's stated that several large 
cocaine transactions took placed [sic] over the course of 
several months.  These CRI's furnished information that 
was able to be corroborated such as vehicle descriptions 
and photo identifications. Both CRI's stated that they 
knew POO BEAR to drive a gray in color Honda Accord 
Station wagon when he would conduct these drug deals.  
It was learned through this Investigation that "POO 
BEAR" was positively identified as Alfonso Thompson 
and he also had an F350 Ford Dually blue and Gold in 
color. In August of 2007 the SCSO Narcotics Division 
arrested Keith Jeter who stated that he was being 
supplied 4½-9 oz. of cocaine at a time from Alfonzo 
Thompson aka "POO BEAR."  Jeter further stated that 
"POO BEAR" would bring the cocaine to his residence 
on Huxley St. in Spartanburg City. In September of 2008 
the SCSO Narcotics Division interviewed a [sic] 
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individual named Fred Meadows who stated that he was 
being supplied cocaine from "POO BEAR" and that 
"POO BEAR" drove a blue and gold Ford F-350 Dually.  
Meadows further stated that he grew up with "POO 
BEAR" in the city and has known him for a long time.  
Meadows stated that "POO BEAR" would deliver the 
cocaine to his house on Virginia St. in the city of 
Spartanburg. Also in late 2008 Spartanburg City Police 
Narcotics had an informant who came forward and stated 
the [sic] "POO BEAR" had a residence at the end of 
River St. on the left hand side and that "POO BEAR" 
was a large scale cocaine Trafficker.  In January of 2009 
the Spartanburg County Narcotics Division had two more 
different CRI's that came forward and stated that they 
had purchased 18 ounces of cocaine from "POO BEAR".  
They identified Alfonzo Thompson in a photo lineup as 
being the "POO BEAR" that they had dealt with.  These 
two CRI's also confirmed that "POO BEAR" had an F­
350 Ford Dually and it was Blue and Gold in color.  On 
February 11, 2009 The Spartanburg County Narcotics 
Division arrested Jose Luis Diaz-Arroyo with a kilo of 
cocaine. During the interview with Arroyo he stated that 
his brother in law Alejandro Sosa Galvan was supplying 
a black male named "POO BEAR."  Arroyo further 
stated that Sosa Galvan had multiple Kilos of cocaine
delivered to "POO BEAR" at this River St. address on 
several different occasions. On July 30, 2009 a fifth CRI 
stated he was being supplied by a Deangelo Young aka 
"LITTLE MAN" and that Young was getting his cocaine 
from his cousin "POO BEAR."  This CRI made a 
controlled buy from "LITTLE MAN" by taking him 
$4000 in Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office recorded 
funds. "LITTLE MAN" left the buy location and was 
followed to 1868 Tamara Way where he met with "POO 
BEAR" (THOMPSON). Thompson was driving a white 
in color Honda Civic Sc[sic] tag . . . .  This Civic is 
registered to a Pamela D. Jones of 1868 Tamara Way. 
Pamela Jones is a known girlfriend of "POO BEAR".  
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"LITTLE MAN" left "POO BEAR" and met with the 
CRI at the buy location where he turned over 4 ounces of 
Cocaine to him. 
Over the past 6 months the Spartanburg County 
Sheriff's Office Narcotics Division has conducted 
surveillance on 120 River St. and on several occasions 
has seen Thompson driving different vehicles to include 
the Ford F-350 Dually blue and gold in color and the 
white in color Honda Civic to and from this location.  
Investigators have also seen the gray in color Honda 
Accord station wagon come and go from this residence.   
Over the past 6 months Investigators have 
witnessed Thompson visit this 120 River St. address just 
before making cocaine deliveries throughout Spartanburg 
City. 
On May 11, 2010 Investigators bought ½ ounce of 
cocaine base from Authur Jones. When Jones was 
approached he started cooperating with the SCSO 
Narcotics Division. Jones stated that he was buying his 
cocaine from Alfonzo Thompson aka "POO BEAR."  
Jones stated that "POO BEAR'' was fronting him about 9 
ounces of Powder Cocaine a month.  Jones stated that he 
would take the powder and then turn it into cocaine base 
and then sell it. When it was all gone he would call 
"POO BEAR" and tell him that he was ready for him.  
Jones stated that he was paying $1000 an ounce for the 
cocaine. On 05-11-2010 Jones placed a recorded 
telephone call to Thompson stating that he was ready to 
re-up. Thompson agreed to come by.  Jones stated that 
Thompson's M.O. was to come by in the next couple of 
days. On 05-12-2010 Jones called "POO BEAR" again 
with no response. At approximately 6:30 PM Jones 
received a telephone call from "POO BEAR" . . .  asking 
Jones if he was going to be home.  Jones stated yes and 
hung up. Jones knew this to mean that "POO BEAR" 
was coming shortly.  At Approximately [sic] 7:19 PM 
Thompson pulled into Jones [sic] driveway driving the 
white Honda Civic.  Thompson exited the vehicle and 
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came inside. Once inside Jones handed Thompson 
$9000.00 in recorded funds. Thompson stated that he 
would bring the package in the morning.  Jones knew this 
to mean that Thompson would bring the cocaine to him
the next day. Investigators were inside the residence 
watching the transaction take place as well as the 
transaction being Video and Audio recorded. There was 
[sic] also outside surveillance units near the scene.  
Thompson was loosely followed in the Honda Civic after 
the transaction.
This investigator feels that Thompson has 
demonstrated a pattern over the course of the last 2 years 
of large scale cocaine trafficking.  It is believed that 
Items related to the Drug Trafficking Trade will be 
located inside this residence as well as Cocaine and or 
Cocaine Base. It is also known by Investigators that
Drug Traffickers hide their drugs and proceeds from 
drugs [sic] sales in various places about the residence and 
cartilage [sic] areas.  Due to the violent Nature of Drug 
Trafficking Organizations a "NO KNOCK WARRANT 
IS REQUESTED." 
On appeal, Thompson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress all of the evidence found as a result of the illegal search of 120 River 
Street. In particular, he argues the affidavit failed to demonstrate veracity and 
basis of knowledge of the numerous individuals providing information for the 
warrant, it failed to provide a sufficient link to the River Street home to provide 
probable cause that drugs would be found at the property, and all the relevant 
information in the affidavit was stale.  Accordingly, he maintains the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant does not pass the "totality of the circumstances test" 
to show a substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude probable cause 
existed. We disagree. 
Both the United States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution provide a 
safeguard against unlawful searches and seizures, guaranteeing "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures," and avowing no warrants shall issue except 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, "and particularly describing 
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the place to be searched," as well as the persons or things to be seized.  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. South Carolina allows issuance of a search 
warrant "only upon affidavit sworn to before the magistrate, municipal judicial 
officer, or judge of a court of record establishing the grounds for the warrant."  
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-140 (2014).  "Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is inadmissible in both state and federal court."  State v. Gentile, 373 
S.C. 506, 512, 646 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 
A search warrant may issue only upon a finding of probable cause, and it is the 
duty of the reviewing court to ensure the issuing judge had a substantial basis upon 
which to conclude that probable cause existed.  State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 50, 
625 S.E.2d 216, 221 (2006). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 
(1983). 
 
Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in 
formal trials, have no place in the [judge's] decision [to 
issue a search warrant]. While an effort to fix some 
general, numerically precise degree of certainty 
corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it 
is clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie 
showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable 
cause." 
 
Id. at 235. 
 
"A warrant is supported by probable cause if, given the totality of the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."  State v. Kinloch, 410 S.C. 
612, 617, 767 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2014).  Under the "totality of the circumstances" 
test, 
 
[t]he task of the issuing [judge] is simply to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, [given all] the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of 
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persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place. 
State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 247, 395 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1990) (quoting Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238-39). The duty of a court reviewing a determination of probable 
cause for a search warrant is to ensure the issuing judge had a substantial basis for 
concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Bellamy, 336 S.C. 140, 144, 519 
S.E.2d 347, 349 (1999). "The appellate court should give great deference to [an 
issuing judge's] determination of probable cause."  State v. Gore, 408 S.C. 237, 
247, 758 S.E.2d 717, 722 (Ct. App. 2014). 
In Johnson, our supreme court found an affidavit defective because "it [did] not set 
forth any information as to the reliability of the informant nor was the information 
corroborated." 302 S.C. at 247, 395 S.E.2d at 169.  If an affidavit fails to include 
any information concerning the reliability of the 
informant, the inferences from the facts which lead to the 
complaint will be drawn not by a neutral and detached 
magistrate, as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a 
police officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime, or . . . by an unidentified 
informant. 
Id. at 248, 395 S.E.2d at 169 (citation omitted).  However, an informant's veracity 
or reliability and his basis of knowledge should not "be construed as entirely 
separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case."  
Bellamy, 336 S.C. at 143, 519 S.E.2d at 348-49.  Rather, they are closely 
intertwined elements and relevant considerations in the totality-of-the­
circumstances analysis, and "a deficiency in one of the elements may be 
compensated for . . . by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia 
of reliability." Id. at 143-44, 519 S.E.2d at 349. Further, the failure to specifically 
include past reliability and/or basis of knowledge of an individual providing 
information is not always fatal to a search warrant affidavit.  Our courts have 
determined "nonconfidential informants and eyewitnesses have more credibility 
than confidential informants."  State v. Jones, 342 S.C. 121, 128, 536 S.E.2d 675, 
679 (2000). "[E]vidence of past reliability is not usually required when 
information is provided by an eyewitness because, unlike the paid informer, the 
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eyewitness does not ordinarily have the opportunity to establish a record of 
previous reliability." State v. Driggers, 322 S.C. 506, 510, 473 S.E.2d 57, 59 (Ct. 
App. 1996). "[A] non-confidential informant should be given a higher level of 
credibility because he exposes himself to public view and to possible criminal and 
civil liability should the information he supplied prove to be false."  Id. at 511, 473 
S.E.2d at 60. Additionally, an informant may be considered reliable "if he 
possesse[s] a special relationship and capacity to gain knowledge that should 
prompt belief in the veracity of his information."  Id. at 512, 473 S.E.2d at 60. 
 
"In order for an affidavit in support of a search warrant to show probable cause, it 
must state facts so closely related to the time of the issuance of the warrant as to 
justify a finding of probable cause at that time." State v. Winborne, 273 S.C. 62, 
64, 254 S.E.2d 297, 298 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "Whether 
averments in an affidavit are sufficiently timely to establish probable cause 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case."  State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 
302, 316, 513 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant in this case can be summarized as 
providing the following pertinent information: 
 
1. In June 2007, two unnamed informants indicated Thompson had been 
supplying them with large amounts of cocaine.  
 
2. In August 2007 and September 2008, two named individuals, Keith Jeter and 
Fred Meadows, stated Thompson was supplying them with cocaine, noting 
Thompson would deliver the cocaine to their homes.   
 
3. In late 2008, another unnamed informant stated Thompson was a large scale 
cocaine trafficker and that Thompson had "a residence at the end of River St."   
 
4. In January 2009, two unnamed informants stated they had purchased 
eighteen ounces of cocaine from Thompson, identifying Thompson in a photo line­
up. 
 
5. On February 11, 2009, a named individual, Jose Luis Diaz-Arroyo, who had 
been arrested with a kilo of cocaine, stated that his brother-in-law was supplying 
Thompson and that his brother-in-law had multiple kilos of cocaine delivered to 
Thompson at the River Street address "on several different occasions."   
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6. On July 30, 2009, another unnamed informant stated he was being supplied 
by a cousin to Thompson who was getting cocaine from Thompson.  The unnamed 
informant made a controlled buy from the cousin by taking the cousin $4,000.  The 
cousin left the location and was followed to the home of Thompson's girlfriend 
where he met with Thompson and the cousin then left Thompson and met up with 
the unnamed informant at the buy location where the cousin turned over four 
ounces of cocaine to the unnamed informant. 
 
7. In the six months preceding the affidavit, surveillance had been conducted 
on 120 River Street, and Thompson was observed on several occasions driving 
different vehicles to and from this location. 
 
8. In the six months preceding the affidavit, investigators "witnessed 
Thompson visit this River Street address just before making cocaine deliveries 
throughout Spartanburg." 
 
9. On May 11, 2010, after investigators purchased cocaine from a named 
individual, Arthur Jones, Jones began cooperating with authorities, informing them 
he was buying his cocaine from Thompson and that Thompson would front him 
about nine ounces of cocaine a month.  On May 11, 2010, Jones placed a recorded 
call to Thompson stating he was ready to "re-up, and Thompson agreed to come 
by." On May 12, 2010, Jones received a phone call from Thompson asking if the 
individual was going to be home, and within an hour from the call Thompson 
arrived at Jones's home.  Inside the home, Jones handed Thompson $9,000 in 
recorded funds and Thompson stated he would "bring the package in the morning," 
which Jones knew to mean Thompson would bring him cocaine.  Investigators 
were inside Jones's home watching the money transaction take place, and the 
transaction was video and audio recorded. 
 
We agree with Thompson that the affidavit fails to set forth information as to the 
veracity, reliability or basis of knowledge of several of the informants referenced.  
However, even disregarding all of the information supplied by the unnamed 
informants, there is substantial other evidence from named and/or eyewitness 
informants contained in the affidavit, and the affidavit includes information which 
is sufficiently closely related in time to the issuance of the search warrant so as to 
justify a finding of probable cause. 
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As to the information that, in August 2007 and September 2008, Thompson was 
supplying two of the informants with cocaine and delivered the cocaine to their 
homes, the affidavit specifically provides the names of these two individuals, Keith 
Jeter and Fred Meadows. Further, this information from Jeter and Meadows, 
though somewhat stale, is supported by the current information concerning the 
Jones transaction, which occurred within the two days preceding issuance of the 
search warrant and showed Thompson was of the habit of delivering cocaine to his 
buyers at his buyers' homes.  Notably, the information concerning the Arthur Jones 
transaction indicates both reliability and basis of knowledge as Jones is a 
nonconfidential informant and part of the information was actually witnessed by 
the authorities, thus lending credibility to Jones's information.  Next, there is 
information in the affidavit from another named informant indicating large 
quantities of drugs were, in the past, delivered to the River Street address.  
Specifically, in February 2009, Jose Luis Diaz-Arroyo stated that his brother-in­
law was supplying Thompson with multiple kilos of cocaine, which his brother-in­
law had delivered to Thompson at the River Street address "on several different 
occasions." While this information is likewise somewhat stale, it is supported by 
information in the affidavit that the River Street address had been under 
surveillance for the preceding six months before issuance of the search warrant, 
and during that time Thompson was observed driving to and from the location and 
investigators "witnessed Thompson visit this 120 River St. address just before 
making cocaine deliveries throughout Spartanburg City."4  Further, there is more 
4 Notably, Thompson did not request a Franks hearing in order to challenge any 
portion of the affidavit as being false or made with reckless disregard for the truth, 
and at no point did Thompson ask the trial court to consider any portions of the 
affidavit false or made with reckless disregard. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 
154, 155-56 (1978) ("[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary 
showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if 
the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the 
Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request.  In 
the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is 
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the 
affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is 
insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the 
fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on 
the face of the affidavit."). 
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current and first-hand information in the affidavit concerning the authorities'
observation of Thompson, both coming and going from the River Street address 
and stopping by there before making cocaine deliveries, as well as him engaging in 
a monetary exchange pursuant to a drug transaction within a day of issuance of the 
warrant. Accordingly, the affidavit contains information from four named sources, 
whose veracity and/or basis of knowledge is otherwise supported in the affidavit, 
and additionally contains first-hand eyewitness information from the police.  From
this can be gleaned the following information in the search warrant affidavit to 
support probable cause: (1) in 2007 and 2008, Thompson was supplying cocaine 
and delivering cocaine to the homes of his buyers; (2) in February 2009, authorities 
were informed that Thompson was being supplied multiple kilos of cocaine, and 
the cocaine was delivered to Thompson at the River Street address; (3) in the six-
month time period prior to issuance of the search warrant, investigators observed 
Thompson driving different vehicles to and from the River Street address, and also 
observed him visiting the River Street address right before making cocaine 
deliveries; and (4) two days before the issuance of the search warrant, an 
individual informed investigators he was buying nine ounces of cocaine a month 
from Thompson, on that date the individual spoke to Thompson on the phone 
indicating he was ready for more drugs, and the day before issuance of the warrant 
Thompson arrived at the individual's home where he received $9,000 from the 
individual after which Thompson agreed to bring the individual "the package" in 
the morning, with this monetary transaction being observed, as well as audio and 
video recorded, by investigators. There is very recent information in the affidavit 
showing Thompson's habit of selling to his buyers by taking the cocaine to his 
buyers' homes.  Logically, Thompson would have to retrieve the drugs from some 
location in order to complete the Jones drug transaction, and viewing the affidavit 
as a whole, it would have been reasonable for the issuing judge to assume and 
make a "practical, common sense decision," under the totality of circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit, that there was a fair probability Thompson would be 
retrieving those drugs from the River Street address.  See United States v. 
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding a search warrant affidavit 
which fails to include any factual assertions directly linking the items sought to a 
residence can nonetheless establish a sufficient nexus between a defendant's
criminal conduct and a residence linked to the defendant, and the fact that a 
defendant may split his time among several different homes will not render the 
search of the different homes invalid). 
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Based upon the above, a review of the matter convinces us that, under the totality 
of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the issuing judge had before him
information supporting a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
would be found at 120 River Street, and the judge therefore had a substantial basis 
upon which to conclude that probable cause existed for issuance of the search 
warrant. 
II. Confession 
Thompson also made an in limine motion to suppress his statement to police.  In a 
Jackson v. Denno5 hearing, Thompson maintained he confessed to owning the 
drugs found because the officer threatened to take his parents to jail if he did not.  
The officer denied any promises or threats were made to Thompson and 
particularly denied threatening that Thompson's parents would go to jail.  The trial 
court found the State established by the greater weight of the evidence that 
Thompson's statement was freely and voluntarily made and, therefore, denied 
Thompson's motion to exclude it.  Thereafter, over Thompson's objection, his 
taped confession and his written confession were admitted into evidence.   
On appeal, Thompson contends his confession should have been suppressed 
because (1) it flowed from an illegal arrest and (2) it was coerced.  We find no 
error. 
A. Illegal Arrest 
First, Thompson argues his arrest was unsupported by probable cause because the 
affidavit in support of his arrest was deficient.   
This argument is clearly not preserved for our review.  In order to be preserved for 
appellate review, an issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial 
court. State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003). "Issues 
not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."  Id. at 
142, 587 S.E.2d at 693-94. "A party need not use the exact name of a legal doctrine 
in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the argument has been presented on 
that ground." Id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694. "For an objection to be preserved for 
appellate review, the objection must be made . . . with sufficient specificity to 
5 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
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inform the [trial court] of the point being urged by the objector."  State v. Byers, 
392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011).  At no time did Thompson ever argue 
before the trial court that the arrest warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish 
probable cause for his arrest, much less that his confession should be suppressed 
on this basis. Accordingly, we affirm based on error preservation grounds. 
B. Coerced Confession 
Thompson also contends his confession was improperly coerced and, because it 
was obtained under duress, it should have been suppressed.  We disagree. 
A "confession may not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained 
by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of improper 
influence." State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A police threat to arrest 
family members unless a defendant confesses to a crime could render the 
defendant's confession involuntary if it in fact occurred. State v. McClure, 312 
S.C. 369, 371, 440 S.E.2d 404, 405 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, the question of the 
voluntariness of such a confession can come down to a question of credibility, 
which may be resolved by the trial court in favor of the officers.  Id. at 371-72, 440 
S.E.2d at 405-06. "On appeal, the conclusion of the trial [court] on issues of fact 
as to the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless so manifestly 
erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion."  Rochester, 301 S.C. at 200, 391 
S.E.2d at 247. "When reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning voluntariness, 
[the appellate court] does not reevaluate the facts based on its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial court's 
ruling is supported by any evidence." State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 
240, 252 (2001). 
Here, though Thompson testified he was threatened with the arrest of his parents if 
he did not confess to ownership of the drugs, Investigator Raymond denied any 
promises or threats were made to Thompson and particularly denied threatening 
that Thompson's parents would go to jail.  As in McClure, the issue boils down to 
one of credibility.  Accordingly, based upon the record before us, there is evidence 
to support the trial court's ruling and we find no error. 
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III. Directed Verdict on the Weapons Charge 
At trial, the State presented evidence that, along with cocaine located in the 
detached garage and marijuana located in both the house and in the detached 
garage, numerous weapons were found during the search of the house at 120 River 
Street, including an Intratec 9mm pistol. A trace on the pistol showed it was 
purchased by Thompson on November 17, 2000, at a pawn shop.  The police had 
no documentation linking Thompson to any of the other weapons.  One of the bags 
of marijuana found in the house was located in the same bedroom as the pistol that 
was registered to Thompson. 
Following the presentation of evidence by the State, Thompson moved for a 
directed verdict with respect to the weapons charge, asserting the State failed to 
present evidence (1) he constructively possessed any of the weapons found in the 
home or (2) that he was engaged in a violent crime.  The solicitor argued one of the 
firearms found there was registered to Thompson.  The trial court found there was 
some evidence tending to establish the elements of the crime and, therefore, denied 
the motion.  After Thompson testified in his own defense and rested his case, he 
renewed his motion for a directed verdict as to the weapons charge, arguing his 
testimony showed the only weapon linked to him was given by Thompson to his 
father. He maintained the State failed to meet its burden of (1) linking him to any 
weapons found and (2) showing he was "guilty in any way of a violent crime."  
The trial court again denied the motion. 
On appeal, Thompson argues his weapons conviction should be reversed because 
the State (1) failed to prove he constructively possessed any weapon and (2) failed 
to establish any nexus between any weapon and any violent crime, as required by 
State v. Whitesides, 397 S.C. 313, 725 S.E.2d 487 (2012).  We find no reversible 
error. 
A. Constructive Possession 
Thompson argues, of the various weapons introduced by the State that had been 
found at the River Street home, the State only attempted to link the 9mm pistol to 
him, and the State's witnesses conceded he was not present when the pistol was 
found and he did not reside at the home.  He further notes, although he initially 
testified the pistol that was purchased ten years earlier was his, he explained he had 
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given this gun to his father.  Thus, he maintains there was no direct or 
circumstantial evidence to show he constructively possessed any weapon found at 
the River Street home, and the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion for 
directed verdict on the weapons charge.  We disagree. 
"When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] views the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state."  
State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  "If there is any 
direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to 
prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly 
submitted to the jury." Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648.
In State v. Halyard, 274 S.C. 397, 264 S.E.2d 841 (1980), "the South Carolina 
Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether a person not in actual possession of a 
firearm could nevertheless be convicted for possession of the firearm."  State v. 
Jennings, 335 S.C. 82, 86, 515 S.E.2d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1999).  In Halyard, the 
court held, "[t]o prove constructive possession [of an item], the State must show a 
defendant had dominion and control, or the right to exercise dominion and control 
over the [item]." 274 S.C. at 400, 264 S.E.2d at 842.  "Constructive possession 
may be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence, and possession 
may be shared." Jennings, 335 S.C. at 87, 515 S.E.2d at 109. 
We believe the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, created a 
jury issue as to whether Thompson was in constructive possession of the pistol.  
Thompson admitted that he stayed at his parents' home "every now and then," he 
had a key to the house and the gate, he could come and go from the house 
whenever he wanted whether his parents were there or not, and the car in the 
garage—where a large amount of the cocaine was found—belonged to Thompson's 
friend and was in his parents' garage because Thompson was working on it.  
Thompson also acknowledged he helped build a fence around the house and helped 
set up the home's security system.  Also, Lieutenant Cooper, who oversaw the 
search of 120 River Street, testified they had information Thompson had control of 
the residence. Further, though Thompson claimed he gave the pistol found in the 
home to his father, the State presented evidence that Thompson bought the pistol 
and it was registered to him.  Accordingly, we find the State presented evidence of 
Thompson's constructive possession of the pistol,and the trial court therefore did 
not err in declining to grant a directed verdict on this basis.   
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B. Nexus to Violent Crime 
Thompson also argues, even if the State presented sufficient evidence that he 
constructively possessed a firearm, it failed to provide a sufficient nexus between 
any firearm and any violent crime. Citing Whitesides, Thompson contends the 
State failed to show any firearm was accessible to him, that he ever let anyone 
know he carried a weapon, or that any weapon ever provided him with a defense 
against potential robbers.  We find this argument is not properly preserved.  
As noted, in order to be preserved for appellate review, a matter must have been 
raised to and ruled upon by the trial court, and arguments which have not been 
raised to and ruled upon by the trial court will not be considered on appeal.  
Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693-94.  Though "[a] party need not use 
the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that 
the argument has been presented on that ground." Id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694. 
Further, "[a] party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on 
appeal." Id.
When trial counsel made his motion for a directed verdict with respect to the 
weapons charge, he argued the State "would have had to have proven constructive 
possession of those weapons, and they would have to prove also of course that he 
was engaged in a violent crime.  We believe the State has failed to meet [its]
burden in that respect."  He then went on to present argument concerning only the 
State's failure to show constructive possession.  When trial counsel renewed his 
motion for directed verdict, he stated as to the weapons charge as follows:
[T]he only link with any of the weapons is the purchase
of a 9mm pistol which my client has freely admitted that 
he did not have possession of, constructive or actual, at 
the time of his arrest and which was found in his father's 
house which had been given to him by my client. 
Again, I don't believe the State has met its burden of 
linking him with any of the weapons and for that matter 
showing that he was guilty in any way of a violent crime. 
While Thompson's argument on appeal as to constructive possession is properly 
preserved for our review, his appellate argument concerning the State's failure to 
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show a nexus to a violent crime is not. At most, trial counsel argued the State 
failed to present evidence Thompson committed a violent crime.  Thus, Thompson 
never asserted to the trial court, as he does on appeal, that the State was required to 
show a nexus between a violent crime and his actual or constructive possession of 
a firearm during its commission.6 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's denial of Thompson's motion 
to suppress all the evidence, finding under the totality of the circumstances the 
search warrant affidavit set forth facts from which the issuing judge could 
conclude there was a fair probability that drugs would be found at 120 River Street, 
and, therefore, the issuing judge had a substantial basis upon which to conclude 
that probable cause existed.  We also affirm the admission of Thompson's 
confession and the denial of his directed verdict motion. 
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, J., concurs. 
FEW, C.J., dissenting:  I agree with the majority the trial court correctly admitted 
Thompson's confession into evidence and denied his motion for a directed verdict 
on the weapons charge. I also agree with the circuit judge who issued the 
warrants—and the trial court—the officers had probable cause to search 
Thompson's residence, his business, and his girlfriend's residence, and to arrest 
Thompson on drug charges.  I do not agree, however, the officers had probable 
cause to search the River Street home.  On this point, I respectfully dissent.  
Because the vast majority of the drugs for which Thompson was convicted were 
6 While it is true Thompson's trial began January 23, 2012, and the opinion in 
Whitesides was not filed until April 4, 2012, just as the appellant in Whitesides
raised the issue to the trial court that it was necessary for the weapon in question to 
facilitate the trafficking crime and mere possession of a weapon would not be 
sufficient to support a possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime charge, Thompson could have made such an argument to the trial court in his 
case, but failed to do so. 
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seized from the River Street home, I would find the error of denying his motion to
suppress that evidence prejudiced Thompson, and I would reverse his convictions.   
I begin my analysis by emphasizing two important categories of facts.  The first 
relates to the locations where all of this took place.  The River Street home is 
Thompson's parents' home—not Thompson's.  It is located in downtown 
Spartanburg. Thompson lived in Fountain Inn, in a different county.  Thompson's 
girlfriend—whose home was also searched—lived approximately seven miles from 
the River Street home. Thompson's business—which was searched—was located 
in Boiling Springs, also miles from the River Street home.   
The second category relates to timing.  The affidavit submitted in support of the 
warrant to search the River Street home shows Thompson engaged in extensive 
drug-related activity from at least June 2007 through July 30, 2009, much of which 
is directly connected to the River Street home.  The affidavit also shows Thompson 
was engaged in drug-related activity on May 11 and 12, 2010.  However, the 
affidavit—dated May 13, 2010—contains no specific facts showing any 
connection between Thompson's drug-related activity and the River Street home
after February 11, 2009. The only evidence of such a connection is found in the 
following conclusory statements: 
Over the past 6 months the Spartanburg County Sheriff's 
Office Narcotics Division has conducted surveillance on 
120 River St. and on several occasions has seen 
Thompson driving different vehicles [including three 
vehicles connected to his drug activity] to and from this 
location. 
Over the past 6 months Investigators have witnessed 
Thompson visit this 120 River St. address just before 
making cocaine deliveries throughout Spartanburg City. 
While the affidavit contains extensive and specific evidence of Thompson's drug-
related activity over a long period of time, these non-specific references to 
Thompson's activity at the River Street home after February 2009 do not provide a 
substantial basis to support a finding of probable cause that evidence of his crimes 
would be found at River Street in May 2010. See State v. Kinloch, 410 S.C. 612, 
617, 767 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2014) (stating "circuit court judges must determine 
134
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis upon which to conclude that 
probable cause existed"); see also United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 (4th 
Cir. 1993) ("In determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable 
cause, the crucial element is not whether the target of the search is suspected of a 
crime, but whether it is reasonable to believe that the items to be seized will be 
found in the place to be searched.").   
In fact, the specific detail in the affidavit of Thompson's activities before July 2009 
and during May 2010 compared with the conclusory descriptions of his activities 
in the interim has the opposite effect of supporting probable cause.  The statements 
that officers "on several occasions ha[ve] seen Thompson driving different vehicles 
. . . to and from" River Street and "Investigators have witnessed Thompson visit 
. . . 120 River St[reet] . . . just before making cocaine deliveries" are 
representations that officers saw these events, and thus demonstrate the officers 
had access to the same level of detail the affidavit contains of other events.  This 
comparison raises serious questions as to why that specific detail is lacking for the 
fifteen months immediately preceding the search.  Importantly, the circuit judge 
who signed the search warrant did not question the officer to supplement the 
information provided in the affidavit.   
The officers clearly believed there was a connection between Thompson's drug-
related activities and the River Street home.  In retrospect, they were correct.  The 
Fourth Amendment, however, does not permit officers to make the decision that 
probable cause exists to support a search warrant—that decision must be made by 
the judge who issues the warrant. Otherwise, "'the inferences from the facts which 
lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and detached magistrate,' as 
the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'"  State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 
248, 395 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1990) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115, 84 
S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 729 (1964)). 
In my opinion, this affidavit did not provide the judge with a substantial basis for a 
finding of probable cause that evidence of Thompson's drug-related activity would 
be found at River Street. I respectfully dissent. 
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FEW, C.J.:  John and Louise Goodwin and Gary and Joyce Owens appeal the 
circuit court's refusal to restore their case to the docket after it was "stricken" due 
to one defendant's bankruptcy.  The circuit court denied the motion to restore the 
case on the ground the case was barred by the statute of limitations.  We hold that 
because the Goodwins and Owenses complied with the statute of limitations when 
they initially filed and served the summons and complaint, it was not necessary for 
them to comply with the statute again when they attempted to restore the case to 
the docket. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.  
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
In September 2007, Bonnie and Ronald Charlton and Bayside Property, Inc. sold a 
tract of land on Winyah Bay in the city of Georgetown to South Bay Properties, 
LLC for $20.85 million—$6.27 million in cash and a $14.58 million note secured 
by a mortgage.  South Bay—a joint venture of Landquest Development, LLC, C.R. 
Thompson and Sons, LLC, and Kyle C. Corkum—planned to develop the property 
into a residential subdivision named the Harbor Club on Winyah Bay.  Prior to
construction, South Bay sold fifty-four lots—including one each to the Goodwins 
and Owenses—generating $14,737,600 in proceeds.   
On July 9, 2009, after South Bay failed to build the basic infrastructure of the 
subdivision in a timely manner, the Goodwins and Owenses, along with other lot 
owners, filed this lawsuit ("lot owners' action") and recorded a lis pendens on the 
property still owned by South Bay.  The record indicates the lawsuit was promptly 
served. 
In June 2010, South Bay filed a petition for bankruptcy.  The record reflects no 
further activity in the lot owners' action until it appeared on the trial roster for July 
25, 2011. South Bay then filed a motion for a "continuance," relying on the 
"automatic stay" imposed under the federal bankruptcy code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a)(1) (2012) (discussed in section II. A. of this opinion).  The circuit court 
granted South Bay's motion for a continuance, and in a separate Form 4, it ordered 
"Case Stricken Due To Bankruptcy." On August 12, 2011, the bankruptcy court 
dismissed South Bay's bankruptcy case.  
In August 2012, the Charltons and Bayside filed an action to foreclose on the 
mortgage.  They named as defendants any party that "may have or claim" an 
interest in the property, including the Goodwins and Owenses.  The Goodwins and 
Owenses—without an attorney—filed answers that contained only a general denial 
of the allegations in the complaint.  The Charltons and Bayside filed a motion for 
an order of reference to the master-in-equity. 
On January 22, 2013, the Goodwins and Owenses—then represented by an 
attorney—filed two motions.  The first was a motion to "Reinstate/Restore" 
seeking "an Order . . . reinstating the [lot owners'] action to the active trial docket" 
and to consolidate the lot owners' action and the foreclosure suit.  The second was 
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a motion to amend their answers in the foreclosure suit to assert counterclaims and 
cross-claims seeking the same relief they sought in the lot owners' action.1 
The circuit court denied the motion to restore the lot owners' action, ruling the 
Goodwins' and Owenses' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  As to 
consolidation, the circuit court stated, "Since restoration . . . is denied, 
consolidation of this case . . . is moot."  In a separate order in the foreclosure suit, 
the circuit court referred that case to the master and declined to rule on the motion 
to amend.  The Goodwins and Owenses filed motions to alter or amend both orders 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP.  In the foreclosure suit, they asked the circuit court 
to rescind the order of reference and repeated their request to amend their answers.  
After the master recused himself for unrelated reasons and returned the foreclosure 
suit to circuit court, the court entered orders denying the Rule 59(e) motions in 
both cases.2 
II. Motion to Restore 
The Goodwins and Owenses argue the circuit court erred in denying their motion 
to restore on the grounds that their claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  
We agree.3 
The statute of limitations provides, "Civil actions may only be commenced within 
the periods prescribed in this title after the cause of action has accrued . . . ."  S.C. 
1 The cross-claims and counterclaims in the proposed amended answers in the 
foreclosure suit are nearly identical to the claims in the lot owners' action.   
2 The Goodwins and Owenses interpreted the order in the foreclosure suit as 
denying their motion to amend.  In a separate appeal in the foreclosure suit, we 
found the order did not deny the motion to amend and was not an immediately 
appealable order. We dismissed the other appeal and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
3 Because this is a question of law, we review the circuit court's decision de novo.  
See Lambries v. Saluda Cnty. Council, 409 S.C. 1, 7, 760 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2014) 
(stating an appellate court "reviews questions of law de novo" (quoting Town of 
Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 
(2008))).
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Code Ann. § 15-3-20(A) (2005).  Thus, the statute of limitations applies to the date 
a lawsuit is "commenced."  Rule 3(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides, "A civil action is commenced when the summons and 
complaint are filed with the clerk of court if: (1) the summons and complaint are 
served within the statute of limitations . . . ."  Section 15-3-530 of the South 
Carolina Code (2005) prescribes the limitations period for this case as three years.  
The Goodwins and Owenses complied with the statute of limitations in 2009 when 
they filed the summons and complaint and served them on the defendants within 
the three-year limitations period.  Thus, the circuit court erred by finding the 
lawsuit barred by the statute of limitations.  
The respondents argue, however, the Goodwins and Owenses did not comply with 
the tolling provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2012) and Rule 40(j) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. As we will explain, because the lawsuit had 
already been commenced, there was nothing to toll.  Therefore, the tolling 
provisions are irrelevant.   
A. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) 
The filing of a petition for bankruptcy by a defendant in a state civil proceeding 
invokes 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Section 362 is entitled "Automatic stay," and 
provides the filing of the petition "operates as a stay . . . of . . . the commencement 
or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding against the debtor."  § 
362(a)(1). This automatic stay prevents a state court from proceeding with the 
action while the stay is in effect. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (2012), "the stay 
. . . continues until . . . the [bankruptcy] case is dismissed." 
Our rules of procedure do not address how a circuit court must deal with the 
automatic stay. However, neither our rules nor 11 U.S.C. § 362 require the 
dismissal of the action.  Here, the circuit court did not dismiss the action.  The 
circuit court employed a Form 4 order provided by our supreme court that contains 
various boxes for the court to check to indicate the effect of the order.4  The form
4 See Rule 84, SCRCP ("The Supreme Court shall prescribe the content and format 
of forms required by these rules.").  By order dated June 24, 2008, the supreme 
court approved the form used by the circuit court in this case.  See Order re: Form 
4, Judgment in a Civil Case, No. 2008-06-24-01 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed June 24, 
2008), available at http://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm? 
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includes boxes for the dismissal of an action and the reason for the dismissal, but 
the court did not check the dismissal boxes in this order.  Rather, the circuit court 
checked the box labeled "ACTION STRICKEN," and as a reason for striking, the 
box labeled "Bankruptcy." In the portion of the form provided for text, the circuit 
court wrote, "Case Stricken Due To Bankruptcy."
In deciding not to restore the case to the docket, the circuit court relied on 11 
U.S.C. § 108(c), which states, 
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a 
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a 
period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a 
court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the 
debtor, . . . and such period has not expired before the 
date of the filing of the petition, then such period does 
not expire until the later of—(1) the end of such period, 
including any suspension of such period occurring on or 
after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after 
notice of the termination or expiration of the stay.   
The circuit court incorrectly concluded section 108(c) has any application to this 
case. By its terms, the subsection tolls "a [time] period for commencing or 
continuing a civil action" when the time period is "fixe[d]" by (1) "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law," (2) "an order," or (3) "an agreement."  Here, there is no order 
or agreement fixing any period of time for restoring the lawsuit, and the only "law" 
the respondents contend is applicable is the statute of limitations.  However, the 
Goodwins and Owenses commenced the lot owners' action, and thus complied with 
the statute of limitations, before the automatic stay took effect.  Under these 
circumstances, the statute of limitations was no longer an "applicable 
orderNo=2008-06-24-01 (last visited August 7, 2015).  The Form 4 form has 
subsequently been revised. See Order re: Judgment in a Civil Case Form (SCRCP 
Form 4C), No. 2013-03-26-01 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2013-03-26-01 
(last visited August 7, 2015).
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nonbankruptcy law" that "fixe[d] a period for commencing or continuing a civil 
action."5  Therefore, the tolling provision in section 108(c) is irrelevant in this case. 
B. Rule 40(j), SCRCP 
The circuit court also relied on Rule 40(j) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We find the court erred in relying on this rule for several reasons.  
First, the lot owners' action was stricken due to bankruptcy, not pursuant to Rule 
40(j). Second, even if Rule 40(j) was at issue, the rule does not set a deadline for 
restoring a case.  As our supreme court has explained, 
Rule 40(j) does not require that a party move to restore 
the case to the docket within one year after it was 
stricken. Instead, the unambiguous language provides 
that, if the claim is restored within one year after it is 
stricken, the statute of limitations is tolled for that period. 
. . . A party can move to restore a case to the docket 
more than one year after the claim was stricken without 
running afoul of Rule 40(j); the party simply cannot take 
advantage of the one year tolling period provided by the 
rule. 
Maxwell v. Genez, 356 S.C. 617, 620-21, 591 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2003). 
Under Rule 40(j), therefore, the applicable deadline remains the statute of 
limitations.  The effect of the rule is not to set a new deadline, but to extend the 
statute of limitations' deadline by applying the rule's tolling provision when the 
motion to restore is made within a year.  Because the Goodwins and Owenses 
commenced the lawsuit within the statute of limitations, there was nothing to toll 
and they did not need the tolling provision in Rule 40(j).  
Third, the requirement of complying with the statute of limitations after a case is 
stricken pursuant to Rule 40(j) depends on the event of "striking" being considered 
5 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) is applicable to a situation where the automatic stay has 
prevented the commencement of a lawsuit before the statute of limitations expires, 
or where a law, order, or agreement otherwise sets some time limit for 
"commencing or continuing" a lawsuit.   
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a dismissal.  While our rules do not clearly provide that striking a case pursuant to 
Rule 40(j) is a dismissal, there is a basis in our law for considering a case stricken 
pursuant to the rule as the equivalent of dismissed.  In the notes to the 1994 
amendments to the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 40(j) is 
described as "substantially revis[ing] the procedure for dismissing a case 
previously found in Rule 40(c)(3)."  Rule 40, SCRCP Notes, Notes to 1994 
Amendments (emphasis added).  The notes go on to state, "Rule 40(j) now requires 
all adverse parties to consent to the dismissal in writing, but, the consent also 
operates to toll the statute of limitations for one year after the case is stricken . . . .  
Any remaining portion of the statute of limitations begins to run one year after the 
case was stricken unless the case has previously been restored . . . ."  Id.; see also
Maxwell, 356 S.C. at 621, 591 S.E.2d at 28 (relying on the notes in interpreting 
Rule 40(j)). 
Moreover, the tolling period would not be necessary if striking the case pursuant to 
Rule 40(j) were not the equivalent of a dismissal.  See Maxwell, 356 S.C. at 620, 
591 S.E.2d at 27 ("In interpreting the meaning of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court applies the same rules of construction used to interpret 
statutes."); State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 351, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) ("A 
statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part 
shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous."); Nucor Steel, a Div. of Nucor Corp. 
v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 310 S.C. 539, 545, 426 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1992) 
("[W]here possible, all provisions of a statute must be given full force and effect.").   
There is also an historical basis for considering a case stricken pursuant to Rule 
40(j) as the equivalent of dismissed.  We adopted our Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1985. See Rule 86(a), SCRCP ("These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1985.").  
Before then, the circuit court had the power to dismiss an action without prejudice
if it was called for trial and the parties were not ready to proceed.  See Small v. 
Mungo, 254 S.C. 438, 441, 443, 175 S.E.2d 802, 803, 804 (1970) (holding the 
inability of counsel "to contact plaintiff and his witnesses and be ready for trial" 
and "the failure of plaintiff and his counsel to appear when the case was called for 
trial constituted a failure to proceed with the cause . . . and a ground for dismissal 
of the action").  When the supreme court decided Small, former Circuit Court Rule 
81 was in effect. The rule provided, "When a case is reached on the Common 
Pleas trial roster and is called for trial, . . . if counsel are not ready to go forward 
with the case it shall be placed . . . at the foot of the Calendar."  S.C. Code Ann. 
vol. 22, Circuit Court Rule 81 (Supp. 1984) (repealed 1985).  In 1985, former Rule 
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40(c)(3), SCRCP, took effect. Similar to the procedure described in Small, Rule 
40(c)(3) applied only if the parties were not prepared to proceed when the case was 
called for trial. However, the rule allowed the circuit court to "strike" the action.  
The rule provided: 
When an action is reached on the trial roster and is called 
for trial, it shall not be continued by consent, and if 
counsel are not ready to go forward the court shall strike 
the action from the calendar (file book) with leave to 
restore, unless continuance is granted for good cause 
shown. 
Rule 40(c)(3), SCRCP (West 1994) (repealed 1995). 
The rule did not use the word "dismissed," but tracking the language of former 
Circuit Court Rule 81, it did require a restored case to "be placed at the foot of the 
calendar (file book) and a new case number assigned."  Rule 40(c)(3); see Rule 
40(c)(3), Notes ("This Rule 40 is substantially a compendium of present Circuit 
Court Rules . . . ."). Our law treated the striking of a case pursuant to Rule 40(c)(3) 
as the equivalent of a dismissal,6 and our courts required the plaintiff to comply 
with the statute of limitations upon restoring the case.  See Graham v. Dorchester 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 339 S.C. 121, 122, 125 n.1, 528 S.E.2d 80, 81, 82 n.1 (Ct. App. 
2000) (stating in a case "struck . . . from the trial roster . . . pursuant to former Rule 
40(c)(3), SCRCP" that "the statute of limitations clearly expired" before the motion 
to restore was filed). But see Robinson v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 751 F. Supp. 100, 
105 (D.S.C. 1990) (stating for purposes of calculating timely removal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2012), "an action which has been removed from the docket 
pursuant to [Rule] 40(c)(3) is pending while it is off of the docket" and is not 
"commenced when it is restored to the calendar").  
There is no such basis in our law, however, for considering the striking of a case 
due to bankruptcy as a dismissal.  In fact, the striking of a case from the docket due 
to bankruptcy is not mentioned in our rules at all.  In practice, our courts have 
treated the striking of a case due to bankruptcy as not being a dismissal.  For 
example, in an "Administrative Order" dated May 4, 1988, then Chief Justice 
6 See Rule 40, SCRCP Notes, Notes to 1994 Amendments (referring to "the 
procedure for dismissing a case previously found in Rule 40(c)(3)").
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Gregory provided, "I . . . find that if a common pleas case is struck from the 
calendar (file book) due to bankruptcy and later restored, it should be restored at its 
original place on the calendar (file book), without the payment of an additional 
filing fee." See Administrative Order, No. 1988-05-04-01 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 
4, 1988), available at http://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/ 
displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=1988-05-04-01 (last visited August 7, 2015).   
We acknowledge the Form 4 uses the term "stricken"—the same term that equates 
to "dismissed" under Rule 40(j).  However, while the forms are provided for in the 
Rules, see Rule 84, SCRCP, and are designed to assist courts to carry out the 
Rules, the forms themselves are not the law.  See Robinson, 751 F. Supp. at 105 
(stating "this court would be remiss if we allowed administrative laws . . . to dictate 
important procedural rights").   
It is also important to note that striking a case pursuant to Rule 40(j) may be done 
only by consent. See Rule 40(j), SCRCP (providing the party asserting a claim 
may strike it only when "all parties adverse to that claim . . . agree in writing that it 
may be stricken"). To the contrary, many cases are stricken due to bankruptcy 
whether the parties consent or not. In this case, for example, the record contains 
no indication the case was stricken with the consent of the Goodwins or Owenses.  
In fact, it appears the circuit court entered the order striking the case on its own 
initiative, with no prior notice to the parties.7  To consider the striking of this 
case—or any case where the automatic stay applies—as a dismissal without the 
consent of the party making the claim would conflict with Rule 41(b), SCRCP, 
which provides limited circumstances in which an action may be dismissed 
involuntarily.8 
7 The only motion in our record that mentions South Bay's bankruptcy is South 
Bay's motion for a continuance, which recites the "consent of all parties."  
However, the motion does not request striking the action.  In the Goodwins' and 
Owenses' Rule 59(e) motion, they indicate they did not consent to striking the case, 
stating, "The case was struck either at the request of South Bay . . . or on the 
Court's own initiative."   
8 See also Rule 79(f), SCRCP ("No action listed in the file book . . . shall be . . . 
stricken . . . unless and until: (1) plaintiff shall file and serve a notice . . . or 
stipulation of dismissal . . . ; or (2) counsel . . . have prepared and filed an order . . . 
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For these reasons, we find the tolling provision of Rule 40(j) is irrelevant in a case 
stricken due to bankruptcy.
III. Conclusion 
We REVERSE the denial of the Goodwins' and Owenses' motion to restore the 
case and REMAND for further proceedings.  Because our resolution of the issues 
discussed above is dispositive of the appeal, we do not address the Goodwins' and 
Owenses' remaining arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, 
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (An "appellate court need not 
address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive").   
HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
bearing the written consent of all interested parties . . . ; or (3) dismissal is ordered 
by the court."). None of those events occurred in this case. 
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